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3Abstract
In 1800 the writer Heinrich von Kleist observed that an arch remains standing 
because its stones all want to collapse at the same time. Rather than being an 
empirical observation, Kleist’s proposition of the collapsing arch as a material 
object made from cut stone which constructs space, inadvertently became a 
poetic, and a trope for his later work as it contained the possibility of its own 
disruption and demise. After reading Kant’s critical philosophy Kleist made a 
traumatic transition from empirical to critical thinking. Kleist represented the 
potential for collapse through the application of Kant’s premise of uncertainty 
and in the unknowability of truth.
This thesis is practice-based and interdisciplinary. Novalis’s poetic, multi-
disciplinary, experimental writing is referenced. The central inquiry theorises 
collapse, uncertainty and experimentation through philosophical, historical, 
material, architectural and conceptual thinking and in film and video making 
as experimental practice. Through making 16mm films, videos and still 
photography I explored and demonstrated collapse on the island of Portland in 
Dorset, as an uncertain landscape where quarrying and landslips have rendered 
much of the island as a space that can be viewed as one of collapse. Portland is 
a site where material histories of place and histories of material in turn can be 
traced on to the constructed, empty spaces as a disrupted landscape of collapse. 
The quality of uncertainty pervades the island.
With reference to Kant, the first chapter analyses Kleist’s letter about the 
collapsing arch as a material object and as epistolary philosophy. The second 
chapter closely examines collapse as architectural, social, material, territorial 
and spatial in two of Kleist’s stories and his compulsion towards the abyss. The 
third chapter on materiality and collapse at Portland leads back to eighteenth 
century theories of the earth, histories of geology and architecture, and the use 
of stone. In the fourth chapter the film and video as situated practice synthesize 
experimental thinking and practice as a poetic of collapse. 
The exploration and experimentation with the concept of collapse in theory and 
practice aims to demonstrate that collapse as imminence – potential and actual – 
is internal and external, and that uncertainty creates the conditions of collapse in 
time and space.
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Introduction
Ich ging an jenem Abend vor dem wichtigsten Tage meins Lebens in 
Würzburg spazieren. Als die Sonne herabsank war es mir als ob mein 
Glück unterginge. Mich schauerte wenn ich dachte, daß ich vielleicht 
von allem scheiden müßte, von allem was mir teuer ist. 
Da ging ich, in mich gekehrt, durch das gewölbte Tor sinnend zurück 
in die Stadt. Warum, dachte ich, sinkt wohl das Gewölbe nicht ein, da 
es doch keine Stütze hat? Es steht, antwortete ich, weil all Steine auf 
einmal einstürzen wollen – und ich zog aus diesem Gedanken einen 
unbeschreiblich erquickenden Trost, der mir bis zu dem entscheidenden 
Augenblicke immer mit der Hoffnung zur Seite stand, daß auch ich mich 
halten würde, wenn alles sinken läßt. 
Das, mein liebes Minchen, würde mir kein Buch gesagt haben und das 
nenne ich recht eigentlich lernen von der Natur.1 
Heinrich von Kleist Berlin 16. (und 18.) November 1800 (und Zusatz vom 30. 
Dez.) 1800
On the evening before that most important day of my life, in Würzburg, 
I went for a walk. When the sun went down, it seemed as though my 
happiness were sinking with it. I was horrified to think that I might be 
forced to part with everything, everything of importance to me. 
I was walking back to the city, lost in my own thoughts, through an 
arched gate. Why, I asked myself, does this arch not collapse, since 
after all it has no support? It remains standing, I answered, because all 
the stones tend to collapse at the same time – and from this thought I 
derived an indescribably heartening consolation, which stayed by me 
right up to the decisive moment: I too would not collapse, even if all my 
support were removed! 
That, my dear Minna, no book could have told me, and I call it a true 
lesson from nature.2
Heinrich von Kleist, Berlin 16 (and 18) November (and with addition 30 
December) 1800
1 Heinrich von Kleist, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Herausgegeben von Helmut 
Sembdner Zweiter Band, (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1985), p. 593.
2 Heinrich von Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough: Letters of Heinrich von Kleist 
with a selection of Essays and Anecdotes, trans., ed., and introduced by Philip 
B. Miller (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1982), p. 76. Letter to Wilhelmine von 
Zenge, Berlin November 16, 18, 1800. Kleist’s emphasis.
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0.1 Kleist letter, Sheet 2, page 4. 
18 November 1800, drawing added 30 December 1800.
Photograph, Jane Madsen
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1. Collapse: uncertainty and experimentation
At the turn of the eighteenth century Heinrich von Kleist (1777–1811) made the 
observation to his fiancée, Wilhelmine von Zenge, that an arch only remains 
upright because all its stones want to collapse at the same time. At first Kleist’s 
statement about the arch seems an elegantly constructed visual metaphor based 
on empirical observation; upon further scrutiny, this visualisation of the arch as 
an experimental allegory raises a series of provocative questions about collapse 
as philosophy, space, literature, material, territory, and architecture.3 These 
ideas of collapse are taken and applied to a research project where collapse as 
a concept is retrieved from Kleist’s thinking, analysed in relation to selected 
pieces of his prose and put in connection with an experimental film practice 
and the study of a site. The outcome of Kleist’s observation that the arch has 
the potential and capacity for collapse suggests the seeds of this imminent 
destruction were already planted in the knowable ground of empiricism. If 
the arch holds collapse in a state of abeyance, does it indicate an uncertain 
outcome? Does the inevitable corollary of Kleist’s visual and architectural 
image of the collapsing arch foreshadow the collapse of the certainties of 
empiricism?
The idea of collapse suggests a way of looking, thinking, reading and 
experimenting conditioned by uncertainty and by time and space. Kleist’s 
speculation about the possible fate of the arch underpins the following inquiries 
here about the arch as image, object and architecture, geometries of space, 
threshold and container, the material and materiality of the stones from 
which it is built, the possibility and uncertainty of vertical and horizontal 
collapse. The arch is made of parts, of separate elements; it is a whole that does 
not identify its potential to fragment, or to become fragments. Given these 
circumstances, I have considered what collapse might look like and how it 
may be viewed. The questions that have determined this research project have 
been: how could collapse be represented in practice? How could film and video 
practice experiment with uncertainty and express the potential of collapse? 
The research has taken Kleist’s thinking about the image, object and concept 
of the arch to engage with and permeate experiments in material film, video, 
still photography and animation for exhibition as an installation embodying 
uncertainty and collapse.
3 I first encountered Kleist’s arch metaphor paraphrased in Heinrich von Kleist: 
Selected Writings, ed. and trans. by David Constantine (London: J.M. Dent, 
1997), p. xxi. Constantine refers to this quote and mentions Kleist’s drawing 
of the arch. This motivated me to find the Kleist’s exact piece of writing and 
the drawing. This quote was also used in Selected Prose Heinrich von Kleist, 
selected, trans. by Peter Worstman (New York: Archipelago Books, 2010), p. 
275. Worstman’s afterword ‘All Fall Down: The House of Cards of Heinrich von 
Kleist’ pp. 275–88 is a generalized, biographical background to Kleist.
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Collapse is a concept that concerns uncertainty, of what may happen 
imminently or what is in the process of happening as an event in time; it 
concerns the material disaster and the internal state of being that can only be 
described with reference to external phenomena. In this study uncertainty is the 
pre-condition of collapse. By maintaining a connection to Kleist’s statement, 
the continuous referent in this thesis is that collapse may not yet have 
happened, but collapse might occur at any moment, and it will be –  as Kleist 
said about the stones of the arch – collapse at the same time. This occurrence 
in time is the quality of imminence, and is inhabited by uncertainty. Kleist’s 
construction of the arch went beyond the implications of empirical observation: 
he intuitively and inadvertently created and constructed an experimental poesis 
or collapse as a poetic. Experimentation, what it is to be experimental, and 
ways of experimenting has created the means of exploring and testing the 
thinking of collapse and uncertainty in this research. 
This thesis builds a concept of collapse – it is constructed, demonstrated, 
viewed, found, and made as a philosophical and material poetic. Kleist 
created the image of the arch as a compelling poetic of collapse; he inhabited 
the uncertainty of collapse. Kleist’s image of the arch that remains standing 
because the stones constructing it want to collapse holds many questions 
for architecture, including that collapse is inherent to the construction of an 
arch, that the mechanism of the arch is an effective engineering structure for 
addressing the downward thrust of the stones. This pressure on the material 
object of the arch as an impetus for collapse is dynamic and holds collapse in 
abeyance. The arch as an architectural construction creates space, makes a void 
and builds a threshold; it is space that can be traversed, it creates a temporal 
relationship with the observer and user. 
This concept of collapse is demonstrated through interdisciplinary experiments 
in philosophy, materiality, space, place and site, and brought together as a 
whole in experimental film, video and photographic installation. The research 
draws on the disciplines and practices of literature, philosophy, architecture, 
history, geology, geography, art history, film theory and filmmaking, but 
does not place one above the other, nor claims total identification with one 
discipline, but experiments with what can be learned from interdisciplinary 
thinking. Novalis’s experimental Romantic Encyclopaedia suggested the 
structure and organisation of ideas in this thesis where philosophy, poetics 
and science are arranged non-hierarchically. The main areas of inquiry are 
collapse, uncertainty and experimentation; they form a triangle4 with collapse 
as the fixed point at the apex, and uncertainty and experimentation completing 
4 This should be considered as spatial triangulation, rather than the term 
in social sciences where triangulation is meant as two (or more) methods  
deployed to test research areas.
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the triangle’s remaining points, informing, providing and constructing a 
methodology for thinking about collapse.
Uncertainty: What can we know?
Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) turn from natural to critical philosophy is 
central to the development of thought from the middle of the eighteenth 
century. The progression and process of Kant’s thinking is of significance for 
the manner in which it laid the foundation of modern thought and philosophy. 
The rapid expansion of German philosophy was the atmosphere of the last 
two decades of the eighteenth and the first two of the nineteenth centuries 
– this was the air Kleist breathed. After reading Kant, Kleist dismantled his 
previously held beliefs concerning empiricism, where truth was demonstrable 
through meticulous analysis of observed reality. The idea of uncertainty 
became a means of identifying the loss of empiricism and questioning certainty. 
Kant had already begun to explore the pre-condition for the transition to 
critical thinking in his 1764 essay ‘Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the 
Principles of Natural Theology and Morality’5 where questions of certainty are 
the prime consideration. The collapse of certainty is a compelling marker for 
the change of thinking in the latter part of the eighteenth century, as it defines 
the terms of what is knowable and what is knowledge; that the individual can 
only be sure of what they alone can see, or what is graspable by their own 
thinking; this led to the construction of the modern subject.
The discussion of Kant’s work does not appear in chronological order in this 
thesis, but rather in the way that it had an effect on Kleist. Previously for Kleist 
the accumulation of truth was perfectible and had the potential to lead to a 
state of purity as a kind of semi-secularized endeavour. Even though there is 
no definite sense as to which of Kant’s critical works he read, it is clear that 
Kleist was an attentive and careful reader who understood the implications 
of what he was reading. After reading Kant’s Critique, Kleist’s empiricism 
collapsed and his interior world imploded; it was an inner collapse, which he 
could neither refute nor retreat from, since he could not un-know or un-learn 
this new knowledge. The unravelling of certainty for Kleist caused him great 
anguish, and created the conditions under which the artist was formed. Kleist 
enacted that uncertainty throughout his literary oeuvre. His ominous and 
uneasy late essay Über das Marionettentheater (On the Marionette Theatre) 
(1810),6 written less than a year before his death, showed that Kleist continued 
5 Kant, ‘Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural 
Theology and Morality’ 1764, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770, trans. by 
David Walford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992), pp. 243–86.
6 This tends to be translated as ‘On the Puppet Theatre’, by Philip B. Miller 
in, An Abyss Deep Enough, pp. 211–16, and David Constantine, ‘The Puppet 
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to scrutinize concepts of uncertainty, knowledge and knowingness and is an 
exploration of Kant’s question of what is knowable.7 
The construction and concept of the modern subject emerging from Kant’s 
Critiques was both problematic and productive. Kant’s conception questions 
what is knowable, and shows that certainty cannot stand up to the scrutiny 
of absolutes. This was explored in different ways. In his critical and schematic 
study of Johann Fichte (1762–1814), Novalis’s (Friedrich von Hardenberg) 
(1772–1801) commentary revises ideas concerning the modern subject, 
especially represented in the concept of ‘I’ and ‘Not–I’.8 Subsequent to his 
encounter with Kant’s Critique, Kleist constructed an analogy showing how 
someone can only really know the truth of what they see themselves, likening 
it to wearing green glasses,9 but that if the rest of the world were not wearing 
such glasses what would they see or know? As such, this perspective works 
against and undermines a universalizing notion of truth, making it relative and 
uncertain. 
Uncertainty: history and the earth
The histories explored in this thesis form a lateral interdisciplinary web as 
philosophy, literature, architecture, materiality, geology, spatial thinking and 
film practices. The collapse of certainty occurred when the continent of Europe 
was refashioned through the political events of war, revolution, crumbling 
regimes and social upheaval, and also by the profound changes in philosophical 
thought marked by the publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in 
1781. Kleist’s dates, 1777–1811, coincide with this history, and Kleist’s life is 
completely contained in this period of war and uncertainty. The turmoil of 
these times created the conditions for change and it is possible to recognize 
the origins of European thinking in the present. In 1800 Kleist invoked the 
metaphor about the imminent collapse of the arch, which became an expression 
of uncertainty. This study originates from that history and the space made by 
the experiment that he had not intended to make. 
Theatre’, in Selected Writings: Heinrich von Kleist, pp. 411–16. The use of 
the generalized word puppet rather than marionette is unfortunate, because 
marionette tends to be understood as the string puppet with jointed arms and 
legs animated and operated from above by the puppeteer.
7 See Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, pp. 211–16, Constantine pp. 411–16. The 
essay Über das Marionetten Theatre was first published in four instalments 
from 12 to 15 December 1810 in the daily Berliner Abendblätter. Kleist was 
editor from 1810–11; it was Berlin’s first daily newspaper. The Brothers Grimm 
amassed the most complete collection of it.
8 Novalis Fichte Studies, ed. and trans. Jane Kneller (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) p. 7.
9 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 95. Letter to Wilhelmine 26 March 1801.
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Kleist was a writer and dramatist who was creatively and socially located 
on the margins of the Frühromantik (Early Romantics).10 He was born in 
Frankfurt an der Oder where the Kleists were part of the Prussian Uradel 
(ancient nobility) with very longstanding connections to the region, though the 
fortunes of his part of the family were dwindling. Kleist joined the army at an 
early age and had resigned his commission by the time he was twenty-one.11 
He then studied philosophy, mathematics, economics and law in a desultory 
way and searched for a meaningful existence before becoming a writer. The 
entire output of his writing occurred in an intense period of nine years between 
1802 and his suicide in 1811. Kleist’s bleak, spare and mordant writing and his 
problematic relationship with the world are intriguingly modern. Kleist’s early 
writing appeared as letters, particularly from 1799 to 1802, traces the time 
he left the army, became a student, was engaged to Wilhelmine, and travelled 
through Europe, before acknowledging himself as a writer. The arch letter12 is 
analysed in the context of letter writing in the eighteenth century as epistolary 
empirical philosophy, as drawing and diagram and as material object and 
artefact. Kleist’s arch letter to Wilhelmine is primarily an essay on empiricism, 
and was written as part of his instruction and contribution to the expansion 
of her knowledge. Kleist discusses a series of empirical examples, gradually 
building to the arch metaphor, and concluding that his empirical examples are 
a ‘true lesson from nature.’13 Kleist’s attachment to what can be empirically 
learned from nature was an article of faith. 
Kant’s earliest writings, from 1746 to 1754, place him in the arena of natural 
philosophy. He wrote commentaries on other natural philosophers and 
mathematicians, such as Leibniz and Newton. Kant had started to write 
theories of the earth, when the shocking news of the Lisbon earthquake of 
1 November 1755 intruded upon his thoughts. The scale of devastation of a 
modern capital shocked and disturbed Europe. The outcome for Kant was 
the series of three essays written between January and April 175614 within 
a few months of the event. The impetus and solemnity of the catastrophe 
led Kant to systematically evaluate theories of earthquakes and the earth 
in these essays. One of Kant’s recurrent themes was the uncertainty of the 
foundations of the earth. Kant’s work on earthquakes did not produce wholly 
10 This group included Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg) (1772–1801), 
Johann Fichte (1762–1814), Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829), August Schlegel 
(1767–1845), Ludwig Tieck (1773–1853), E.T.A. Hoffmann (1776–1822), 
Friedrich Höldelin (1770–1843).
11 Kleist was in the army from 1792–99 and took part in the siege of Mainz in 
the spring and summer of 1793. By Heinrich von Kleist’s lifetime his family had 
produced eighteen generals and a noted poet.
12 For shorthand purposes I have referred to Kleist’s letter to Wilhelmine von 
Zenge of 16 and 18 November 1800, as the ‘arch letter’ since it is the main focus.
13 Ibid. p. 76. Kleist’s emphasis.
14 Immanuel Kant, Natural Science, ed. by Eric Watkins, trans. by Lewis White 
Beck, Jeffrey B. Edwards, Olaf Reinhardt, Martin Schönfeld and Eric Watkins, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), Chapters 6–8.
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original findings or outcomes,15 nor a viable theory as to their cause. Kant 
relied on secondary sources. However, the significance was that he developed 
methods for approaching research in the natural sciences: principally that all 
the available material on the Lisbon earthquake needed to be evaluated and 
scrutinized, especially including the accounts of survivors. Crucially, Kant 
argued that an earthquake was not the punishment of a vengeful god. Oldroyd 
and Reinhardt16 note that these essays provide important and valuable insights 
into Kant’s pre-critical thinking and writing.
Kant’s three earthquake essays show his methods in the pre-critical phase, and 
are of historical importance. I argue that Kant applied an empirical method 
to the material under scrutiny, and that he incrementally progressed from 
empirical to critical thinking. The transitional writing marking the space 
between Kant’s pre-critical thinking and the critical writing is noted with 
reference to his essay of 1763, which also returns to the theme of earthquake, 
‘The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence 
of God’.17 This study notes that Kant’s natural philosophy, in particular the 
earthquake essays, are under-investigated, especially in a cultural context, given 
also that as the first and the third of these essays were only fully translated 
into English in 2012.18 As a natural philosopher Kant did not try to amass a 
totalizing theory of the earth and earthquakes. Kant hypothesized the age of 
the earth;19 following the earthquake essays, Kant lectured on geography for 
forty years, which suggests that he continued to perceive himself as a natural 
philosopher.
The research for this thesis substantially differs from the considerable 
literature on the ruin.20 The ruin is not representative of uncertainty, but 
rather its opposite: the ruin has already happened. The main thread of the 
discussion on the ruin has been in the history and theory of architecture and 
art, especially from the eighteenth century onward, in the work of John Soane 
(1753–1837)21 who designed buildings incorporating the future ruin into the 
15 Kant’s reliance on the first-hand observations of others has been commented 
on. However, this situation remains a continuing problem since seismologists 
are very seldom on site when substantial earthquakes occur.
16 O. Reinhardt and D. R. Oldroyd, ‘Kant’s Theory of Earthquakes and 
Volcanic Action’, Annals of Science 40:3 (1983), 247–72 (p. 252)
17 Immanuel Kant, ‘The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration 
of the Existence of God’, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770, pp.107–202.
18 See Kant, Natural Science, pp. 329–36 and pp. 368–73.
19 O. Reinhardt and D. R. Oldroyd, ‘Kant’s Thoughts on the Ageing of the 
Earth’, Annals of Science 39:4 (1982), 349–69.
20 See Andreas Huyssen, ‘Authentic Ruins: Products of Modernity’, pp. 17–28 
and Alexander Reiger, ‘Foundational Ruins: The Lisbon Earthquake and the 
Sublime’, pp. 357–74, in Ruins of Modernity, ed. by Julia Hell and Andreas 
Schönle (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010)
21 See ‘A Life in Ruins’, in Jonathan Hill, Weather Architecture (London: 
Routledge, 2012), pp. 87–108.
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form and concept, in the paintings of J.M.W Turner (1775–1851)22 and Caspar 
David Friedrich (1774–1840), and in the etchings of Giovanni Battista Piranesi 
(1720–1778)23 where ruins in the landscape feature in a number of works. 
Later, the modern ruin was significant to post-World War II reconstruction 
and is acknowledged in the development of thinking and design in the Brutalist 
architecture of Alison and Peter Smithson (1928–1993 and 1923–2003).24 
Graham Sutherland (1903–1980) and John Piper (1903–1992), both of whom 
worked as official war artists, depicted ruin as the devastation of bombed cities 
at home. The World War II concrete ruin was photographed, documented and 
discussed by Paul Virillio.25 The ruin is dependent on a previous event or events; 
historically, the ruin has been observed as an aestheticized space to be looked 
at and contemplated, but one firmly located in a past that cannot be changed. 
In the ruin the dust has settled, the weeds and the moss have grown, the former 
building, bridge or construction is no longer what it was, but has become the 
aggregation and remnant of material in a new and certain form: that of the 
ruin. The contemplation of the ruin generates ruin thinking as an aesthetic.
2. Experiment: poetics
Experimental ways of thinking, writing and observing emerged during the 
latter part of the eighteenth century with the post-Kantians, particularly 
in the philosophy and the poetics of the Frühromantik through the use of 
aphorisms, axioms, anecdotes and fragments.26 The most daring of these 
emerged in Novalis’s experimental work, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: 
Das Allegemeine Brouillon (The General Notebook) (1798–99).27 This 
22 Some of this was addressed in Tate Britain’s exhibition ‘Ruin Lust’, 4 
March–18 May 2014. Ex. cat. Brian Dillon, Ruin Lust: Artists’ Fascination 
with Ruins from Turner to the Present Day, (London: Tate Publishing, 2014). 
This exhibition was not wholly successful, though the section on eighteenth-
century painting and architecture was coherent.
23 See Tarnya Cooper, ‘Forgetting Rome and the Voice of Piranesi’s “Speaking 
Ruins” ’ in Adrian Forty and Susanne Küchler, eds. The Art of Forgetting 
(Oxford: Berg, 1999)
24 See Jonathan Hill, Weather Architecture, ‘Submitting to the Seasons’, pp. 
224–52; which begins with a discussion of the Smithsons and the ruin, and 
also, ‘Ruin’ in Stephen Cairns and Jane M. Jacobs, Buildings Must Die: A 
Perverse View of Architecture (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2014), pp. 167–91.
25 Paul Virillio, Bunker Archaeology (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1994)
26 This group included Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel. Kleist’s anecdotes 
as well as his essays, shorter writings and reviews appeared in the Berliner 
Abendblätter. His anecdotes are roughly contemporary and reflected human 
fallibility during war. See for example ‘From the Last Prussian War’, which 
refers to the Battle of Jena in 1806, in An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 264–65. 
Kleist’s anecdotes were short spare pieces of prose and were significant for 
later writers such as Nietzsche; Kafka wrote an introduction when they were 
collected together and published.
27 Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon, 
trans., ed., and introduction by David Wood (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2007)
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remarkable work suggested a method of approaching the interdisciplinary 
themes in this study. The unique structure of Novalis’s unfinished Notes for a 
Romantic Encyclopaedia was built around a configuration where mathematics, 
mineralogy, natural history, physics, chemistry, medicine, science, logic, 
organology, psychology, archaeology, poetics, art, philosophy, literature, and 
many more28 including his own construction, ‘encyclopdeistics’, are organized 
and arranged as multiple, crystalline facets of knowledge interconnected and 
non-hierarchical, where each form of knowledge is given equal importance 
and status.29 This demonstrated the scope and depth of Novalis’s thinking and 
understanding; he was unusual among the Jena Romantics because he was 
qualified in engineering, science, philosophy and law. Notwithstanding its 
unfinished form, the idea of equivalence given to each subject discipline was in 
place before he stopped working on it. Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia is 
a work that is extraordinary and unclassifiable. 
Practice underpinned the whole concept of Novalis’s idea for the 
Encyclopaedia. His sense of himself as a practitioner was developed during his 
practical study of mineralogy and training as a mining engineer in the field 
alongside the study of current scientific theory at Freiberg Mining Academy. 
The link between theory and practice is also present in his experimental poetic, 
natural-philosophic novel Die Lehrlinge zu Sais (The Novices of Sais) (1797–
1800), written at Freiberg, and also unfinished. 
Novalis’s experimental, interdisciplinary approach to writing and thinking 
in the Romantic Encyclopaedia was unique, but it remained unfinished and 
many of the entries were in note form. However, this kind of interdisciplinary 
writing appearing as it did in the very last years of the eighteenth and in the 
first decade of the nineteenth centuries would be curtailed – supplanted by the 
sense of progress of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, where the 
singular expertise of professionalization emerged in precisely determined fields 
of knowledge. It was not until the aftermath of the First World War brought 
about changes to thinking and the questioning of unifying authority, that 
concepts applying interdisciplinary or trans-disciplinary approaches re-emerged 
as philosophical, literary, social, historical and cultural analysis.30 
28 Novalis listed more than one hundred and fifty disciplines or categories in 1151 entries.
29 Novalis’s Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia was informed by Denis 
Diderot’s and Jean le Rond D’Alembert’s seventeen volume Encyclopédie 
published from 1751–65, which had been considerably developed and expanded 
from an initial translation of Ephraim Chambers’s Cyclopaedia; or an 
Universal dictionary of arts and sciences 1728. The Encyclopédie constructed 
and charted universal knowledge in the arts and sciences in alphabetical 
order. Novalis’s aspiration and organization differed from these previous 
encyclopaedias because it sought to construct knowledge as non-hierarchical. 
30 To some extent this can be seen in works such as, Walter Benjamin’s The 
Arcades Project, trans. by Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, Harvard University, 2002); or more recently 
in Mieke Bal’s Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: a rough guide, (Toronto: 
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Experimentation in any field involves the risk that the experiment may go 
wrong, or produce unwanted results, may fall apart or fail. Novalis was aware 
of the conditions of experimentation, and in the Romantic Encyclopaedia he 
repeatedly questions the methods of experiment, as in the entries:
528. LOGIC ETC. Just as I must bring a general idea–an ideal schema 
of experimenting to experimenting itself–and a rough schematic 
hypothesis–so for demonstrating and ideal experimenting, I must 
also have as a basis–a rough–determinable–attractive–and objective 
schema. The subjective imagination supplies the former–the objective 
imagination the latter. A plan is a subjective schema. As the ideal and 
real experiment progresses–the schema becomes more diverse–and more 
harmoniously–determined–and conversely, with the completion and 
elevation of the schema, the experiment becomes ever clearer, of a more 
varied and higher degree. […] 
529. THEORY OF THE EXPERIMENT […] The process of 
observation is at once a subjective and objective process–both an 
ideal and real experiment. Both the proposition and product must be 
completed if it is to be truly perfect. If the observed object is already 
a proposition, and the process thoroughly conceptualized–then the 
resulting proof is the same proposition, but at a higher degree. 31 
For Novalis the terms of experimentation were under constant scrutiny. 
The schema did not seek to scatter or divide the elements or regard them 
as separated fragments, but rather that they would be arranged in dynamic 
sequential arrangements. The latter entry, 529, concerns material and chemical 
experiments; it is based both in practice and on the conceptual notions of 
experimenting and the experimental, as well as on what is ventured and 
discovered through experimentation. Central to the Romantic Encyclopaedia 
was Novalis’s recurring concept of what it was to romanticize, of how 
thought is elevated through creative processes derived from mathematics 
as ‘potentization’, or the raising to a higher degree. In entry 717, Novalis 
articulates this as:
The diversity of the methods increases–the thinker eventually knows 
how to make everything, out of each thing–the philosopher becomes 
a poet. The poet is but the highest degree of the thinker, or senser etc. 
(Degrees of a poet.) 32
University of Toronto Press, 2002)
31 Novalis Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia, p. 94. In this entry (529) 
Novalis discusses theories of experimentation with critical reference to 
Abraham Werner’s system of mineralogy classification.
32 Ibid. p. 132.
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The concept of poetics suggested by Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel (1772–
1829) characterized poetics through the concept of ‘romantische Poesie’ 
as an entire entity, not so much as the synthesis of the work of art, but the 
thinking, making and construction of the work, which Frederick Beiser notes 
returned to Aristotle’s foundation that ‘[…] poetic (poietikós) was that which 
pertains to making or creating something’.33 In the Aristotelian sense, poetics 
is presented as a skill, as tekhnê – the means, the idea and the experience of the 
construction,34 and it is this understanding and meaning of poetics that I apply 
throughout this thesis.35 
Kleist was on the margins of Romanticism, especially of the Frühromantik (Early 
Romantic) period from about 1794 to 180836 both intellectually and personally. 
Poetics was not a concept that Kleist acknowledged, though he would have 
been aware of the ideas of poesie through his knowledge of Novalis’s published 
and unpublished writings. In general, Kleist37 is either erroneously linked to the 
previous generation of Sturm und Drang writers, active from the mid-1760s to the 
end of the 1770s, or with the Frühromantik.38 However, neither of these categories 
defines Kleist’s writing. In addition, his work does not correspond to the classicism 
of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) or Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), 
although some of his plays were set in antiquity; for example, in Penthesilea (1807), 
33 Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: the Concept of Early German 
Romanticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 16.
34 See: Aristotle, Poetics (London: Penguin, 1996), and, Aristotle, The 
Metaphysics, trans. and introduced Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin, 
2004), Book Alpha I, pp. 4–6.
35 For example the contemporary use and understanding of poetics, especially as 
it is analysed and applied in the field of semiotics and structural linguistics, while 
an area of considerable scholarship, would not be effective here. These themes are 
explored by Umberto Eco in ‘Analysis of Poetic Language’ and ‘The Poetics of the 
Open Work’ in The Open Work, trans. Anna Cancogni (London: Hutchinson 
Radius, 1989), Tzvetan Todorov in Introduction to Poetics (Brighton: Harvester, 
1981), Kristen Kreider in Poetics + Place: The Architecture of Sign, Subjects + Site 
(London: I.B.Tauris, 2014), and in Roland Barthes The Pleasure of the Text, trans. 
Richard Miller (New York: Hill and Wang, 1975) where Barthes plays with the 
pleasure of literary form of prose and the novel in a poetic way.
36 Manfred Frank suggests these dates in The Philosophical Foundations of 
Early German Romanticism, trans. and introduced by Elizabeth Millán- 
Zaibert (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), p. ix.
37 Kleist is not well known outside of German language readership. The 
prestigious literary award, the ‘Kleist prize’ commenced on the centenary of his 
death; recipients have included Bertholt Brecht and Alexander Kluge.
38 There is much that differentiates Kleist from Romanticism – he is less concerned 
with questions of being and is also not concerned with the representation and 
power of aesthetics and allegory; there is no connection to Fichte’s reconfiguration 
of Kant and little direct inquiry into the modern subject – all of which were of 
importance to Frühromantik. Kleist diverges from Friedrich Schlegel’s position on 
poetry and poesis as a totality of thought, culture and construction presented in 
Athenäumsfragment 116; in J.M. Bernstein, ed. Classic and Romantic German 
Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 249–50. See also: 
Manfred Frank, The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism; 
and, Frederick C. Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: the Concept of Early German 
Romanticism.
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Der zerbrochene Krug (The Broken Jug) (1808) and Amphiriton (1807) Kleist 
subverted the classicism of Goethe and Schiller. Though Kleist is better known as 
a playwright, the stories and novellas were spare and experimental and dealt with 
difficult subjects, which further placed him on the literary margins.
Experiment: practice[s]
Embarking on a thesis located in the territory of practice-based research 
has necessitated questioning, engaging and experimenting with it as a form; 
consequently, practice resists accepted orthodoxies of research. This finds 
correspondence with Ruiz’s comments in The Poetics of Cinema (1995) 
about how avant-garde film, artists’ film or experimental film are constantly              
[re]inventing the form, that his interest lay ‘[…] in films, which wherever they 
occur, are in some sense unique’.39 
The aim to find and demonstrate a visual equivalent of the concept of collapse 
was key to this research. This led to recalling a visit to the island of Portland on 
Dorset’s Jurassic coast in 1999. What was so striking about Portland is that it 
is a material and visual manifestation of disruption and collapse. At Portland, 
collapse is integral to the outward appearance of the landscape and is embedded 
in the geomorphology of its limestone. Portland is not an aestheticized place 
for looking at past events, but is the continuing collapse of more than three 
centuries of quarrying, as well as coastal collapse occurring over millennia. 
Portland’s landscape is a constructed environment that can be read visually and 
architecturally. Developed as situated research and practice,40 analogue film 
was shot on the island; it experimented with the surface of stone and film as 
material. During this research I encountered the work Robert Smithson made at 
Portland and Chesil Beach in 1969, which was part of his Mirror Displacement 
series.41 Smithson’s writings about materiality and landscape were of considerable 
39 Raúl Ruiz, Poetics of Cinema (Paris, Éditions Dis Voir, 1995) p. 77; also see ‘For 
a Shamanic Cinema’ pp.73–90, where he further elaborates ‘one-of-a-kind-cinema.’
40 The term ‘situated’ research and practice derives from two intersecting sources: 
firstly fine art, especially when sculptors moved their practices out of the studio 
making work as ‘site-specific’, where the artwork is either made, installed or 
located in one place, or working serially in similar places, such as Richard Long 
and Robert Smithson; and secondly, from filmmakers who worked with a poetic 
sense of place, such as Jonas Mekas, Margaret Tait, and Chris Welsby; and 
also in expanded cinema where experimental filmmakers broke out of the two 
dimensionality of the cinema screen through performance and the installation 
of film in galleries. See: Nick Kaye, Site Specific Art: Performance, Place and 
Documentation (London: Routledege, 2007), Miwon Kwon, One Place after 
Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2004), Gene Youngblood, Expanded Cinema (New York: Dutton, 1970), A.L. 
Rees, Dave Curtis, Duncan White, Steven Ball eds., Expanded Cinema: art, 
performance, film (Tate Publications: London, 2011).
41 See: Robert Smithson, ‘Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan’ written for 
Artforum (September 1969). Published as photographs and essay. Reprinted 
in Robert Smithson, Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, ed. by Jack 
Flam (Berkley: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 119–33. The mirror 
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interest;42 I was especially fascinated by his interest in quarries, which suggested 
ways of looking at the space of quarries as post-industrial sites appropriate to the 
context of collapse. 
Tracing the use of stone for architecture led back to the materiality of the stones 
used to construct Kleist’s arch; the latter was possibly made from stone similar 
to the limestone at Portland. The stones of Kleist’s unknown arch, which stood 
somewhere in Berlin, were probably quarried in Germany. The arch would have 
been very difficult to identify and in all likelihood it may have been demolished 
or had collapsed long ago. Following the use and application of natural scientific 
knowledge drawn from elsewhere by Kant and Novalis, the knowledge gained 
from the material, architectural, geological and scientific histories of Portland 
stone has been transported and connected to the thinking in natural philosophy 
from late eighteenth-century Germany 
The concept of collapse is explored and shown in experimental practices of 
moving image using 16mm film and digital video, stills and animation as visual 
poetics, all demonstrated by situating and focussing the practice at Portland. 
Collapse is also shown in the videos made at the sites of Kleist’s birth and death. 
Film and video is used to explore these landscapes as spatialized collapse. Time 
and space are constructed through moving image as a poetics of collapse. These 
spaces of absence are contemplated and given visual form in films, videos and 
installation. The 16mm films made at Portland explore collapse as a visual poetic 
through the transience of film and its disappearance as a collapsing technology. 
But what of the process of making itself? This is explored through filming the 
quarries as contemplative voids carved into the landscape, and the cliff faces 
as sites of potential collapse. The spaces of the quarries are built environments 
that construct emptiness. This is a material and tangible application of collapse 
in space and time derived from Kant, reached through Kleist’s identification of 
collapse, and particularly the concept of uncertainty: Portland’s industrialized 
landscape, scarred from the effects of quarrying, is an uncertain place. It is 
impossible to return to the same island, as each time it has been changed by 
quarrying and taking away its stone, as well as through the collapse of its cliffs. 
In his novel about the island, The Well-Beloved: A Sketch Temperament (1898), 
Thomas Hardy asked if the island could be eaten all away.43 The connection of 
piece from Portland was included in the exhibition Prospect 69 held from 
30 September to 12 October, in Dusseldorf, at the Städtische Kusthalle. The 
work Smithson did during his short visit to England and Wales in 1969 is 
intriguing, however I have not undertaken a substantial interaction with it in 
the experimental film practice in this thesis. Even if I had wanted to engage 
with these works, it would have been difficult to make effective experimental 
film work using mirrors, since by the end of the 1970s experimental filmmakers 
in Britain and America had already overused mirrors.
42 Smithson, Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings.
43  Hardy, The Well-Beloved: A Sketch of Temperament (London: Everyman, 1997)
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space and place are important to practice and to thinking about collapse as a 
situated filmic inquiry. The work and practice of making space will be further 
discussed by turning to Edward Casey’s The Fate of Place (1997)44 through the 
concept of the container and the limit. 
Experiment: situating practice
The legacy of three tendencies of experimental and avant-garde film informed 
my practice. Firstly, the experimental films made by artists and poets from 
the late 1940s to 1970s: Jonas Mekas, Joseph Cornell, Andy Warhol, Stan 
Brakhage, Maya Deren, Kenneth Anger, Margaret Tait and Chris Welsby. 
The poetics of place is ingrained in the work of Cornell, Mekas and Welsby; 
Cornell collected film material by sending filmmakers out to film for him 
and Mekas made the work by taking the camera out and allowing the 
situation encountered to determine what was filmed, whilst Welsby worked 
with landscape and time. Most of these filmmakers used a Bolex, the Swiss 
clockwork 16mm camera that was the cornerstone of experimental film at the 
New York Filmmakers Co-Operative, London Filmmakers Co-Operative and 
elsewhere. Secondly, in the legacy of the radical European film movements 
particularly of the New German Cinema including such filmmakers as 
Alexander Kluge, Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle Huillet.45 Thirdly, in the 
poetic and experimental documentaries of the GPO and Crown film units of 
the 1930s and 1940s, particularly those by Humphrey Jennings and Len Lye, 
and in the political essay documentaries of the British film workshop movement 
of the 1970s and 1980s. The majority of this work is linked by a common 
thread of exploring the visual language of experimental film as one of poetics 
and politics. The key text that discussed experimental film as art by bringing 
together the avant-gardes of early European Dada and Surrealist cinema with 
post-war American experimental film, and began the debate on structural film, 
was P. Adams Sitney’s Visionary Film (1974).46 The term ‘experimental film’ 
44 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place (Berkley: University of California Press, 1997)
45 The number adaptations of Kleist’s stories and plays, especially those made 
by New German Cinema film directors, show the continuation of Kleist’s 
experimental legacy. For example, Hans Jurgen Syberberg San Domingo 
(1972), Penthesilea (1988), Die Marquise von O– (1989), and Die Nacht (1985) 
(installation including readings from Kleist and the Early Romantics) and 
from other European art cinemas, Laura Mulvey and Peter Wollen Penthesilea 
(1974), Éric Rohmer The Marquise of O (1976), Catherine de Heilbronn (1980).
46 P. Adams Sitney, Visionary Film: The American Avant-Garde (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1974). Other important texts were, Lenny Lipton, 
Independent Filmmaking, introduced by Stan Brakhage (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1972), which was the handbook for experimental filmmakers; and 
the exhibition catalogue, Film as Film: formal experiment in film 1910–1975, 
(Arts Council of Great Britain: Hayward Gallery, South Bank, London, SE1. 
3 May–17 June 1979). Journals have always been important to this field, 
especially: Framework 1974–92, initially published from Warwick University, 
later University of East Anglia; also Screen 1969– to present, especially the 
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does not define a particular movement or a historical movement, but describes 
a general approach to filmmaking and is problematic, hence Sitney suggests 
that the terms ‘experimental’ and ‘film poems’ are ‘inaccurate and limiting’47 as 
are the terms ‘underground’, ‘avant-garde’ and ‘auteur’.48 
In experimental film the Bolex camera generated inconsistencies in the 
movement of the film through the camera, and made possible in-camera 
techniques such as double exposures, dissolves, fades to black or white; it 
was also used for analogue methods, such as optical printing – all of which 
created a painterly aesthetic developed from an economy of means. In all 
these processes the uncertainties of the Bolex are pushed to the limit, and the 
filmmaker courts disaster, or looks for the unexpected lucky accident. The 
visual accident is an analogue process not unique to film, and is present in 
other art forms, whether painting, print making, drawing or photography. 
In moving image the accidental cannot be programmed – the attempts to 
make filmic effects such as putting film-like scratches by programming them 
into digital video formats looks too contrived and precise. Unlike large-scale 
mainstream productions, experimental filmmakers, especially from the 1960s 
onwards, tended to have the luxury of time, even if they did not have money, 
adding to films incrementally over a long time span, or spontaneously making a 
piece in a day, or in the time it took to make a performance.49
My previous experience in film editing shaped the development of my visual 
thinking and film practice. I reflect on the work of women editors with particular 
reference to Yelizaveta Svilova (1900–1975), who edited Man with a Movie 
Camera (1929), and Danièle Huillet (1936–2006) who was principal editor of 
the films she made collaboratively with Jean-Marie Straub from 1963 to 2006. 
Eisenstein’s theories of montage are also of significance. He analysed the way 
editing gave a new thought to images ‘[…] the juxtaposition of two separate shots 
by splicing them together resembles not so much a simple sum of one shot plus 
another shot – as it does a creation.’50 The process of analogue film editing has 
its own thinking and material practice, which is distinct from digital editing. 
collections: John Ellis, ed., Screen Reader I: cinema/ideology/politics (London: 
SEFT, 1977); and Mick Eaton and Steve Neale, eds., Screen Reader II: cinema 
& semiotics, (London: SEFT, 1981). The journals specifically, by and, about 
experimental film and filmmakers were: Cantrills Filmnotes published from 
1971–2000; and Undercut from the London Filmmakers Co-Op, published in 
19 issues from 1981–90, the Special Issue on Landscape in Film, Photography 
and Video, Number 7/8 Spring (1983) was of considerable interest.
47 Sitney Visionary Film p. vii.
48 Ibid. p. viii
49 See for example, Bruce Nauman’s performance in the studio Dance or Walk 
on the Perimeter of a Square 1967, or Bas Jan Ader’s performance films, where 
he falls down into a canal, out of a tree, off a roof and so on. Bas Jan Ader later 
disappeared at sea in 1972 while trying to sail the smallest boat possible across 
the Atlantic. Ader’s oeuvre could be interpreted as demonstrating collapse. See: 
www.ubu.com/film
50 Serge Eisenstein, The Film Sense (London: Faber and Faber, 1943), p. 17.
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The practice of film editing, where the original film material generated is cut and 
assembled into the finished film work, also suggested an analogous interpretation 
to the physical process and work of the stonemason, where each stone is cut and 
prepared and made to fit the construction (of the arch) creating the final object.
The contemporary practical difficulty of confronting the end of the medium 
and material of celluloid analogue film is discussed. The meaning and scale 
of that collapse is considered, especially in the idea that film was the art form 
of the twentieth century and its materiality was part of that history. This is 
discussed with reference to Walter Benjamin’s 1936 essay ‘The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’51 and how artists’ films from the 1920s 
and 1930s may have already started to question Benjamin’s terms as to what 
mechanical reproduction might mean.
Experiment: materiality and film
As far as possible, following the example of Smithson, Mekas and Wellsby, 
I have tried to have an immersive relationship to the site, of being there and 
allowing Portland to seep into conscious and unconscious formations. In 
doing so I found more and more connections between the site and the period 
of time at the end of the eighteenth century when Kleist was writing and 
European thinking was changing. In this sense, Portland as a small island 
of approximately 4.4 square miles became a kind of situated laboratory for 
experimental thought, philosophy, history, and visual practices. Paul Carter’s 
Material Thinking (2004) identifies the questions emerging from practice; in 
particular, he analyses how material thinking is a collaboration between the 
artist and the material.52 The process of situated practice-based research at 
Portland has been the means to visualize landscape differently – it is no longer 
a lateral horizontal surface that light falls on, but is now inflected with volume, 
of what lies beneath, of geological formations, of what is stable and uncertain.
The practice comes together as an installation comprising 16mm film works, stills 
and digital video. The 16mm films are Portland Nos. 2 – 5 (North of Wallsend 
Cove to Mutton Cove, Portland Bill, West Weares, Independent Quarry, Tout 
Quarry) (2010–2012) and Off Cuts: Portland 3f. (2013). Portland Nos. 2 – 5, 
depicting cliffs and quarries, is shown on two continuously running projectors. 
The time-based medium of moving image is used to survey Portland as place and 
material inscribed by time. The installation shows technical and material images 
of the stone, the spaces left behind in the quarries, and the geology of the cracks 
51 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. and introduced by Hannah Arendt, 
trans. by Harry Zohn, (London: Fontana, 1982), pp. 219–53
52 See: Paul Carter, Material Thinking (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
2004), pp. xi, 7, 10–15.
27
in the limestone cliff faces – these are viewed as sites of imminent or potential 
collapse. In the mechanics of the film repeatedly running through the projector, 
scratches and marks appear, scarring the surface of the film, which deteriorates 
and breaks down: collapse occurs in time and in the presence of the viewer as the 
uncertainty of a vanishing and fragile medium.
Off Cuts: Portland 3f is an installation comprising 80 glass-mounted slides 
that contain three frames of 16mm film. These fragments of film are treated 
as specimens in a quasi-scientific manner: the film is mounted and preserved 
as though it were a rare example. This piece is an archive and archaeology of 
film. The 35 mm slides and projector used are material and equipment also 
in decline. This work has its origins in the editing process as it is made from 
the remnants of film, of the trims generated during editing. The projected 
slides create a monument to the collapse of celluloid film. Nicodemus Knob 
Panorama (2012/2015) comprises twenty-four 6x6 slide stills mounted between 
sheets of perspex in a light box which is another form of film projection. 
Quarrymen left the pillar of stone, known as Nicodemus Knob, in the disused 
seventeenth century Waycroft and Kingbarrow quarries in order to show how 
much stone had been quarried away. The fractured and fragmentary panorama 
represents collapse as absence. The film Das Gewölbe 1800 (The Arch 1800) 
(2012/2015) is a two minute animation based on Kleist’s pencil drawing of the 
arch.53 Kleist’s drawing of the arch is enlarged and traced on to cells, and then 
animated by filming each one a frame at a time. When projected, it creates lines 
of febrile movement because each cell is individually drawn. This movement 
of the arch drawing, which is bisected by a conceptual line, captures the 
uncertainty of imminent collapse.
Two videos were made in Germany: one in the city where Kleist was born, 
and the second at the place where he died. The use of video allowed for shots 
of a longer duration than is possible with the 16mm Bolex camera. The first 
video, Die Insel Ziegenwerder, Frankfurt an der Oder (The Goat River Island) 
2013, is five minutes in duration and was shot on a small, bleak island on the 
Oder, is a reflection on Kleist’s restless wandering. The only sound is that of 
the atmosphere of the river and footsteps. The second video, Kleist Grabe, 
Kleiner Wansee (Kleist Grave, Lesser Wansee) (2013), is four minutes in 
duration and documents the grave of Henrich von Kleist and Henriette Vogel 
at Kleine Wansee. This is the same place where they died in a suicide pact 
on 21 November 1811. It is raining, the sound of the raindrops adds to the 
melancholy atmosphere at the place of Kleist’s final collapse. The voice-over 
is from Ferdinand Grimm’s writing about visiting and tending Kleist’s grave. 
These videos experiment with Kleist’s wavering spirit and the sense of the abyss 
as spatialized collapse.
53 Added: 30 December 1800, letter to Wilhelmine 16 and 18 November 1800.
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3. Forms of Collapse 
Collapse as imminent possibility, event, and material disaster occurring in 
time and space is the central theme and determining concept of this thesis. 
Uncertainty and experimentation are established as the means of exploring 
and elaborating a concept of collapse. The forms of collapse identified 
and worked with are philosophical, spatial and material; form is intended 
and meant throughout as both as a typology and, significantly, in its fine 
art and film applications through material construction and destruction, 
drawing, thinking and experimentation. These forms occur as: the collapse 
of certainty after Kleist read Kant’s Critique; literary collapse as the failure 
of Kleist’s lebensplan and as the determination to become a writer; material 
collapse and architecture, not just as the possible collapse of the arch itself 
but in the disastrous collapse of a city following an earthquake, explored in 
Kleist’s experiments with Kantian thinking represented in Erdbeben in Chili 
(Earthquake in Chili) (1807) and in the geography of horizontal collapse as 
disputed territory in the novella Michael Kohlhaas (1808 and 1810), the spatial 
and abyssal collapse of Kleist’s early death; and as material and temporal 
collapse represented and demonstrated through located film practice and stills 
in the quarries and landscape of Portland, in videos of German landscape, and 
an animation of the image of the arch, all of which are brought together as an 
installation contemplating collapse. 
Collapse: spatial geometry
The space constructed by the arch, which may imminently collapse, 
suggested an interpretation of the geometry of the arch. In the absence of 
knowing precisely which of Kant’s writings Kleist read, I have focused on the 
‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ in the Critique of Pure Reason,54 and argue that the 
themes of time and space are appropriate to an analysis of the Kleist’s metaphor 
and drawing of the arch. The idea of the imminence of collapse, not only of 
the arch, is also explored as uncertainty. While the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ 
in the Critique of Pure Reason is out of chronological order in terms of Kant’s 
writing, the analysis followed the order suggested in Kleist’s letter where the 
arch metaphor was proposed.
The secondary philosophy sources referred to give further historical, 
philosophical and cultural context to Kant and Kleist. I have referred to 
Nietzsche’s critique of Kant in relation to Kleist. With reference to the geometry 
of space and the arch I consider Giorgio Agamben’s very short piece on the 
54 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by Paul Guyer and 
Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)
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threshold,55 which questions and responds to Kant’s thoughts on the limit 
(Schranke) and threshold (Grenze). Edward Casey’s56 theories of place and the 
geometries of space, boundary and limit were relevant to the analysis of the 
geometries suggested by the space of the arch. Kleist’s recurrent motif of the 
abyss has been analysed as a concept of definite and indefinite space, of an 
uncertain container, and one deeply connected to and demarcating spatialized 
collapse. 
Collapse: foundational
Two of Kleist’s prose works, Das Erdbeben in Chili and Michael Kohlhaas, are 
analysed as representing and experimenting with collapse. In these stories the 
foundations of the world his characters stand on are shown to be uncertain and 
capable of collapse. These two stories were drawn from real historical events; 
they have the matter-of-fact quality of anecdote and Kleist documents the 
collapse and death of his main characters in a mordant and experimental way, 
where collapse is the inexorable conclusion of external events.57 
The historic catastrophe of the Lisbon earthquake in 1755, when a 
contemporary, rich European capital collapsed in moments, was a decisive 
harbinger for the beginning of a period of terrible uncertainty that ultimately 
transformed Europe. During the period from 1755 until Kleist’s death in 1811 
Europe was beset with uncertainty. Kant’s earthquake essays are discussed 
in detail in connection to Kleist’s Das Erdebeben in Chili, written in 1807. 
Even though Das Erdbeben in Chili was written fifty years after the Lisbon 
earthquake, it is intriguing that Kleist chose to return to it. This story 
investigates the lead-up and outcome of the vertical collapse of a city following 
earthquake and the collapse of architecture, social order, and morality, as well 
as the consequences for the life and death of two individuals.
The concept of collapse – spatial, geographical and horizontal – is analysed 
in Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas. The collapse represented in this 181058 novella 
is temporal and horizontal and happens when the eponymous character 
traverses a previously unregulated border between two states, Brandenburg 
and Saxony, where the imposition of unfairly and arbitrarily applied law causes 
the circumstances for Kohlhaas’s political and personal collapse. The novella 
55 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt, Theory out 
of Bounds, Volume 1 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003) p. 67–68.
56 Casey, The Fate of Place, p. 63.
57 This is different to the swooning collapse in his best-known novella, Die 
Marquise von O– (1808), in which collapse is apparently internal and subjective 
but is actually based on secrets, duplicity and concealment. 
58 Kleist wrote Michael Kohlhaas 1808 then revised it, adding a different ending in 1810.
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is an exploration of uncertainty, as opposed to the interior, subjective state 
of Kohlhaas’s being. The terrain becomes the cause and the object of dispute, 
and I analyse this with reference to Kant’s writing on geography, published in 
revised translations in Kant Natural Science (2012)59 and with reference to its 
later interpretation in the secondary literature of Stuart Elden and Eduardo 
Mendieta’s Reading Kant’s Geography (2011).60 The history of territory as 
a legal and politicized terrain is analysed with reference to Elden’s Birth of 
Territory (2013)61 a historical account of the rise of law over land and territory. 
Philosophies of space and place as horizontal terrain and bounded containers 
are discussed in conjunction with Casey’s62 theories of boundary and limit; 
and Jeff Malpas and Karsten Thiel63 confirmed concepts of place, space, and 
topology in Kant’s ideas on geography. The spatialized contestation of terrain 
in Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas also involved considering Kant’s political writing 
and the contemporary response by Friedrich Schlegel, as well as referencing 
Michel Foucault on geography and politics.64
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s construction of the concept of the ‘war 
machine’65 referred to Michael Kohlhaas and Kleist. The ‘war machine’ is 
a broad philosophical and poetic concept about war as the function and 
representation of state apparatus as it grinds itself out over a non-defined 
horizontal plane. The ‘war machine’ appears to offer much to the study of 
Kleist’s narrative themes, but it is overwrought and the interpretive depth 
this powerful image promises is compromised – since during Kleist’s entire 
(short) writing career there was no other reality than a time of war. Other 
apparently Kleistian thinking was suggested by such references as Maurice 
Blanchot’s Writing the Disaster (1995), but its circularity and sense of looking 
at the disaster after it had occurred brought Blanchot’s ideas of the disaster 
closer to the ruin than the imminence of collapse, where collapse occurs as 
spatial, temporal, visual and material. Later writers and philosophers wrote 
about Kleist: Nietzsche, Benjamin, Kafka and Robert Walser.66 Contemporary 
59 Ibid. pp. ‘Physical Geography’, pp. 439–682.
60 Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta, eds., Reading Kant’s Geography 
(Albany: State University of New York, 2011)
61 Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013)
62 Casey, The Fate of Place, p. 63.
63 Jeff Malpas and Karsten Thiel, ‘Kant’s Geography of Reason’ in Elden and 
Mendita Reading Kant’s Geography, pp. 195–214 (pp. 206–10).
64 See: Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden, eds., Space, Knowledge and 
Power: Foucault and Geography (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); and Michel 
Foucault, ‘Course Summary’, in “Society Must be Defended”: Lectures at the 
Collège de France 1975–76, trans. by David Macey (London: Penguin Books, 
2004), Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings, ed. by Hans Reiss. trans. by 
H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Frederick 
C. Beiser, ed., The Early Political Writings of the German Romanitcs, trans. 
Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
65 See Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1994), pp. 351–56.
66 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ed. by Daniel Breazeale, trans. by 
R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
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scholars on Kleist tend to be located in the field of ‘Germanistik’67 where there 
is a particular focus on and fascination with the violence in his writing, but 
little from the interdisciplinary perspectives of philosophy and history and 
material practices proposed throughout this study.
Collapse: material and geological 
Collapse as a material concept is suggested by Kleist’s deliberation on the stones 
of the arch and what may befall them when they collapse at the same time. The 
visual and conceptual perspective of collapse is considered through natural 
philosophy,68 theories of the earth, geography and early concepts of geology, 
where the subterranean foundations are uncertain. This inquiry experiments 
with fragments from the history of geology in order to consider collapse as 
something beyond the histories suggested by the mid- to late eighteenth century 
– as uncertain layers of material existing in time. Experimenting with the 
limestone at Portland and understanding its significance to eighteenth-century 
studies of geology found a compelling concurrence and correspondence with 
the material, geological, literary and philosophical histories of eighteenth-
century Germany: for example, mineral collecting was a passion for Goethe, 
who spent a fortune amassing his collection of 18,000 specimens; Abraham 
Werner of the Freiberg Mining Academy also had a comparable collection. 
Werner searched for a way of cataloguing mineralogy. Novalis was critical of 
Werner’s mineralogical taxonomy in Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia.69 
The seventeenth-century scientist, architect and polymath Robert Hooke links 
Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings Volume 2, 1927–1934, trans. by Rodney 
Livingstone and others, ed. by Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland and Gary 
Smith (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, Harvard University, 1999), Franz 
Kafka, Letters to Felice, eds. Erich Heller and Jürgen Born, trans. by James 
Stern and Elisabeth Duckworth (New York: Schocken Books, 1973), Robert 
Walser, Selected Stories, trans. Christopher Middleton and others (New York: 
Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2012).
67 ‘Germanistik’ the German term for German studies, including literature and 
language. For example see Luanne Frank, ‘No way out: Heinrich von Kleist’s 
Erdbeben in Chile’; in The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755: Representations and 
Reactions, ed. by Theodore Braun and John Radner, Studies on Voltaire and the 
Eighteenth Century, Vol. 2 (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 2005), p. 267.
68 Throughout this thesis I have preferred the term ‘natural philosophy’ to 
natural science since in English ‘science’ is a much later term, also Kant 
described himself as a natural philosopher, though ‘Wissenschaft’ in 
German does mean natural science and consequently many translators opt 
for that. Further, according to Catherine Plant (Teaching Fellow German/ 
EAP, UCL Centre for Languages and International Education CLIE) ‘the 
Wahrig Deutsches Wörterbuch gives the meaning as (I translate) an “ordered, 
coherent and logically structured field of insights/knowledge”. Science is often 
also used contrastively with regard to the arts, and religion or belief/faith. 
Naturwissenschaft was added later to indicate the natural sciences, as opposed 
to just science, i.e. anything that was deducted from experiments, observation, 
proofs etc., so the word wissenschaftlich is often used to mean academic as 
well as scientific.’ [Email to author: 11 June 2013]
69 Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon, p. 95
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the material of Portland stone to fossils and geology, and to architecture and 
engineering. Hooke’s ideas were crucial for the later development of James 
Hutton’s theories.70 Credited with with establishing geology as a discipline, 
Hutton published his first geological observations in 1785 as Theory of the 
Earth,71 where he identified geological time as layers that were incrementally 
formed and breached over vast periods. Later theories of the earth took up 
themes of collapse in a different way – Georges Cuvier, the French comparative 
anatomist, advanced the theory of catastrophism in his 1812 theory of the 
earth; his study of fossils was the first to theorize a concept of extinction.
The key texts for considering the geological as an experimental poetic of 
collapse are Novalis’s Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia, and Die Lehrlinge 
zu Sais (The Novices of Sais), the writings of the quarryman and self-taught 
geologist Hugh Miller (1802–1856), and Jacquetta Hawkes’s (1910–1996) 
cultural archaeology, A Land (1951), which portrayed Britain’s geology as an 
experimental poetic. She identifies stone as an enduring material of continuity 
and locates questions of geology and the perception of time. But there is a 
paradox in this continuity: that of the geological formations of the earth having 
been forged in collapse, disaster and upheaval, even if they took place over vast 
millennia. Hawkes formed her ideas during World War II, a time of uncertainty 
and large-scale human misery, when attachment to the land emerged from 
social and collective need. Material histories are considered in Adrian Stokes’s 
writings on limestone and later in Alberto Perez-Gomez’s Architecture and the 
Crisis of Modern Science (1983), in Bernard Stiegler’s concept of the tekhneˉ in 
Technics and Time I (1998), and in Paul Carter’s Material Thinking (2004).
The volume and density of Portland stone is collapse made material: it is a fine 
limestone made of oolites – microscopic shells – formed in layers over millennia as 
they collapsed and died in the abundance of the warm seas of the Jurrasic period 
some 70 million years ago. This is most graphic in the top or roach layer of Portland 
stone, where the fossilized bivalves and twisted shells Aptyxiella portlandica 
‘Portland screw’ can be seen – these dead creatures are the material itself, death as 
stone. 
William Smith made the world’s first geological map, which started from 
observing the fossil material contained in the strata while working as a 
surveyor and engineer building canals in the West Country. Smith amassed a 
large collection of fossils and catalogued them as evidence for mapping Britain’s 
geological strata. The fossil collectors, Mary Anning, William Smith, and 
the quarryman and self-taught geologist, Hugh Miller, made contributions to 
70 Ellen Tan Drake, Restless Genius: Robert Hooke and his Earthly Thoughts 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
71 This was predated by the novelist and playwright, Oliver Goldsmith’s 8 
volume: An History of the Earth, and Animated Nature, 1774.
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geology through their practical work on site in the field.
The specific nature of coastal collapse on Portland is the consideration of 
the work of Brundsen, Coombe, Goudie, and Parker in their 1996 study 
‘The structural morphology of the Isle of Portland, southern England,’72 
which discusses how the distinctive qualities of limestone create conditions 
for collapse. In the cliffs at Portland, coastal collapse is the most frequent in 
Britain. Limestone is formed horizontally in layers, with naturally occurring 
vertical cracks. At the edge of the island these fissures or ‘gullies’ have the 
potential to expand, rendering the cliffs vulnerable to collapse. Since 1636 there 
have been seventy-two cliff collapses at Portland. Collapse at Portland makes 
the foundation of some parts of the island unstable and uncertain. Collapse is 
an inherent quality of the island of Portland and its stone.
Collapse: material and architectural
The perpendicular whiteness of freshly exposed cliffs following a substantial 
coastal collapse at Portland in 1636 showed how this local limestone could 
be translated into the classical ideal. As an architectural material, Portland 
has a long association with London and has given its architecture a visual 
coherence. The architectural limestone from Portland had its most rapid 
expansion under the monopoly of the royal charter initially operated by Inigo 
Jones, and expanded by Christopher Wren.73 Portland’s location on the coast 
meant that quarried blocks could easily be transported to London. Large-scale 
requisition of Portland stone befell following the disaster of the Great Fire of 
London, when  Wren was commissioned to rebuild St. Paul’s and fifty other 
London churches and buildings. The attribute of stone to encompass time made 
it an effective material for renewal and memorial. Portland stone was later 
used to build the grave markers and memorials for the absent bodies of the 
missing dead after the First and Second World Wars. In quarrying and taking 
the stone to stand in for the dead absence is doubled. The use of limestone for 
rites of death is characterized in its chemistry, and in its linguistic meaning and 
history: the Greek word sarcophagus means flesh-eating stone – sarx flesh and 
phagien to eat. Adrian Stokes’s writings on limestone and its weathering as well 
as his thoughts on flesh and stone are also considered.
72 Denys Brunsden, Ken Coombe, Andrew S. Goudie, and Adrian G. Parker, 
‘The structural geomorphology of the Isle of Portland, southern England’ 
Proceedings of the Geologists’ Association Vol.107, No. 3 (1996), 209–30.
<doi: 10.1016/S0016-7878(96)80030-7> [accessed: 20 November 2010]
73 See Norman Bezzant, Out of the Rock, The Bath and Portland Group 
(London: Heinemann, 1980), ‘Resurgam’, pp. 75–90, and Jane Lang, 
Rebuilding St. Paul’s after the Great Fire of London (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1956)
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As a material, stone confers its geological history to architecture. It is quarried, 
cut and prepared. As an architect and engineer, Robert Hooke was significant 
in researching structural methods. Kleist’s initial proposition of the arch held 
in place because all the stones want to collapse at the same time, that the arch 
made from stone holds collapse in abeyance, is put in context with Hooke’s 
theorem as to why an arch remains standing; this is discussed with reference to 
the engineering of an arch and the circumstances of how it may collapse in an 
architectural situation. The history of this is also identified as the demarcated 
shift between the master stonemason and the professionalization of the 
architect and engineer through the teaching of stereotomy in France in the mid- 
to late eighteenth century, as referenced in Pérez-Gómez’s Architecture and the 
Crisis of Modern Science (1983).
At Portland the quarries are places constructed incrementally as each block is 
cut and taken away; space is made and the void created. Architecture returns 
to the quarries as negative space, as inverted architecture and as a form of 
collapse. The uncertainty of the sites of the quarries and the cliffs, where 
coastal collapse has happened and will likely occur again, have been places 
where site-specific research has been able to unfold and suggest multiple ways 
of thinking and experimenting with collapse.
4. Chapter Overview
The first chapter begins by analysing Kleist’s empirical concept of the arch 
held together by collapse, as it was advanced in a two thousand-word letter 
to his fiancée, written over several days in late November 1800, and with the 
drawing of the arch as an addendum in December. The letter is investigated as 
a material object, the site of the development and rehearsal of Kleist’s thinking, 
as the place for instruction to Wilhelmine the betrothed, and as eighteenth-
century activity. An epistolary philosophy is suggested. Kleist’s empiricism 
is repeatedly articulated in his letters, which are autodidactic whilst serving 
as instruction to Wilhelmine; his deep attachment to the concept is shown 
in his zeal to teach it to her and in the desperation he feels as it collapses. 
He articulates his abject misery after reading Kant’s unspecified Critique, 
which caused his understanding of the world to collapse. Kleist’s formation 
of the arch is interpreted with reference to Kant’s theories of space and time 
in ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ (first and second parts) in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Kant’s Critique is further considered in terms of the development of 
the modern subject and what can be known and certain about truth.
Chapter Two is divided into three parts; the first two are a close textual 
analysis of two of Kleist’s stories: the short story Das Erdbeben in Chili and 
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the novella, Michael Kohlhaas, as embodying collapse both materially and 
conceptually, and as external and internal realities of uncertainty. The third 
part explores Kleist’s concept of the abyss as spatial collapse. In Kleist’s writing, 
architecture is a repeated conceptual device that acts upon the characters. In 
this chapter the focus on the story Das Erdbeben in Chili is connected with 
the probable source material for the story, the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, 
analysing the story in its historical context and the subsequent development 
of scientific inquiry in the latter part of the eighteenth century, particularly as 
it appears in Kant’s three essays on earthquakes, written in the wake of the 
Lisbon catastrophe. These essays in part demonstrate Kant’s own transition 
from empirical to critical thinking. This chapter suggests that rather than only 
considering Kant’s later critical works, it is likely that Kant’s earlier writing on 
natural phenomena also shaped the themes explored in Das Erdbeben in Chili. 
The grimness of the fate of the two characters in the story shows material, 
architectural, social, moral and foundational collapse. In Michael Kohlhaas, 
collapse is explored as contested terrain, as the territory and geography of 
collapse, as the eponymous character engages in battle across state boundaries; 
as political collapse represented through the abuse of power by the ruling 
elite; and, finally as the internal collapse of reason in Kohlhaas himself. This 
is explored with reference to the history and theory of territory, and the 
rise of the citizen in late seventeenth century. The texts are analysed closely 
through identification and scrutiny of architectural and spatial metaphors as 
representations of material and social collapse. 
Part three of Chapter Two discusses spatial and abyssal collapse as Kleist 
embarked on a frenetic and spectacularly productive period of writing and 
publishing and experimenting until his death. Looming over everything is 
Kleist’s early death in 1811 at the age of thirty-five, in a suicide pact with a 
young woman who was dying of cancer. Kleist shot both her and himself. They 
died on the banks of the Kleiner Wansee. Kleist describes a rage of misery, but 
it is one that is based on having a relationship with the world and with ideas, 
rather than the avoidance of it. Kleist’s misery was productive.
The inquiry in Chapter Three makes a connection between practice and 
material knowledge through the interdisciplinary work laid out in Novalis’s 
Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia. The arch made from stone led to 
considering the effect mineralogy and fossil collecting had on the histories 
of geology in eighteenth-century Germany and Britain. Traveller-naturalists 
brought knowledge and material from far-flung places to centres of learning. 
Novalis’s background in mineralogy, poetics and philosophy were concurrent 
with the expansion of philosophical thought in the latter part of the 
eighteenth century. This has a strong lateral link to Kant’s evolution from 
natural to critical philosophy. In Britain, Robert Hooke was a key figure in 
36
the development of geology and was also a scientist, engineer, and architect 
important in the rebuilding of London after the Great Fire. Hooke intuited a 
theorem concerning how an arch stays up and has strength and elasticity. The 
collapse of arches is discussed with reference to engineering, particularly the 
work of the civil engineer, Jacques Heyman in Arches, Vaults and Buttresses 
(1996). As part of the Jurassic coast, the geology and history of Portland is tied 
to theories of the earth, which developed from mid- to late eighteenth century. 
Alongside Kant’s natural philosophy, other theories of the earth, by Cuvier’s 
and James Hutton, are considered, and also the working-class geologists and 
collectors William Smith, Mary Anning and Hugh Miller as practitioners in the 
field. A key text for this inquiry is Jacquetta Hawkes A Land, first published in 
1951; it is a geological, archaeological, poetic history of the land of Britain and 
is an early work of site-writing. 
The final chapter analyses my previous film and video practice against the 
current context of anxieties concerning the collapse of the material of celluloid 
film stock. Analogue film is discussed as the principal mechanical form 
of Walter Benjamin’s ‘Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction’, and in 
relation to art film of the 1930s. Further context is given to my identification 
with the poetics of experimental and art film. The mechanics of film editing 
and the work of women film editors, Yelizaveta Svilova and Danielle Huillet 
are discussed, because my early experience in film editing shaped my visual 
practice. An overview of my previous film practice is considered in terms 
of the recurrent themes of materiality and place. The experimental practice 
consists of time-based media: 16 mm film, video, animation and projected 
still images. The concept of collapse is explored and demonstrated through a 
situated practice from the island of Portland in Dorset, and my film practice 
experiments with the uncertain spaces of the quarries and the disrupted 
landscape of Portland as a site demonstrating collapse. The sense of collapse 
as wandering and death is explored in the digital videos shot in Germany 
in Frankfurt an der Oder, the city of Kleist’s birth, and at Kleiner Wannsee, 
near Potsdam, where he died. The practice coalesces where the films, videos, 
animation and stills are brought together and culminate in an installation 
where experiments of uncertainty are created as a synthesis of collapse.
The arch as concept, object and image where the stones constructing it are 
bound together in a formation of collapse has been used to consider collapse in 
other forms and modes. This has been validated through experimentation with 
how collapse, which is conditioned by uncertainty, can be seen and interpreted 
in other fields. Collapse, thus became a way of looking at, thinking about and 
interpreting space, material and practice.
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Chapter One
The collapse of certainty and the geometry of collapse
This chapter analyses Kleist’s empirical metaphor of the arch held in place by 
collapse. The letter in which it is proposed is investigated as artefact. When 
Kleist reads Kant’s Critique his previous understanding of truth collapses. The 
geometry of the arch is interpreted with reference to Kant’s theories of space 
and time. Kant’s questions about what can be known, and the uncertainty of 
truth, are also considered.
On the evening before that most important day of my life, in Würzburg, 
I went for a walk. When the sun went down, it seemed as though my 
happiness were sinking with it. I was horrified to think that I might be 
forced to part with everything, everything of importance to me. 
I was walking back to the city, lost in my own thoughts, through an arched 
gate. Why, I asked myself, does this arch not collapse, since after all it has 
no support? It remains standing, I answered, because all the stones tend to 
collapse at the same time – and from this thought I derived an indescribably 
heartening consolation, which stayed by me right up to the decisive 
moment: I too would not collapse, even if all my support were removed! 
That, my dear Minna, no book could have told me, and I call it a true 
lesson from nature.1
1 Heinrich von Kleist, Berlin 16 (and 18) November (and with addition 30 
December) 1800. Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 76. Kleist’s emphasis. Kleist 
used idiosyncratic punctuation, this was mainly because he was writing prior the 
establishment of the grammatical rules defined in the Duden Handbook, 1860.
1.1 Kleist letter, arch drawing
added 30 December 1800.
Photograph, Jane Madsen
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1. The Arch Letter and epistolary space
Kleist wrote the above letter to his fiancée, Wilhelmine von Zenge, early in 
their betrothal. He was in an ebullient state and felt that he should inform 
and instruct her. In order to analyse the arch letter, it is useful to put Kleist’s 
letters, in particular those to Wilhelmine von Zenge, in context. There is only 
one of her late letters extant2 and consequently it is difficult to gauge her voice. 
For Kleist, she appears at a particular moment in his adult life, in 1799, when 
he was 21 and had resigned his commission from the army, having joined in 
1792 at the age of 14. He was meant to be studying in Frankfurt an der Oder, 
though he did this in a somewhat erratic way – of working in bouts of intensity 
and subsequent ambivalence. Kleist was born in Frankfurt an der Oder, the 
region where the Kleists were part of the Uradel (ancient nobility) with very 
longstanding connections.3 The university was not reputed to be one of ‘great 
standing’4 however, the quality of the university is of less immediate note than 
the subjects Kleist studied: physics, mathematics and philosophy. The topics 
engendered by his studies in these fields are the basis, and very likely the style, 
of the arch letter. In the letters to Wilhelmine, Kleist often adopts the method 
and stance of the teacher – the knowing figure instructing the untutored; he 
is somewhat pompous, he does not write as the enthusiastic student who is 
learning new things, but as one convinced of his understanding and conceptual 
grasp of the world.
When he parted company with the army, Kleist wrote to Christian Ernst 
Martini, his childhood tutor who remained his friend and confidante, 
describing his military career as:
[…] something fundamentally incompatible with my entire nature, and 
to which I had never really felt committed at heart […] I now dedicate 
myself to the realm of knowledge, this is no new occupation for me, 
for since I have been in Potsdam I have been more of a student than a 
soldier in any case. […] At home in Frankfurt I had to listen to
2 Wilhelmine von Zengen an Kleist 10 April 1802, in Heinrich von Kleist, 
Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Herausgegeben von Helmut Sembdner, Zweiter 
Band (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1984), p. 721–23; and Kleist, An Abyss 
Deep Enough, p. 143–45. Following the common practice editing the letters of 
literary figures, the letters from his correspondents are omitted. Only one of 
Wilhelmine’s letters is included, this is because the letter was returned to her 
unopened. Kleist’s biographer refers to Wilhelmine’s letters, but they are not 
referenced, see Joachim Maass, Kleist: a biography, trans. Ralph Manheim 
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1983), pp. 17–18, 20, 32. There are few 
biographies of Kleist; this is neither a particularly intellectual nor a literary 
biography, but gives a good account of the chronology and people in Kleist’s life.
3 The Kleists had substantial estates in Prussia in the southern region of the 
former Duchy of Pomerania, later part of Brandenburg, which were recorded as 
early as the C12th or C13th. 
4 Maass, Kleist: a biography, p. 6.
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objections, questionings as to what bread-winning knowledge I intended 
to acquire. […] They granted me a choice between law and political 
science.5
This is a familiar and somewhat contemporary voice of the unresolved and 
dissatisfied youth moving from one quarter to another, consumed by indecision, 
only knowing what he does not like, while at the same time facing familial 
expectation and disappointment. However, generational conflict had been 
at the heart of cultural manifestations in Germany; for example, the Sturm 
und Drang group of the previous generation in the 1770s was comprised 
of disaffected young men.6 In his role at the university at Frankfurt an der 
Oder, Kleist anticipates the trope of the student characterised by Thomas 
Elssasser as someone who is socially displaced, without social status, poor and 
marginalised as a kind of non-person,7 and by resigning his army commission, 
Kleist chose this marginalised role of the student. This connotation of the 
student is also a romantic one, where the young (male) person is somehow away 
from the world, in a monastic space, learning and, more particularly, thinking. 
This was all the more so in Germany in the late eighteenth century where, 
compared to other European countries, there were many universities, and 
German universities had no entry requirements. This, according to Whaley, 
meant that the ‘system was over producing academically qualified young men’8 
and consequently there were large numbers of either low-paid or unemployed 
educated young, mainly middle class, men. Whaley further notes that the 
number of young writers emerging from this was one of the ‘most significant 
social developments in Germany in the eighteenth century.’9 This was the 
context in which Kleist started university, though the problem of eventually 
finding some kind of acceptable employment was less one of class for Kleist 
than one of inclination.
Kleist’s older half sister Ulrike was the person to whom he wrote most 
consistently,10 writing in a different style than the way he directed his thoughts 
to Wilhelmine. He addressed Ulrike as an intimate equal, sharing confidences
5 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, pp. 22–23.
6 This is further explored in Mark Roseman, ed., Generations in Conflict: 
youth revolt and generation conflict in Germany 1770–1968 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1995), Chapters 1 and 2.
7 See Thomas Elsasser ‘Social Mobility and the Fantastic: German Silent 
Cinema’ in James Donald, ed. Fantasy and the Cinema (London: BFI 
Publishing 1989), pp. 26–27, 37, where he discusses the role of the student 
depicted in such film examples as Der Student von Prague (The Student of 
Prague) (1913), and its literary sources from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries.
8 Joachim Whaley, ‘The ideal of youth in late eighteenth-century Germany’ in 
Roseman Generations in Conflict, p. 51.
9 Ibid.
10 At the end of his life this relationship had broken down and Kleist was closer 
to Marie von Kleist, his cousin by marriage.
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with her in a fraternal way, though also as someone older and responsible 
for arranging things, especially the continual transfer and forwarding of 
money.11 Kleist adopted a frank tone with Ulrike, using the letters to take up 
further points in a conversation, and from these it is possible to get a strong 
sense of Kleist’s voice. Two months after he left the army, he wrote to Ulrike 
reproaching her lack of understanding of his rationalist directive for living, the 
lebensplan (life plan): ‘[…] I feel with such inwardness the calm with which I 
look to the future, the priceless happiness that my life plan affords me […]’.12 
In this instance, Kleist’s claim about his inward calm seems so precarious that 
it is possible to already see the demise that he believes his plan prevents, and 
to sense Ulrike’s implied doubt. In his lebensplan Kleist tried to draw up a 
contract with the world, as a way of ordering his method of living in and with 
the world; inevitably, such an unworkable contract could only be broken. 
Kleist held fast to the conviction of the lebensplan, his rationalist strategy 
for life. He wrote to Ulrike in 1799, somewhat affronted about her apparent 
scepticism concerning his certainty, and claimed that:
A traveller who knows his destination, and the route to that destination, 
has a travel plan. What a travel plan is for the traveller, a life plan is 
for the person in general. To undertake a journey without an itinerary 
would mean leaving to Chance whether we should reach a goal, which 
we ourselves would not foreknow. To live without an itinerary for 
our life would mean leaving to Chance whether we should arrive at a 
happiness of which we ourselves have no prior conception.13
It is curious that in order to emphasize that he has a rational plan for his 
life he uses similes derived from travel, without any hint of irony, nor 
acknowledgement that travel and movement from one place to another is 
inherently an encounter with the unknown, the unforeseen and uncertainty, 
even if there is an itinerary. Nevertheless, Kleist’s conviction in his life plan, 
the sense of certainty, the need and the intense desire for such certainty lends 
further insight as to how badly he would be affected by reading Kant’s critical 
philosophy. Despite his lebensplan, Kleist’s life was never quite in control or 
never far from going disastrously awry.
In November 1799 Kleist wrote to Ulrike about meeting Wilhelmine, saying 
that his only daily company in Frankfurt an der Oder was at the home of 
11 Ulrike von Kleist was financially better off as she had inherited from her 
mother’s fortune. Heinrich von Kleist was his father’s third child – the first 
son and first child of his father’s second marriage and therefore reliant on his 
father’s dwindled fortune. See Maass, Kleist: a biography, pp. 4–9.
12 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 28. Letter, May 1799.
13 Ibid.
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Major-General von Zenge.14 He described Wilhelmine as having a ‘sense for the 
finer things’ saying ‘[…] I am grateful if she listens to me at times with interest, 
even if she has not much to say in return.’15 It is interesting that Kleist describes 
her as a quiet person with little to say. Whereas, on the other hand, Kleist had 
a great deal to say, and at times in the course of the letters Wilhelmine is less a 
person with whom he exchanges ideas and personal experiences than someone 
to whom he can send his notes and one who will look after his developing 
ideas; she becomes a mirror in which he seeks a reflection of himself. Only a 
short time after meeting late in 1799, at the beginning of 1800 they became 
engaged. Their liaison was also the beginning of Kleist’s education of 
Wilhelmine and the place where his own self-instruction was demonstrated.16 
Consequently, the letters to Wilhelmine are sites where he works through and 
develops his understanding and knowledge of the philosophical ideas to which 
he is attached, and presumably has been exposed at the university in Frankfurt 
an der Oder. He refers to Wilhelmine’s education again in the letter of 22 
March 1801, written in the immediate aftermath of reading Kant’s Critique. 
However, before explaining his state of mind, he comments on her reading 
Rousseau’s Émile, telling her he will buy her Rousseau’s complete works and 
that he will advise her in which order they are best read, indicating that Kleist 
was well acquainted with Rousseau.
All of this seems at odds with the later, more agonised content of the letter, 
especially given that Émile deals with the life of the individual where education 
is the formation of the heart and spirit of the boy from earliest infancy to 
about twenty-five, exploring how moral freedom can be aligned within society 
14 Major-General von Zenge later commanded a brigade in the Battle of Jena 
on 14 October 1806, which the Prussians lost. 
15 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 31.
16 See Maass, Kleist: a biography, p. 17. Kleist’s proposal of marriage to 
Wilhelmine was by letter and was included in an envelope with a correction of 
her last essay.
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while still being good.17 The letters are explorations of exterior spaces as well 
as thoughts about their relationship. For example, an earlier long letter to 
Wilhelmine, sent from Würzburg and dated 11 and 12 September 1800, is 
full of lengthy detours and detailed descriptions Kleist makes an offhand and 
revealing aside, saying ‘Forgive all these minutiae. I expect to make use of these 
notes some day.’18 This in part explains some of the impersonal, observational 
detail in the letters, but also indicates that he has his eye on a future, which 
may include being a writer, though at this moment he is collecting the notes 
and observations as raw material, and constructing an archive, and meanwhile 
expects Wilhelmine to keep the letters safe for him.
The letters had a purpose other than a desire to correspond or communicate 
with his betrothed. Kleist’s letters to Wilhelmine seldom conform to any 
recognisable form the love letter has taken in any era; he concedes few 
intimacies or acknowledgements of ardour or deeply held feeling towards her. 
These note-taking letters sent to Wilhelmine for safe keeping may explain 
the elaborate deviations into such examples as his fascination with Catholic 
churches and Catholicism, even though he is Protestant and manifests no 
religious feeling himself. These notes show his interest in Catholicism as it 
applies to and determines the lives of others, themes later appearing in Das 
Erdbeben in Chili (The Earthquake in Chile), and Die heilige Cäcile oder die 
Gewalt der Musik (St. Cecilia or The Power of Music) (1810). The length of 
many of the letters and their use as spaces where Kleist’s thought is developed 
gives them the quality of both the essay and the epistle. In the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries epistolary writing was an essential aspect of life 
for a cultured and educated person. Letters were the place where ideas were 
developed, and the epistolary form was the critical structuring device in the 
development of the novel, where epistolary writing was used to shift the mode 
of address from that of a known reader to an unknown one.19
Letter writing was an important social activity, and one in which someone 
of Kleist’s class was expected to participate. The German writer, essayist and 
philosopher Christian Fürchtegott Gellert published theories on letter writing 
in 1742 and in 1751, suggesting that letters should be written in a ‘natural’
17 See Nicholas Dent, Rousseau (Oxford: Routledge 2005), pp. 23–27, also Ch. 
4,‘Émile’ pp. 81–123.
18 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 57.
19 See for example: Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa, 1748; this early form of the 
novel developed by English writers was of importance in the history of German 
literature. Ludwig Tieck’s first novel Die Gesichte de Herrn William Lovell 
(The story of Mr William Lovell), (1795–96) was based on Clarissa. Goethe’s 
early epistolary novel was Die Leiden des jungen Werther (The Sorrows of 
Young Werther), (1774); its theme of suicide caused a sensation. Hölderlin’s 
Hyperion (1797–99) was also written in the epistolary form.
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style,20 this concept of ‘naturalness’ suggests a connection to contemporary 
Enlightenment prose writing. However, for Kleist, these epistles are more essays 
in practical philosophy or natural philosophy, and even though his letters are 
at times long and verbose this form never became the vehicle for his own prose 
writing, which was rather spare in style.
Similarly, he also charged Ulrike as carer and custodian of his writings. In 
a postscript to his letter of 27 October 1800 he asks ‘If Aunt must go to my 
bureau for linen, then see to it that the upper part where my scribblings are, 
will not be opened’.21 Clearly, he wants to keep the ‘scribblings’ for later use; 
it is not indicated whether they are letters, but may already be notes intended 
for future writing schemes. This postscript also reveals his tendency to be 
secretive: his desire for concealment confuses how Kleist’s letters may be 
viewed as personal collections of ideas, and leads to Hans Bödeker’s question 
as to whether letters are private or public. He argues that as soon as a letter has 
been despatched it becomes ‘public’.22 This raises the further question: does the 
content of a letter still belong to the writer once it has left them, given that the 
letter as a material object belongs to the recipient? More generally, is it possible 
to ask what kind of spaces letters mark out? In Germany in the eighteenth 
century, Elkar notes that there was a tradition among the Freundschaftbünde 
(friendship groups) where circles of friends would meet, and that:
Frequently, the letters would be read out amongst the remaining 
members of the circle, and some found a wider audience in the journals 
of the time, a number of which reserved a regular section for such 
correspondence.23
This comment provides the context in which letters were read and the spaces 
20 ‘Natural’ in this instance meant a less highly formal aristocratic style, see 
Willemijn Ruberg ‘Letter Writing and Elite Identity in the Netherlands 1770– 
1850’ Scandinavian Journal of History 30:3–4, (September, 2005), pp. 249–58.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03468750500272579> [accessed 26 January 2013]. 
Christian Fürchtegott Gellert 1715–1769 a popular poet, storywriter and 
essayist wrote on uplifting moral themes, published instruction about letter- 
writing; this is discussed in Rafael Arto-Haumacher, Gellerts Briefpraxis und 
Brieflehre: der Anfang einer neuen Briefkultur (Gellert’s letter-writing practice 
and letter-writing instruction: the beginnings of a new letter-writing culture) 
(Wiesbaden: DUV c.1995). Kleist unfavourably mentions Gellert, clearly 
regarding him as a pompous philosopher, An Abyss Deep Enough, pp. 56, 241. 
21 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 72. Kleist’s emphasis.
22 Hans Erich Bödeker, ‘Letters as historical resources – Some concluding 
reflections’, in Reading, Interpreting and Histroicizing: Letters as Historical 
Sources, ed. by Regina Schulte and Xenia von Tippelskirch, EUI Working Paper 
HEC No. 2004/2, (European University Institute, Florence, Department of 
History and Civilization), [accessed 21 January 2013], p. 200.
23 Rainer Elkar ‘Young Germans and Young Germany: some remarks on the 
history of German youth in the late eighteenth and in the first half of the 
nineteenth century’, in Roseman, Generations in Conflict, p. 71.
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letters occupied in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.24 The 
writings of Gellert, Schiller and Christoph Martin Wieland25 were popular 
among the Freundschaftbünde. What kind of space do Kleist’s letters create? 
It is possible within his own family, in Wilhelmine’s circle, among the army 
friends he retained and his later literary colleagues, that his letters were read 
out loud. Therefore, keeping the ‘scribblings’ secret seems unduly suspicious. 
Kleist’s letters are not especially confessional, and those to Wilhelmine are in 
a pedagogical mode, which seems more clearly interpretable as public. The 
keeping and preservation of the material letters is a role designated to women, a 
historically ambivalent role, since without Ulrike and Wilhelmine’s initial care 
and preservation these letters may not exist, yet few of their letters seem to have 
been kept by Kleist, nor were they published, and consequently their particular 
perspectives, voices and responses are less available. There are many absences 
in the series of letters26 – before his suicide Kleist destroyed papers, which likely 
included letters. In the immediate aftermath of his death a number of Kleist’s 
letters were destroyed by Ulrike and Marie von Kleist, because relatively soon 
after he died it was evident that there was going to be a reputation to protect; 
24 For example the importance of letters as personal and private conversations 
between two people were a later occurrence as epistolary culture developed, 
see James Daybell, The Material Letter in Early Modern England: Manuscript 
Letters and the Culture and Practices of Letter-Writing, 1512–1635, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 12–13. See also Introduction 
in David Barton and Nigel Hall, eds. Letter Writing as a Social Practice, 
(Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999), p. 2, where they note: ‘Despite its 
prevalence there has been little study of letters as a genre, compared for 
example, with poetry or the novel, and there has been little attention paid to 
letters as objects.’
25 Friedrich Schiller poet, playwright (1755–1805). Christoph Martin Wieland 
(1733–1813), the editor of Der Teutscher Merkur was a powerful publicist and 
literary figure. See James J. Sheehan, German History (1770 –1866), (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1989), p. 210.
26 There were two hundred and twenty-eight letters initially collected, 
transcribed and published. The letters are in different collections and 
archives in mainly in Germany and Poland. There was some later (accidental) 
destruction; though undocumented letters occasionally emerge they are rare. 
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but later, the letters were obsessively collected when Kleist’s significance as a 
literary figure was established.27 Kleist’s literary colleague and friend, Ludwig 
Tieck 1773–1853, was instrumental in gathering together and publishing the 
first collected volume of Kleist’s letters, which appeared in 1848. In 1798, 
Kleist had already written Aufsatz, den sichern Weg des Glücks zu finden und 
ungestört – auch unter den größten Drangsalen des Lebens – ihn zu genießen 
(Essay on the secure way to find happiness and undisturbed – also among the 
greatest hardships of life – to enjoy it), a very long and rambling piece of prose 
that is part-way between an essay and a letter: throughout, it is repeatedly 
addressed to the unknown and unidentified ‘mein teurer Freund’ (my dear 
friend). This epistle suggests happiness is dependent on avoiding the vicissitudes 
of chance, bad luck and misfortune, although later, the people in his stories and 
plays did not avoid the cruelties of chance, where bad luck and misfortune play 
a key role in the lives of his characters.
The arch letter is the eighteenth of many long epistles28 to Wilhlemine.29 It 
was written from Berlin in two parts on the 16 and 18 November 1800.30 The 
material letter is on two different sheets of folded paper, making eight pages. 
The first sheet is creamy white and the paper has uniform edges; the second 
27 Kleist’s biographer Joachim Maass admonishes the women surrounding
Kleist holding them accountable for the absences and gaps in the collections of 
letters; see Kleist: a biography, pp. 299–300. It is not a vast collection of letters 
by the standards of the day, for example, by the time he died in 1832, Goethe 
left approximately 10,000 letters, see J. W. Goethe, Letters from Goethe, 
trans. by M. von Herzfeld and C. Melvil Sym. Introduction by W.H. Bruford 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1957)
28 In this instance about 2,500 words.
29 There are thirty-four letters to Wilhelmine. 
30 The letter is held in the Sammlung Autographa (Heinrich v. Kleist), 
Biblioteka Jagiellonska Kraków, is one of about a hundred letters held in the 
Sammlung Autographa (Heinrich v. Kleist). At the end of WWII it was taken 
from the Bibilotek Berlin, along with other material, by the Polish army. 
The exhibition ‘Kleist and the Epistolary Culture of his Epoch’ was held at 
the Jagiellonian Library from 28 September – 28 October 2011, to mark the 
bicentennial of his death.
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sheet is smaller and is different than the first; it is a light blue/green tone, 
not crisp, but light, and flexible with deckled edges;31 the mismatched paper 
suggests that Kleist was using whatever available material to hand. There are a 
few brown age stains on the paper and the edges. The fragile, delicate envelope 
is the same paper as the second sheet, folded around the letter, then sealed 
and initialled and addressed to the ‘Stiftsfräulein’ (convent school young lady) 
Wilhelmine von Zenge ‘Hochwürden u. Hochwholgeb’32 (noble and highborn). 
There are small marks and tears to the envelope. Later additions include notes 
by Wilhemine von Zenge, a handwritten administration number and date 
1923, and a small oval red rubber stamp: ‘Pr. St. Bibliotek Berlin’,33 indicating 
the letter’s provenance. The bright red wax is squeezed out by the oval form of 
the von Zenge family seal – a coat of arms of heraldic imagery, centring on a 
helmet of ancient armour, above which sits a crown with two flags emerging, 
sheaves of wheat, and flowing feathers each side; underneath an object that 
looks like a falling pillar. The letter has been carefully looked after, not much 
handled, nor carried around; there is no scuffing of the paper. There are no 
bends or creases that were not there previously.
The letter is written in very black ink which time has not faded. The angular 
right hand slant of the handwriting gives it a relentless forward movement 
as though the thoughts were driving the writing onwards. The fluid, partly 
illegible writing is quite small and linear; underneath the words the lines are 
straightened and the letters flattened, not self-consciously neat. The lines are 
evenly spaced, neither crammed nor generous, the page is filled from edge to 
31 Sheet 1: 23.7 x 19.2 cm; sheet 2: 21.7 x 18.1 cm. Heinrich von Kleist, Sämtliche 
Werke, Berliner Ausg. Band 4:1. Herausgegeben von Roland Reuss, Peter 
Staengle, (Basel; Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld/Roter Stern, 1988), p. 379.
32 Ibid. p. 380.
33 This stamp is on the envelope, first page of sheet 1, and last page of sheet 2.






edge, its space not wasted. As the letter progresses, the writing seems hastier, 
as though in service to the intention of the quickly emerging ideas. There are 
more crossings out and underlinings emphasizing important thoughts. The 
paragraphs are defined and ended by the questions raised. As a material object, 
the letter seems preparatory – its overall quality, the paper, the writing seem 
more a gathering of thoughts, notations of ideas.
Following the date, Berlin 16 November 1800, is ‘Liebe Wilhelminen,’ then 
‘Liebe’ is struck through and replaced with the underlined ‘Für Wilhelmine.’ 
Without preamble he begins the discussion on Newton. The first part is an 
epistle on empiricism: Kleist outlines a series of observations that apparently 
advance scientific knowledge and seem to be a validation of what he knows 
extemporised for the benefit of Wihlemine’s further understanding. He tells 
and instructs Wilhelmine what to think, how to look and what she should find. 
These empirically determined examples further demonstrate both his vow to 
his previous tutor, Martini, and enact his avowal and dedication ‘to the realm 
of knowledge’,34 and to what is knowable, where knowledge is justified through 
the evidence he amasses.
This epistemological construction was consistent with the contemporary 
Enlightenment thinking. In the letter, the first empirical observation is that 
of Newton and the falling apple, though Kleist describes this in quite poetic 
terms. The story of Newton’s observation about gravity was probably not 
very original even by Kleist’s time.35 The next concerned Galileo’s observation 
of moving shadows as a chandelier sways, which led to the development of 
theories on the laws of motion (of the pendulum), and then Pilâtre’s idea for 
‘der Luftschiffarhtskunst’36 [the art of air travel] came after seeing smoke 
whirling and ascending, which phenomenon he thought may be capable of 
making something airborne.
Kleist’s observations become ever more fanciful: he suggests that Columbus 
stood on the shore of Portugal, noticed the distinctive features of a piece of 
driftwood, and recognizing that it was from far away led him to America. 
Lastly, a French prisoner languishing in a Dutch fortress developed a means of 
34 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 23.
35 Drake notes, ‘[…] legends regarding Newton and his apple persist in both 
children’s books and text books for higher learning.’ This comment said in the 
context of a critique of Newton’s manipulation of his legacy and his failure to 
acknowledge Robert Hooke’s contribution to the theory of the universal law 
of gravitation. E.T. Drake, Restless Genius: Robert Hooke and his Earthly 
Thoughts including reprint of “Lectures and discourses of earthquakes and 
subterraneous eruptions” from: Posthumous works of Robert Hooke, London:
R. Waller, 1705 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 3.
36 Kleist, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe p. 591. Jean-François Pilâtre de Rozier 
(1754–1785) developed the first hot air balloon in 1783, he later died attempting 
to cross the Channel in 1785.
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predicting the weather by observing the way spiders spin webs. Consequently, 
he was able to warn his French general that the thawing ice would freeze again 
soon and they would be safe to advance; this helped the general defeat the 
Dutch. These observations build an elaborate thesis about nature, culminating 
in Kleist’s own contribution to empirical observation: that the arch remains 
standing because the stones want to collapse at the same time. His epistle 
concludes, ‘That is it, dear girl, that on these pieces of paper wherefore I 
transmit these instructions’,37 this demonstrates his conviction that he is 
teaching her as well as himself. In this context the empirical observation of 
nature has provided the method, and fashioned Kleist into an autodidact.
As he builds up to the analogy of the arch, the apogee that is his own 
observation, Kleist emphasizes and locates the importance of these empirical 
observations:
It is ever clearer to me that books offer very bad moral instruction. 
They do of course tell us what is true, also what is good, but without 
penetrating within. There is one splendid teacher, and that is nature.38
Kleist’s discussion of these examples of scientific history from Newton, and 
Galileo and the empirical observation that led to the development of Pilâtre’s 
balloon are described and presented in terms of absolutes, based on faith 
rather than concepts to be tested. This reveals a seemingly unassailable 
certainty about nature, where one learns through careful observation and 
the observations of others. Kleist asserts that nothing in nature is unworthy 
of our attention, each of the examples listed is concrete – empiricism is thus 
37 Ibid. p. 592. Author’s translation.
38 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 76. Kleist’s emphasis.






presented as a material inquiry dependent on the thing in front of him and 
not an intangible idea. There is nothing more apparently tangible, durable and 
material than the stones of the arch. This raises the question as to whether 
Kleist has pushed the limits of empirical observation of the natural, material 
world to the point that it may no longer bear the weight of this kind of scrutiny. 
The intensity with which Kleist embraced and advocated empiricism did not 
allow any degree of scepticism.
In the late eighteenth century Kleist was not alone in believing that empiricism 
offered incontrovertible truths about nature, that nature was knowable. 
Nature, as a term and as a concept is extraordinarily elusive. Raymond 
Williams even goes so far as to state, ‘Nature is perhaps the most complex 
word in the language,’39 and he addresses the history of its usage, suggesting 
that by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries:
Nature [...], was often in effect personified as a constitutional lawyer. 
The laws came from somewhere, and this was variously but often 
indifferently defined; most practical attention was given to interpreting 
and classifying the laws […] This was the decisive emergence of sense 
[...] nature as material world. But the emphasis on discoverable laws […] 
led to a common identification of Nature with Reason: the object of 
observation with the mode of observation.40
This is a useful account of the thinking at work in Kleist’s application of 
empirical method, where nature is coupled with reason and the knowledge 
derived from that observation of nature is reason. For Kleist there was no 
39 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society.
(London: Fontana Press, 1983), p. 219. Use of bold type Williams’s emphasis.
40 Ibid. pp. 222–23. Williams’s emphasis.






particular interest in ideas of human nature or seeing nature as sublime,41 
therefore, an aesthetic inquiry can be discounted from his view. Kleist tries 
to be organised and ordered and sets out to be rigorous in his application 
of empirical method to these observations derived from nature as natural 
philosophy (science). In the arch letter he builds an argument for empirical 
method; however, it is unclear where this will lead, and while he makes a 
case for this method, there is no thesis to which it is attached. Nevertheless, 
in identifying himself as an empirical thinker, Kleist aligns himself with 
epistemology and the natural philosophers.
By the time Kleist reaches the top of the third page of the letter, where he 
describes the arch that remains standing because the potential force of the 
stones propels them downwards at the same time, there are more crossings 
out and underlinings than in the earlier pages of the letter. The words ‘keine 
Stütze’ (no support) and the sentence: ‘Es steh, antworte ich, weil alle Steine auf 
einmal einstütrzen wollen’ from ‘weil’ (because all the stones want to collapse 
at the same time), and the final point about the arch, ‘lernen von der Natur’ 
(learn from nature) are underlined. There are some trips with the ink where the 
nib has caught the paper. Words have been added in with a curved, fluid line 
indicating changes. The letter seems to become more intense; this is how Kleist 
ends the analogy of the arch:
[…] from this thought I derived an indescribably heartening consolation, 
which stayed by me right up to the decisive moment: I too would not 
collapse, even if all my support were removed! 
That, my dear Minna, no book could have told me, and I call it a true 
lesson from nature.42
This belief in the truths identifiable in nature underlines both Kleist’s sense 
that there was no other way of thinking – this suggests faith in the knowledge 
originating from observation of the world he has experienced – and belief in his 
own contribution to knowledge derived from his empirical observation.
The second part, on 18 November, begins by outlining how questions are 
proposed and evidence construed. He personalises the address by consolidating 
his emphatic instruction of Wilhelmine, that she must be a ‘true observer of 
41 Kleist does not pursue a notion of nature connected to theories of the 
sublime or the aesthetics suggested by David Hume’s ‘Standard of Taste’ 1757 
or Edmund Burke’s ‘A Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of 
the Sublime and the Beautiful’ 1757, arising from the Scottish Enlightenment. 
Roy Porter begins Chapter 13 ‘Nature’, in Enlightenment, stating that ‘The 
key Enlightenment concept was Nature’, Roy Porter, Enlightenment (London: 
Penguin Books, 2000), p. 295. However this is located in the aesthetics of 
Hume, and especially Burke, and specifically not science, nor the contemporary 
term: ‘natural philosophy’. 
42 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 76. Kleist’s emphasis.
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all phenomena’,43 that the reason she has eyes is to observe, and that she must 
write everything in a notebook, then offers excruciating analogies to what he 
imagines are experiences from her life, such as going out for walks on her own, 
or at home cooking, knitting and washing.44 Further empirical examples are 
analysed, such as the properties of a concave mirror. Throughout, there is a 
sense that Kleist is moulding and forming Wilhelmine not just for marriage; 
but also in the pursuit of the knowledge that he valued above all else. On 
29 November, immediately following this letter, he noted his pleasure in 
Wilhelmine’s ‘avid acceptance of my suggestions for your education.’45
On the second, smaller sheet of paper the writing seems hastier, as though the 
ideas were developing and coming more quickly. Halfway down the seventh 
page of the letter he has fitted in extra words at the edge of the page – thinking, 
refining the idea, the question, cramming more in. The last page of the letter is 
three-quarters filled. There is an affectionate conclusion and postscript. There 
is an ink smudge, and excess ink has filled two of the round letterforms, not 
quite a blot. At the end there are only the most cursory initials, as though the 
self-referential quality of a signature was unimportant.
The small pencil drawing of the arch is fitted into less than half of the 
quartered folded page at the end of the letter. The ink from the previous page 
bleeds through. It is a provisional diagram of the arch, a sketch. It is not 
composed as a finished drawing. The geometry of the arch is outlined; the 
dominance of the keystone at the centre is anchored by two heavier marks at 
the lower corners. The way the keystone has been drawn – with light, thin lines 
coming out of the top – makes it look as though it is about to be unlocked from 
the arch, and taken away, which would cause collapse. The voussoirs on either 
43 Ibid. 
44 Kleist, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, pp. 593–96.
45 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 81.
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side of the keystone are tightly locked into the arch. There are marks indicating 
downward movement. It is insightful to see how the marks were made: the 
curved line under the arch is the darkest and most pressed line, as is the defined 
mark at the bottom right corner of the curve. The six quick short lines under 
the arch are light and nearly imperceptible, though as marks of movement they 
indicate downward thrust, suggestive of the potential for collapse at any time. 
The line bisecting the arch immediately under the keystone and stretching 
beyond the drawing of the arch as a whole contradicts the practical purpose 
and expected intention of a diagram or architectural drawing. This horizontal 
line performs no geometric or diagrammatic function – it is entirely conceptual. 
This line traverses the drawing and has two upright marks at each end, pinning 
down the drawing as though it needed to be held in place, that it might slip 
away or collapse. The horizontal line generates another element, something 
unknown, it seems to question the dominance of the keystone at the centre, and 
the axis and stability of the arch becomes uncertain. Whether intentional or 
inadvertent, in making this conceptual line Kleist transfers the drawing of the 
arch from practical geometry to one of uncertainty and experimental ideation. 
The observation about the collapsing arch is both an allegorical reference to 
his emotional state of being in relation to his betrothal to Wilhelmine, and at 
the same time is empirical and rational, material and visual. Underlying all 
this is a sense that he believes he has ingeniously formulated two positions 
simultaneously. Although the drawing is a provisional sketch, it was a dated 
addition with the comment: ‘30t Xbr 1800 am vorletzten Tage im alten 
Jahrhundert’ (30 December 1800 almost the last day of the old century).46 
The addition of the notation of time, imminently poised on a new century, 
added a quality of uncertainty. The use of pencil was unexpected: it hinted at 
potential insights for interpreting the addition of the drawing as being part 
of a discussion, resolving a query, or as explanation. Perhaps Kleist added it 
when he and Wilhelmine were together, in order to clarify how the arch may 
collapse.47 The shadow of this observation is the idea that the arch may one day 
fall, and that in the paradox of why it stands are the seeds of its own demise: 
that it may yet collapse.
46 Author’s translation.
47 According to Kleist’s letters, which provide a rough map of his whereabouts, he wrote 
to Ulrike von Kleist from Frankfurt an der Oder in December 1800. See Appendix.
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2. Kleist and the collapse of empiricism
Kleist had read at least some of Kant’s pre-critical philosophy. Two months 
before the arch letter Kleist wrote to Wilhelmine instructing her on the role of 
women:
All genuine enlightenment of womankind depends finally on one thing: 
she must be able to reflect on the purpose of her earthly life. To reflect 
on the goal of our existence for all eternity, probing whether mankind’s 
ultimate purpose is the highest happiness, as Epicurus thought, or the 
achievement of perfection, as Leibniz believed, or the fulfilment of dry 
Duty, as Kant assures us – such speculation is unfruitful even for men, 
often even destructive.48
This indicates that Kleist had read work from Kant’s pre-critical philosophical 
writing from the period prior to the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781. This 
earlier reference may possibly refer to Kant’s work on moral philosophy. In 
Chapter Two I argue that Kleist’s first engagement with Kant may not have 
48 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 63. Kleist’s emphasis.
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been only with moral philosophy, but the more epistemological natural 
philosophy. Notably, the comment above suggests that at that stage Kleist was 
not overly impressed by Kant’s writing. Just before the arch letter, Kleist wrote 
to Wilhelmine on 13 November proposing various fanciful schemes for gainful 
positions, including going to Paris and ‘…transplanting the newest philosophy 
in that knowledge-hungry land […]’;49 generally regarded to be referring to 
Kant.50 In a letter to Ulrike on 14 August 1800, Kleist requested that his sister: 
‘Send me my paper on the Kantean philosophy, which you have, and also the 
cultural history, which Auguste has – but immediately.’51 Therefore, Kleist 
was not entirely without knowledge and experience of Kant’s writing when 
he studied the unspecified and unidentified Critique a few months after this 
request. As a student and an educated and enlightened thinker Kleist would 
have expected to read Kant as the ‘newest’ contemporary philosopher.
By the time he wrote the following to Ulrike from Berlin on 5 February 1801, it 
is clear that the lebensplan, the search for a meaningful way to be in the world, 
had completely fallen apart:
My condition of inner uncertainty has been unbearable, and to reach a 
decision I have resorted to the means by which that Roman in the tent 
of Porsena forced the monarch, wavering in his tent over the provisions 
of a peace offer, to come to a decision. He drew a circle, in chalk, you 
remember, around himself and the king, and declared that neither of 
them would cross it until a decision, either for war or peace, had been 
reached. I did almost the same. I resolved not to leave my room until I 
had decided on a definite life plan; but eight days passed and in the end I 
had to leave my room after all, and undecided as ever.52
There is something faintly mordant in the last line here, as though he can derive 
some humour, however grim, from observing himself in the situation of abject 
indecision. In addition, his attempt at resolution of the situation concerning 
the failure of his lebensplan was a spatial one: using the example of the chalk 
circle, he remained in his room until he had thought of another lebensplan 
but could not find a solution. His trepidation of life without a plan, previously 
articulated to Ulrike, had come to fruition:
[…] the condition of being without a life plan, without a firm vocation, 
forever hesitant between uncertain desires, ever in contradiction to my 
49 Ibid. p. 75.
50 Ibid. See translators note, which acknowledges that Kant had not yet been 
translated into French; also Maass, Kleist: a biography, p.8, notes that Kleist 
was fluent in French from an early age.
51 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 38.
52 Ibid. p. 91.
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sense of duty, a plaything of Chance, a puppet on the string of fate […]53
This indicates that his lebensplan was based on the belief that he could 
successfully exert a rational determination over the course of his life. Thus, the 
lebensplan was based on an epistemological understanding of the world, and, 
with the loss of empiricism there is no lebensplan. The collapse of his life plan 
is also a failure of thought itself for Kleist. Several weeks later, on 22 March 
1801, he vents the whole catastrophe of his thoughts to Wilhelmine:
Yes, my thoughts have indeed been revolving around a central question 
that has preoccupied my innermost soul; it has had a deeply shattering 
effect upon me […] I had already as a lad […] adopted the idea that 
Perfection is the goal of creation. […] These goals, the collecting of 
Truths and the acquiring of Education, were so sacred to me that for 
them I made the costliest sacrifices. You know what these were. But I 
must come to my point. I recently became familiar with the more recent 
so-called Kantean philosophy, and I may impart one of its leading ideas 
to you without fear of its shattering you as deeply, as painfully as it has 
me.54
And so Kleist has read Kant’s critical writing, and his previously held 
convictions about truth have collapsed. However, in the lead up to the remark 
about Kant in this passage, Kleist makes revealing insights into the previously 
held convictions and the modes of thought and reasoning he operated within. 
For example, his comment about reading and following Wieland’s principles 
suggests an earnest belief in the idea that if he drove himself hard enough in his 
pursuit of knowledge and education then ‘Perfection’ would follow.
This idea of ‘perfection’ was both connected to the lebensplan, as well as the 
aspiration of perfectability, a doctrine that had its origins in the Lutheran 
movement of Pietism.55 Consequently, this suggests that for Kleist empiricism 
53 Ibid. pp. 27–28.
54 Ibid. pp. 92–95. Note on chronology: if the time is strictly followed it would 
put the letter to Ulrike of 5 February 1801 as prior to reading the ‘Kantean 
philosophy’ but that seems unlikely, rather that the idea of ‘three weeks past’ 
mentioned to Wilhelmine is generalized. When Kleist began to read Kant, he 
was studying mathematics, logic and philosophy in Frankfurt an der Oder; but 
seemingly (and surprisingly) had not been exposed to Kant’s Critiques.
55 Pietism: a movement within Protestantism especially emerging from Lutheran 
thought, ‘stressed emotional religiosity and the development of the inner life’, 
in Hans Reiss introduction in Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings, ed. 
by Hans Reiss, trans. by H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991), p. 1. Reiss notes that Kant’s parents followed Pietist beliefs. The 
central theme of Pietism was that faith was an inner or subjective experience 
with an emphasis on practical action or service. Gawthorp suggested that 
Pietism determined the development and cohesion of Prussia as a state because 
it created the cultural condition of the ideology of service through the Pietist 
values of duty, work and prayer, suggesting that Prussia, and subsequently the 
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was not just the epistemological cornerstone of natural philosophy, but that the 
‘truth’ derived from it was ‘sacred’ and intended to take him into the realms of 
the world to come, raising the question as to whether Kleist’s attachment to the 
perfectibility of truth was fanatical.
Continuing in the same letter, Kleist immediately follows with the statement:
If everyone saw the world through green glasses, they would be forced 
to judge that everything they saw was green, and could never be 
sure whether their eyes saw things as they really are, or did not add 
something of their own to what they saw. And so it is with our intellect. 
We can never be certain that what we call Truth is really Truth, or 
whether it does not merely appear so to us. If the latter, then the Truth 
that we acquire here is not Truth after our death, and it is all a vain 
striving for possession that may never follow us into the grave.56
The example that Kleist uses here is intensely visual. It is both strangely modern 
– the analogy of the ‘green glasses’ is suggestive of tinted lenses from film and 
photography to sun-glasses – and simultaneously ancient, in the correlation 
with Saul on the road to Damascus: ‘And immediately there fell from his eyes 
as it had been scales: and he received sight forthwith […]’.57 Whichever way 
this analogy is interpreted, reading Kant was an epiphany for Kleist and he 
saw the world differently. In this painful question marking the transition in 
understanding as to whether what Kleist sees is the same as what another 
person would see, the ‘green glasses’ analogy demonstrates the shift from an 
objective view of the world to a subjective one and, as such, is a remarkable 
example that develops and establishes the concept of the modern subject in 
visual and perspectival terms. The analogy of the ‘green glasses’ of what one 
individual sees, or what the appearance of things may be is a key example that 
clarifies and characterizes the modern subject, and because of this internal state 
identified and analysed by Kant, one can no longer speak for all observable 
knowledge but only of what one individual can absolutely know for sure, what 
one has seen and observed and the way that knowledge has been acquired. The 
concept of the ‘green glasses’ covering the eyes of one person and determining 
what and how they see succinctly expresses Kant’s proposition about certainty 
conditioning the subjective. The metaphor of the ‘green glasses’ demonstrates 
that material and visual examples from nature were no longer necessarily able 
to teach Kleist anything about which he could be certain.
modern state of Germany reached back to Lutheran Pietism. See Introduction, 
Chapters 1, 4 and 8 in Richard L. Gawthorp, Pietism and the making of 
eighteenth-century Prussia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)
56 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 95.
57 Acts 9.18, King James Version.
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The material and visual world had been important to Kleist through his 
extrapolation of looking and seeing. Previously, a visual metaphor was 
attempted in the second part of the arch letter to Wilhelmine, when he tried 
to illustrate an idea of truth and purity using the analogy of the mirror saying, 
‘[…] the external (the nearer) side of the mirror is not really its most important 
part [….], the inner (the further) side is what counts most if the reflection is to 
be pure and true [… ]’.58 This idea of the two layers or sides of the mirror seems 
to be more sophistry than an effective analogy demarcating an idea about 
the mirror’s potential to represent truth for, and of, the individual reflected. 
Nevertheless, the metaphor is conjured from visual imagery and leads to 
questions of seeing and the appearance of things. It was through faith in the 
visual, material world – of what he saw before his eyes, especially in nature, the 
history of natural philosophy, and constructions such as the arch, that Kleist 
had derived his concept of ‘Truth’. Kleist had reasoned a theory of knowledge 
based on an idea that what is knowable can be demonstrated, because the 
capacity of the visible world of nature offered empirical truths. In this letter 
Kleist saw no problem in using the mirror as a metaphor depicting truth, yet he 
failed to question what kind of truth the mirror can hold, and whether indeed 
the mirror can offer any kind of truth. Yet, despite working with the metaphor 
and becoming more ambivalent about what certainties it may deliver Kleist 
does not question this concept of the mirror and it’s potential for consciousness 
as assiduously as it was by other contemporary post-Kantians, such as Novalis, 
who commented: ‘Image and being change. The image is always the inverse of 
being. What is right on the person, is left in the image.’59 According to Manfred 
Frank, Novalis argues that while the mirror confirms the conscious being, it is 
compromised because we ‘[…] misrecognize our identity as the interplay of two 
reflections, an I-subject and an I-object’.60 In this way Novalis uses the idea of 
the mirror to question how the conscious subject is determined and perpetually 
misconstrued.
The problem of the Kantian ‘despair of the truth’61 is addressed by Nietzsche, 
who offers a critical viewpoint on Kant and the thinking of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries mediated from the perspective of German 
philosophy seventy-five years later. In his 1874 essay, ‘Schopenhauer as 
Educator’, Nietzsche argues:
58 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 77.
59 Quoted in Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma, eds., The Modern Subject: 
Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1995), p. 84. [from Novalis Schriften; die Werke 
Friedrich von Hardenbergs, vol 2, p. 142]
60 Manfred Frank ‘Philosophical Foundations of Early Romanticism’, in Ibid. p. 75.
61 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, ed. by Daniel Breazeale, trans. by 
R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 140.
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This danger attends every thinker who sets out from the Kantian 
philosophy […] If Kant ever should begin to exercise any wide influence 
we shall be aware of it in the form of a gnawing and disintegrating 
scepticism and relativism; and only the most active and novel spirits 
who have never been able to exist in a state of doubt would there appear 
instead that undermining and despair of truth such as Heinrich von 
Kleist, for example, experience as the effect of the Kantian philosophy. 
“Not long ago”, he writes in his moving way, “I became acquainted 
with the Kantian philosophy” – […] 62
These are intriguing observations concerning the uncertainty of truth laid 
down by Kant, and Nietzsche is sympathetic to their shattering effect on Kleist. 
Additionally, Nietzsche’s quote from Kleist’s letter to Wilhelmine not only 
contributes to the body of critique censuring Kant, but also demonstrates the 
circulation and readership of Kleist’s collected letters. Nietzsche maintains that 
Kleist and Hölderlin ‘were ruined by their uncommonness’,63 and says with 
reference to Kleist that ‘[…] the most terrible antidote to uncommon men is to 
drive them so deep into themselves that when they re-emerge it is always as a 
volcanic eruption’.64 Nietzsche suggests that the way that Kleist read Kant is 
significant, and that there was, however, a way of avoiding the terrible eruption 
within that came, though too late for Kleist, in the form of the guidance offered 
by Schopenhauer, ‘[…] the leader who leads us from the depths of sceptical 
gloom or criticizing renunciation up to the heights of tragic contemplation’.65 
This was achieved in the way that Schopenhauer identified, contemplated and 
explored his own subjectivity and extrapolated this experience to all.66 In the 
preparatory, unpublished notebooks from 1873 Nietzsche notes his thinking 
on Kleist, that following his reading of Kant he suffered from ‘an excess of 
thought’67 and that these tormented thoughts were ‘ineffectual’68 because 
he was ‘lacking Schopenhauer’.69 Notably, Nietzsche took Kleist’s struggle 
with Kant more seriously than later writers. Nietzsche provides an effective, 
historically located commentary on how Kleist read Kant, as he identifies
62 Ibid. Kleist was an important reference for Nietzsche. In 1859, when he was 
fifteen, Nietzsche was pleased to receive Kleist’s collected works as a Christmas 
present, see: Curtis Cate, Friedrich Nietzsche (London: Hutchinson, 2002)
p. 22. Kleist’s anecdote ‘Prayer of Zarathustra’ published in 1810 is a possible 
source for Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883–1885).
63 Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, p. 138.
64 Ibid. p. 140.
65 Ibid. p. 141.
66 See Nietzsche, ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’, Part 1, in Untimely Meditations, 
pp. 127–30. Nietzsche outlines his thoughts on the way the conscience should 
be followed “ ‘Be yourself!’ ”, p. 127.
67 Friedrich Nietzsche, Unpublished Writings: from the period of 
‘Unfashionable Observations’, trans. with an afterword Richard T. Gray 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 284
68 Ibid. pp. 284 and 297.
69 Ibid. p. 274.
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where the paths of thought from Kant to his own writing can be traced via 
Schopenhauer.
The collapse of truth was the key to the breakdown of Kleist’s thinking, yet 
Maass asks how ‘[…] so intelligent a young man had never reflected on the 
relativity of human truths’ and in part answers this question by suggesting 
that Kleist held on to the ‘mystical truth-cult’70 from his youth. Therefore, 
for Kleist, truth was incontrovertible and had an objective, almost material 
quality, so that when he compiles the list of empirical truths he has gathered 
for Wilhelmine, they are collectible entities that (apparently) cannot be 
dismantled. Kleist’s letters to Ulrike and Wilhelmine after he read Kant’s 
Critique offer a thought-provoking insight into the way in which he grappled 
with and understood Kant’s concept of subjectivity and the construction of 
the modern subject. While the problem for Kleist scholars is focused on what 
he read of Kant’s critical writing, it should perhaps be questioned how he read 
the Critique(s). Was Kleist’s reading of Kant more singular than that of anyone 
else at the time? That Kant was read in multiple ways during his lifetime and 
immediately thereafter is the initial premise advanced by Ameriks when he 
identifies ‘the phenomenon of a lack of consensus in the interpretation of Kant’s 
philosophy’.71 This was demonstrated in the earliest elucidations of Kantian 
thought, especially by Reinhold and Fichte72 who did much to establish the 
concept of the modern subject, yet did so differently. The last two decades of 
the eighteenth and the first two decades of the nineteenth centuries were an 
intensely productive period for German philosophy, during which time the 
response to Kant’s Critiques generated the work of the Kantians, Reinhold 
and Fichte; and the post-Kantians, Hölderlin and Novalis; shaped the work 
of the Jena Romantics, such as Friedrich Schlegel, and also impinged on the 
subsequent work of Schelling and Hegel – points of view and perspectives 
changed rapidly. From the time of the publication of the first Critique in 1781, 
the figure of Kant looms large. German philosophical writing was contingent 
upon how Kant changed philosophical thought. This was the time and place in 
which Kleist lived73 and his collision with Kantian thought seems inevitable, or 
70 Maass, Kleist: a biography, p. 35.
71 Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical 
Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), p. 32.
72 Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823) published ‘Letters on the Kantian 
Philosophy’ in Der Teutsche Merkur in 1786; was the first chair of critical 
philosophy dedicated to teaching Kantian philosophy at Jena in 1787. Johan 
Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) Wissenschaftslehre (Doctrine of Scientific 
Knowledge) (1790) extrapolated a scientific system of knowledge in the Kantian 
mode. Fichte was Jena’s second chair of critical philosophy in 1794. Jena was a 
unique site for philosophy and the origins of Romantic thinking until it fell to 
Napoleon’s army in the Battle of Jena in October 1806.
73 A short time later Kleist moved in literary and philosophical circles making 
connections especially with the Jena Romantics – he knew Novalis’s brother, 
August von Hardenberg. The von Hardenberg family gave Kleist access to 
Novalis’s papers in order prepare and publish them, see Maass, Kleist: a biography, 
p. 137. Kleist also knew August Schlegel, and Friedrich Schlegel (mentioned in a 
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at least difficult to avoid. By the time Kleist read Kant’s critical philosophy, the 
first Critique had been published for twenty years.
Most literary critics are broadly in agreement that Kleist suffered badly after 
reading Kant’s critical writing early in 1801. This period in his life has been 
referred to as the ‘Kant crisis’. Some Kleist scholars from the Germanistik 
field are rather dismissive of Kant’s effect on Kleist, such as Ensenberg, who 
asserts that since it is unclear which of Kant’s Critiques Kleist read, Kant is 
therefore not significant.74 This is demonstrably not the case, particularly if 
Kleist’s decade of writing from 1802 to 1811 is positioned historically, as it 
occurs immediately after reading Kant’s critical writing, and within the phase 
of the fervent expansion of German philosophical thought. In discussing this 
further, Mehigan weaves an equivocal argument concerning the significance of 
Kant to Kleist, stating that Kleist ‘[…] though arguably a philosophical mind, 
was no actual philosopher’.75 Mehigan’s argument is contingent upon his over-
determined assessment of Kant’s response to Hume’s thoughts on scepticism; 
and that Hume’s scepticism was consequently the more significant strand of 
thinking, because it was in turn absorbed and addressed by Kant. Mehigan 
claims that subsequently, this infected Kleist’s thought – even though there is 
no evidence that Kleist actually read Hume.76 Through this, Mehigan works to 
retrieve and foreground Hume over Kant via the concept of scepticism. This is 
not to say that scepticism was not important for Kant (or even Kleist), but it is 
not as pivotal as Mehigan claims. However, contra to Mehigan’s perspective, 
if Kleist’s writing is considered in terms of his connection to Kant through 
the idea of uncertainty as it appears both pre- and post-Critique, then a 
clearer trace of the collapse of the foundations of pre-determined thought and 
concepts of the veracity of truth can be drawn from Kant to Kleist’s thinking. 
Uncertainty is the repeating motif of the territory Kleist’s characters inhabit, 
whereby the collapse of certainty creates an arbitrary, cruel and violent world 
from where there is little or no hope of transcendence. Theories of uncertainty 
define Kleist as a writer.
letter to Adolfine von Werdeck, 29 July 1801, An Abyss Deep Enough, p.122). 
Ludwig Tieck staged one of Kleist’s plays and later collected his letters. It is possible 
that Kleist may have encountered Reinhold as he met and stayed with Reinhold’s 
father-in-law, the poet and philosopher, Christoph Martin Weiland.
74 Quoted and referred to in Timothy J. Mehigan, Heinrich von Kleist: Writing 
after Kant. (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2011), p. 16.
75 Ibid. p. 5.
76 Mehigan asserts the importance of Hume: ‘While Kleist scholarship has been 
unsuccessful in determining which of Kant’s texts led to the sceptical turn in 
Kleist’s thinking there may be some grounds for the view that Kleist discovered 
such scepticism in the very assumptions that Kant used to construct his 
philosophy. […] In this sense it could be argued that Kleist reads beyond Kant 
to Hume’, Ibid. p. 38. Mehigan argues backwards from Kant to Hume. For 
Kant, Hume is of interest especially in the revised ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ 
pp. 138, 146, 225 and in Kant’s ‘Transcendental Doctrine of Method’ in 
Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 627–704.
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It has been suggested by some critics and commentators about Kleist77 that the 
purported ‘Kant crisis’ induced Kleist to write. However, rather than accepting 
the equation of Kant = writing, it is more that Kleist’s tormented transition 
between empirical and critical thinking became the foundation, as well as 
the tenor and the themes he explored in his writing, and not the impetus for 
writing per se. The evidence of the letters already demonstrates that he is a 
writer, and had begun to think of himself as such; for example, his request to 
both Wilhelmine and Ulrike to keep his notes shows that Kleist was collecting 
material for his later use as a writer.78 The recognizable modernity in Kleist’s 
so-called ‘crisis’ is that even though it was problematic for him, he nevertheless 
learned from Kant’s Critiques, and he engaged with these contemporary ideas, 
however reluctantly. In the letter of 13 November 1800, written to Wilhelmine 
immediately before the arch letter, Kleist acknowledged:
[…] I have certain abilities, I mean uncommon abilities – I believe this 
because no field of knowledge seems too difficult for me, because I make 
quick progress, […] – and, finally, I believe it because others assure me 
it is true. […] Then for my future the entire field of writing would stand 
open to me. I feel that I would be very pleased to work at it.79
This reveals several things: that the new philosophical thinking from Kant 
would subsequently pose no intellectual difficulties for Kleist; that people 
around Kleist considered him as a remarkable intellect;80 and that his self-
perception as a writer was becoming more fixed in Kleist’s mind – importantly, 
this pre-dates his reading of Kant’s Critique. While reading Kant caused 
Kleist considerable anguish, and made him wretched and miserable, he 
nevertheless understood the implications of Kant’s Critique and faced them 
squarely. Perhaps that is part of the modernity of his thought: that he could 
not go back to his previous guileless certainty to a state of unknowingness, 
he could not un-learn the insights gained from Kant’s critical philosophy. An 
epiphany is not necessarily a positive or pleasurable experience; thus, reading 
Kant was revelatory, and though he abhorred the implications of Kant’s 
Critique, nevertheless the new way of thinking became important for Kleist’s 
development, yet did not on its own cause Kleist to become a writer.
Apart from the letters, Kleist’s only substantial writing prior to reading Kant’s 
77 See for example: ‘Kleist’s “Kant Crisis” and Its Consequences’, pp. 15–32, in 
Mehigan Heinrich von Kleist: Writing after Kant; and also Luke and Reeves’s 
introduction, in Heinrich von Kleist, The Marquise of O– and other Stories, 
trans. and introduced by David Luke and Nigel Reeves (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1978), pp. 9–10. Kleist’s reading of Kant’s (unnamed) Critique in 1800 
is generalised, described and accepted by the shorthand term: the ‘Kant crisis’.
78 See Note 17, Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 57.
79 Ibid. p. 74–75, letter to Wilhelmine 13 November 1800.
80 See Maass, Kleist: a biography, p. 126.
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Critique was the essay - Aufsatz, den sichern Weg des Glücks zu finden 
und ungestört – auch unter den größten Drangsalen des Lebens – ihn zu 
genießen (Essay on the secure way to find happiness and undisturbed – also 
among the greatest hardships of life – to enjoy it) (1798). This was a very long 
and rambling piece of prose. It is not a particularly good work of writing 
or thinking, and is no indication of what kind of writer Kleist would later 
become. The primary importance of this essay is its epistolary style, where the 
mode of address ‘mein teurer Freund’ [my dear friend] to no one in particular 
marks a transition between the letter and the essay. Ultimately, through the 
subjectivity of the letters to Ulrike and Wilhelmine, Kleist has personalized 
and documented, in intensely modern terms, his intellectual struggle as he 
grapples with himself as an autonomous subject. In the intimate, subjective 
space of the letters to Ulrike and Wilhelmine, and later to Marie von Kleist, 
there is a sense of rawness where the protective layer put on for the world has 
been peeled off, though Kleist may not have had much of a protective layer in 
the first place. Perhaps part of Kleist’s wretchedness lay in mourning the loss 
of his old thinking – but what has he really lost? He has lost a particular style 
of reasoning based on empirical observation, one already abandoned by his 
contemporaries who had read and worked with Kant’s critical philosophy.
Possibly as a consequence, Kleist abandoned his studies in natural philosophy 
and mathematics. However, Kleist may not have been so totally immobilised by 
his loss of conviction in empiricism. In the letter to Ulrike of 5 February 1801 
it is clear that he has indeed read the ‘Kantean paper’, to which he previously 
referred:
The very pillar totters that I have clung to in this whirling tide of life. I 
mean my love for the pursuit of knowledge. But once again how may I 
ever explain myself? […]. Knowledge cannot possibly be man’s highest: 
to do is better than to know.81
In this part of his letter to Ulrike, he describes in architectural terms how the 
previously solid pillars of knowledge are now in a state of collapse, yet at the 
same time the image of clinging to a pillar is in itself suggestive of desperation 
and uncertainty. This is a compelling architectural analogy of collapse, of 
architecture in the moment when it fails and is teetering towards its imminent 
downfall as collapse. However, he seems to find it too unbearable to confront 
the result that his ‘pursuit of knowledge’ has yielded something unexpected: an 
entirely new form of knowledge – that of uncertainty. Yet, the outcome was not 
totally bleak, because further down this paragraph he says:
81 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 93. Kleist’s emphasis.
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[…] must I go from one field of study to another, always swimming on 
the surface and never touching the depths? And so the pillar totters. 
Of course I have a store of ideas in answer to all this confusion. As yet, 
none of them is ripe.82
At the very moment when Kleist’s previous thinking has collapsed, he is already 
acknowledging that ideas are emerging that ‘answer’ his internal state of 
‘confusion’ and uncertainty, and are productive. This letter to Ulrike suggests 
that, while Kleist’s struggle with Kant is significant, it is the way in which 
the Critique engenders ‘a store of ideas’ that demonstrates he is thinking his 
way out of the dilemma with Kant through the search for a new language 
to ‘explain myself’, which is of more significance for Kleist as a reader and 
a thinker. As a consequence, Kleist begins to rebuild his sense of what is 
knowable, while mourning the loss of his previous certainty. Six months later 
he wrote to a friend:
[…] when a ruthless destiny distracts us, […] when necessity compels 
us to think, to die, to act; when new ideas appear but to vanish once 
more […] if then at moments, fleetingly, with spent soul we climb the 
cherished ruins to pluck the little blossom of remembrance, but find 
here too that all is empty and waste, the finest hewn blocks in dust 
and ashes, the few last columns on the verge of collapse, the entire 
monument structure level, finally, and flat like the plain on which it has 
stood […] 83
It is through the use of architectural terminology and material ideas that Kleist 
is able to portray the scale of the destruction of his previous mode of thinking, 
where empiricism had been used to build elaborate metaphors. It is for this 
reason that the concept of collapse, rather than the confusion and immobility 
of ‘crisis’, is a more effective representation of the internal ferocity of the 
change in Kleist’s thinking, which quickly became externalized through his 
writing, as letters and then as literature. This outcome was always a possibility, 
since his empirical observation of the collapsing arch anticipated that potential, 
where collapse was a material and external imminence.
The reference to architecture and the imminent collapse of the stones of the 
arch did not disappear from Kleist’s thinking after his encounter with Kant’s 
Critique; it later appeared in Penthesilea,84 where one of the main characters 
addresses the queen of the Amazons:
82 Ibid. p. 93.
83 Ibid. p. 117.
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prothoë […] If the whole weight 
  Of hell bears down upon you, do not falter! 
  Stand, stand as does the vaulted arch stand firm 
  Because each of its blocks inclines to fall! 
  Present your head, the keystone, to the gods 
  And all their gathered lightening, and cry: Strike! 
  And let yourself be split from head to toe, 
  But do not waver in yourself again 
  So long as one breath still has power to bind 
  The stones and mortar in this youthful breast.85
The reference to the arch is threefold: it recalls the analogy of the collapsing 
arch in the letter to Wilhelmine, it reprises the notion that the arch wants to 
collapse, and also invokes the architecture of classicism. Kleist uses the historic 
location of the play to scratch back the surface of classicism in order to find 
collapse as the chaos represented in The Iliad, suggesting that everyone loses. In 
addition, this subverts of the classicism of Goethe and Schiller.
For Kleist the questions concerning the certainty of knowledge persisted 
throughout his writing, even to his late, and best-known, essay, Über das 
Marionettentheater (Concerning the Marionette Theatre).86 The essay plays 
with concepts and formations of knowledge. This curious and compelling 
piece is written as a remembered dialogue between Herr C., the chief dancer 
from an unnamed opera, and the protagonist recording and remembering 
the exchange. As with the arch letter, Kleist aggregates a series of examples 
to demonstrate this: the marionette on strings held by another; dancers 
in the theatre; a youth who becomes fettered by the acquisition of self-
consciousness; and a bear that intuitively parries a fencing master. This essay 
creates an ominous and uneasy atmosphere. The two speak of the nature of 
the marionette; the dancer says that its ‘advantage’ over a real dancer is that 
84 Penthesilea. Neunter Auftritt (scene 9)
prothoë [...] So sei’s auch wie ein Riese! Sinke nicht,
  Und wenn der ganze Orkus auf dich drückte!
  Steh, stehe fest, wie das Gewölbe steht,
  Weil seiner Blöcke jeder stürzen will!
  Beut deine Scheitel, einem Schlußstein gleich,
   Der Götter Blitzen dar, und rufe, trefft!
   Und laß dich bis zum Fuß herab zerspalten,
   Nicht aber wanke in dir selber mehr,
   So lang ein Athem Mörtel und Gestein,
   In dieser jungen Brust, zusammenhält.
Heinrich von Kleist, Penthesilea: ein Trauerspiel [Facsimile reprint of the original 
edition, Tübingen: Cotta, 1808] (Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1980), p. 72.
85 Heinrich von Kleist, Penthesilea, trans. by Joel Agee (New York: Harper 
Collins, 1998), p. 62.
86 Published in the Abendblätter from 12 to 15 December 1810.
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‘[…] it would be incapable of affectation’.87 He tells the protagonist that “Such 
blunders […] are unavoidable since we have eaten of the tree of knowledge.”88 
Through the device of the dialogue-essay Kleist contends that knowledge is 
knowingness or self-consciousness, and that the mechanics of the marionette 
creates an intuition, or intuition-in-kind, since the movement of the puppet 
is removed from, or at the same time, transposed from the dancer operating 
it. The Germanistik literary critic Luanne Frank discusses this proposition, 
arguing that it is a representation of Kleist’s concept of ‘Gefühl, or feeling, 
intimate personal intuitiveness […] The marionette doesn’t think, doesn’t 
reason her way through the dance; her flawless moves are guided by the 
equivalents of human intuition.’89 In this comment, Luanne Frank does not 
clarify how Kleist applies the concept of Gefühl or what is understood as 
‘human intuition’ or the origins of this idea. Über das Marionettentheater 
emerges as an encounter of the impossibility of reconciliation between intuition 
and knowledge. Is Kleist suggesting that intuition exists outside knowledge? 
While for Kant intuition is the facility of an object or idea to have a form 
or representation; is the Marionette therefore an appearance? Or is Kleist 
suggesting that this a transitory moment between the unselfconscious state 
and one of self-consciousness, as in the example offered by the protagonist of 
the Marionette essay about the youth, who together with the protagonist had 
seen the Spinario sculpture of a young man pulling a thorn from his foot;90 and 
later, after swimming, as the youth dried his foot, he recognised the gesture 
and caught sight of himself and mentioned it to his friend. He tried to repeat 
the unselfconscious gesture but failed each time, as he was now conscious of his 
action, as the protagonist recounts:
“From that day, as though from that very moment, an inconceivable 
transformation began in that young man. He would stand for whole 
days in front of the mirror; one charm after that other fell from him.”91
For Kleist, the mirror has now become the instrument for identifying and 
locating self-consciousness, rather than its previous capacity as a metaphor of 
truth.
It is arguable that in Über das Marionettentheater Kleist is actually proposing 
something bold, that is, the exploration of the self as it is performed: the 
87 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 213.
88 Ibid.
89 Luanne Frank, ‘No way out: Heinrich von Kleist’s Erdbeben in Chile’, in The 
Lisbon Earthquake of 1755: Representations and Reactions, p. 276.
90 Referred to as the Dornauszieher or Spinario (Thorn Puller) anon. bronze, 
Capiotline Museums, Rome. A version of this sculpture is in the Pergamon 
Museum, Berlin. Kleist’s essay suggests it is in Paris. See H. W. Janson, A 
History of Art (London: Thames and Hudson, 1977), p.12, Fig 4.
91 Über das Marionettentheater in Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 215.
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puppet, the dancer, the youth by the mirror, and the fencing master, while they 
are grappling with their conscious selves they are at the same time performing 
them; and that self-consciousness, or the knowingness of the conscious subject 
has another layer in performance, but one that has been compromised or failed 
in the iterations of theatrical repetition. For Kleist each imperfect iteration of a 
performance becomes one of collapse. Reading Über das Marionettentheater 
in this light, it is possible to draw a link to Novalis’s concept, noted by 
Manfred Frank, that ‘[…] being is beyond consciousness and the conception of 
philosophy as an infinite, never ending approximation […]’.92 It can be further 
extrapolated, as far as Kleist is concerned, that ‘approximation’ is the persistent 
problem and the limitation of the performer, and perhaps even of theatre itself. 
While Novalis was ostensibly writing an appraisal summary in his Fichte 
Studien (1795), according to Manfred Frank, it became more of a critique with 
‘perspicuity and argumentative agility’,93 and the position of ‘approximation’ 
was resolved for Novalis where:
[…] the meaning of “being” is essentially “being identical.” However, 
in order to express this identity in the form of a judgement we must 
step outside of it: we must, Novalis thinks, step outside of it: “We leave 
behind the identical in order to represent it.”94
This sense of being, where being exceeds consciousness and does not yield any 
certainty in itself, was iterated in a number of different formations by Novalis; 
for example, ‘[c]onsciousness is a being in being outside of being.’95 This 
construction of consciousness by Novalis has a spatial quality, whereby the 
spaces are created by serial intuitions rather than observations. Novalis further 
established questions of the subject when he asked: 
What do we mean by “I”? 
Has not Fichte too arbitrarily packed everything into the I? With what 
warrant? 
Can an I posit itself as I, without another I or Not–I – /How are I and 
Not-I opposable/ 96
Novalis demonstrates a capacity for experimentation with concepts of the 
92 Manfred Frank ‘Philosophical Foundations of Early Romanticism’, in 
Ameriks and Sturma The Modern Subject: Conceptions of Self in Classical 
German Philosophy p. 72–73.
93 Ibid. p. 72.
94 Ibid. p. 73. [Novalis quoted from Novalis Shriften: die Werke Friedrich 
von Hardenbergs ed. by P. Kluckhohn and R. Samuel, Vol. 4, (Stuttgart: W. 
Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960/75), p.188]
95 Ibid. p. 74. [from Novalis, Novalis Shriften, Volume 2, p. 106, quoted in 
Manfred Frank, ‘Philosophical Foundations of Early Romanticism’] 
96 Novalis Fichte Studies, ed. and trans. Jane Kneller (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) p. 7.
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subject. While he did not espouse Novalis’s concept of the subject,97 Kleist 
was closer to Novalis’s questions of and inquiry into consciousness and found 
correspondence with Novalis’s tough, incisive thinking through the poetics of 
the aphorisms and notes.98
The problem of knowledge experienced by Kleist as the outcome of reading 
Kant’s critical writing had caused an inner collapse from which he never 
retreated, since he could not return to a state of unknowingness. Über das 
Marionettentheater (On the Marionette Theatre) ends with the following 
exchange between the two men, where another mirror metaphor appears:
“[…] just as our image, as we approach a concave mirror, vanishes to 
infinity only to reappear before our eyes, so will grace, having likewise 
traversed the infinite, return to us once more, and so appear most purely 
in that bodily form that has either no consciousness at all or an infinite 
one, which is to say either a puppet or a god.”99
This suggests that Kleist had moved closer to Novalis’s concept of the mirror, 
that the metaphors had changed by this late stage of his writing, and that the 
mirror was now an ambivalent place in terms of the emerging concept of the 
subject: the mirror had become an uncertain site in which to search for or find 
consciousness:
“That means,” I said, somewhat amused, “that we would have to eat 
of the tree of knowledge a second time to fall back into the state of 
innocence.” 
“Of course,” he answered, ‘and that is the final chapter in the history of 
the world.”100
Kleist plays with the impossibility of a return to a previous state of 
unknowingness, of a return to ‘innocence.’ Yet there is a circular play of 
beginning and end between the Biblical ‘tree of knowledge’ and the revelation 
of apocalypse,101 a further assertion of knowledge as collapse. This exploration 
of knowledge as concepts of knowledge and knowingness, consciousness and 
innocence, echoes Kleist’s own transition from empirical to critical thinking. In 
his writings on Fichte, Novalis plotted a careful route in relation to concepts of 
97 See Ibid. pp. 166–72.
98 In Dresden in 1807 Kleist started a publishing venture with his two oldest 
friends – Rühle and Pfuel along with other literary figures; the Hardenberg 
family made Novalis’s complete works available for publication. See Maass 
Kleist; a biography, pp. 124–40, especially p. 140.
99 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 216.
100 Ibid.
101 From the Greek: apokalypsis; apo– ‘un’ + kaluptein ‘to cover’. Oxford 
Dictionary of English, Third Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010)
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truth, cautioning against ‘[a]ll searching for a single principle would be like the 
attempt to square the circle.’102 This had been the method of Kleist’s previous 
empirical mode of thinking, whereby the belief in truth had been singular and 
universalizing. By the time that Kleist wrote Über das Marionettentheater in 
1810, consciousness of knowledge was the question pervading his inquiry.
The question of truth as such is not a theme that is explored or recurs 
in Kleist’s fictional writing or plays, whereas the concept of certainty is. 
Therefore, when he says, ‘We can never be certain that what we call Truth 
is really Truth […],’103 the key point is not so much truth as the certainty of 
truth. The loss of certainty is the collapse that Kleist suffered; he was haunted 
by uncertainty, and uncertainty became the spectre at the heart of his writing 
and determined the fate of his characters. Returning to the image of the arch, 
the inference can be drawn that, throughout Kleist’s previous correspondence, 
certainty is the keystone of his concept of knowledge, and once that was 
undermined, then the arch of knowledge collapsed. In the themes explored 
in his fictional writing the collapse of certainty is the means Kleist uses to 
explicate an arbitrary, incomprehensible and cruel world, in which the state 
fails its people and violence determines the ill-fated lives of the characters.
3. Kant and the geometry of the arch
Despite the uncertainty as to precisely which of Kant’s Critiques Kleist read at 
the time of the so-called crisis in February and March of 1801, it is nevertheless 
constructive to work with some of the ideas from Kant that appear the most 
likely to have contributed not only to the source of so much grief for Kleist, 
but that irretrievably changed his thinking. Kleist’s previously held concept of 
knowledge transmuted from empirical to critical or a priori. In the empirical 
observation Kleist believes he is making about the arch, he simultaneously, and 
perhaps inadvertently, constructed a spatial and geometrical model that offers 
scope for further analysis with reference to Kant’s critical philosophy. There 
is much in Kant’s writing on the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ that is significant 
to this discussion of the space of the arch and what the geometry of this space 
may delineate.
As Kant begins to introduce the idea of the transcendental aesthetic, he lays out 
the idea that:
The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we 
are affected by it, is sensation. That intuition which is related to the 
102 Novalis, Fichte Studies, p. 168. Novalis’s emphasis.
103 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 95.
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object through sensation is called empirical. The undetermined object of 
an empirical intuition is called appearance.104
There is a sense that Kant is carefully paring away what the expectation of 
empiricism is and how the object is determined by sensation as empiricism. 
Kant concludes these introductory remarks by saying that:
In the transcendental aesthetic we will therefore first isolate sensibility 
by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its 
concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. Second, we 
will then detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation 
so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the mere form 
of appearances, which is the only thing that sensibility can make 
available a priori. In this investigation it will be found that there are 
two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles of a priori cognition, 
namely space and time, with the assessment of which we will now be 
concerned.105
For Kant, intuition is the capacity of the object to be represented, to be 
representational, and as such, geometry. The empirical intuition as appearance 
becomes, or has the qualities of, form, though this would only be possible if it 
is accepted that form is a delineation or marker of geometry. When he refers 
to ‘the form of appearances’ this suggests the idea of an external shell, and 
perhaps this external form wraps around the a priori cognition or knowledge. 
Kant begins his discussion of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ by stating what 
space is not:
1) Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer 
experiences. […] 
2) Space is a necessary representation a priori, which is the ground of all 
outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, although 
one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in 
it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of 
appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a 
priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.106
In this way Kant suggests that space is the outward appearance of possibility, 
of an idea of immanence, that something might come into being, of something 
impending, but this does not necessarily have to be an actual form, though the 
latter is not absolutely ruled out. There is, therefore, always the possibility that 
104 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.155. Use of bold type Kant’s emphasis.
105 Ibid. p. 157.
106 Ibid. p. 158.
70
an ‘object’ may at some point be ‘encountered in it’. At the same, time he seems 
to suggest that space is the site or ‘ground of all outer intuitions’ and a place 
from where ‘intuitions’ emerge or become form as geometry.
If, as Kant says above, one can ‘never represent that there is no space’, how 
does he contend that there is indeed space? How can this double negative be 
understood here? Is it that the idea that the ‘never’ and the ‘no’ rule each other 
out? Perhaps through this double negative Kant is cautiously suggesting that 
space does exist in itself, as does time, but only in as much that he cannot say 
that it does not, rather than that it actually does exist. And if an object were 
to be encountered in space, does that then become the means by which space is 
indicated; and is this only because of the very fact of its intrusion? Would that 
break then be the insertion of time, since that object has broken the previously 
empty space and created a marker or interruption? In the ‘Transcendental 
Aesthetic’ Kant’s discussion of time begins with the following statements:
1) Time is not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an 
experience. […] Only under its presupposition can one represent that 
several things exist at one and the same time (simultaneously) or at 
different times (successively). 
2) Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. 
[…] Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is all actuality of 
appearances possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself, as 
the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be removed.107
Therefore, Kant suggests that since time is not empirical, within the supposition 
of time actuality is always and at the same time possible, and that this 
possibility is a perpetual and inherent imminence. Returning to Kant’s previous 
comment at the outset of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, where he said that 
‘[t]he undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance’108 
even if appearances are taken away, time cannot be taken away, as it is 
continuous; and, because it is continuous, time allows for the possibility of 
appearance. Later on, Kant states:
In space considered in itself there is nothing moveable; hence the moveable 
must be something that is found in space only through experience, thus 
an empirical datum. In the same way the transcendental aesthetic cannot 
count the concept of alteration among its a priori data; for time itself does 
not alter but only something that is within time.109
107 Ibid. p. 162.
108 Ibid. p. 178.
109 Ibid. p. 167.
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Here, Kant says that space in and of itself is not moveable, but in space – 
through the mechanism of experience, which could be regarded as being time 
or within time – space becomes moveable. In this way it is possible to return to 
a consideration of Kleist’s metaphor of the arch that is held in place because all 
of its stones are trying to collapse ‘auf einmal’ (at the same time) and suggest 
that it could be seen to demonstrate an idea where appearance can contain both 
space and time. In short, the arch may collapse given time. Kant also seems to 
be suggesting that time does not or cannot care about anything else, that time 
will carry on with or without space or the advent of other things.
While the arch, as described by Kleist, marks out space, his formation is also a 
construction in and of time. When he says of the arch that ‘all the stones tend 
to collapse at the same time’, the compelling image is not that the arch remains 
standing but that the stones are locked together into a formation of collapse. 
This inherent quality is the idea of the stones; this at-the-same-timeness or ‘auf 
einmal’ is a quality of time and in time. The idea of the stones collapsing ‘auf 
einmal’ suggests that this does not just occur simultaneously, but that in this 
collapse time is non-linear. Therefore in identifying this sense of the stones of 
the arch collapsing ‘auf einmal’, or having the quality of at-the-same-timeness, 
Kleist has inadvertently uncovered something beyond the empirical because 
time offers another quality, the potential for another form of knowledge 
– that of the a priori ground, or what can be derived from understanding 
and exploration of time as a separate intellectual inquiry. Clearly, at that 
moment Kleist was not able to recognize, embrace or work with such a radical 
departure in his own thinking, even though this quality of time that holds in it 
the potential of collapse is an ‘auf einmal’ of the stones of the arch and of the 
collapse of his own thinking.
But then space is surely the means by which time is differentiated. Is space 
conditional? In the previously articulated conclusions to the concepts on space, 
Kant says that ‘[s]pace is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances 
of outer sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone 
outer intuition is possible for us.’110 The notion here is that there may be 
something that is, at the very least, possible, that there may be appearance, 
or geometry. Further, in the revised version of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, 
Kant asserts that:
Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one must, to 
be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in 
an infinite set of different possible representations. […] Therefore the 
original representation of space is an a priori intuition, not a concept.111
110 Ibid. p. 159.
111 Ibid. p. 157.
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For Kant representation is not or does not become, of necessity, form, or 
geometry, ‘For one cannot derive synthetic a priori propositions from any 
such representation, as one can from intuition in space.’112 At the same time, 
Kant strongly cautions against any illustration of the concept as unreliable 
distraction. He suggests that ‘ideality’ does not become or is not the same as 
‘intuition in space’, even though it is connected to the:
[…] representation of space in belonging to the subjective constitution 
of the kind of sense, e.g., of sight, of hearing, and feeling through the 
sensations of colours, sounds and warmth, which, however, since they 
are merely sensations and not intuitions, do not in themselves allow any 
object to be cognized, least of all a priori. The aim of this remark is only 
to prevent one from thinking of illustrating the asserted ideality of space 
with completely inadequate examples, since things like colours, taste 
etc., are correctly considered not as qualities of but mere alterations of 
our subject, which can even be different in different people.’113
This may seem to pre-empt the possibility of putting forward the suggestion 
that a metaphor such as Kleist’s arch may be interpreted in the light of 
Kant’s theories of space and time. While this may be the case, it is more to 
prevent the over-reliance on the notion that experience can deliver any certain 
understanding of space and time, that we cannot be sure that one person sees 
the same thing as another. This suggestion by Kant can be partly understood 
by returning to Kleist’s previously mentioned metaphor of the green glasses 
described to demonstrate how one person sees differently from another. Kant 
cautions against universalizing commonality and begins to construct the 
individual subject, ‘[f]or we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other 
thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition 
and that are universally valid for us.’114 In delineating the clarification of how 
‘appearances in space’ are to be judged, Kant argues:
The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the contrary, 
is a critical reminder that absolutely nothing that is intuited in space is 
a thing in itself, and that space is not a form that is proper to anything 
in itself, but rather that objects in themselves are not known to us at 
all, and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere 
representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose true 
correlate, i.e., the thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through 
them, but is also never asked after in experience.115
112 Ibid. p. 178.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid. p. 177.
115 Ibid.
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Thus the assertion here is that anything called or seen as an object is a 
representation of sensibility, where form has become space; however, the 
true meaning of the object or the ‘thing in itself’ (das Ding an sich) may be 
apprehended through an understanding of space, but that experience in itself 
cannot provide any particular knowledge of space.
In the light of the possibilities of space and time it is useful to consider how 
Kleist’s metaphor of the arch might be interpreted. In the arch, geometry is 
suggested. Returning to Kant’s earlier remarks concerning the ‘transcendental 
aesthetic’, Kleist’s metaphor of the arch would seem to be indicative of an 
‘appearance’; however, this is qualified, since in these terms it could be 
analysed as an ‘empirical intuition’, but this is tempered by the fact that it is 
not ‘undetermined’. The geometry suggested by the arch is one of an object 
and a space, as well as an object in space, since an arch creates a space at its 
centre. The space created can be used to move from one place to another, 
and consequently its use suggests a temporal quality, but also a demarcation 
between one place and another. This can be further demonstrated by 
considering Giorgio Agamben’s linguistic and axiomatic discussion of ‘Outside’ 
where he suggests:
Whatever is the figure of pure singularity […] Through this relation, 
as Kant said, singularity borders all possibility and thus receives its 
omnimoda determinatio not from its participation in a determinate 
concept of some actual property […] but only by means of this 
bordering. It belongs to a whole, but without this belonging’s being able 
to be represented by a real condition: Belonging, being-such, is here only 
the relation to an empty and indeterminate totality. 
In Kantian terms this means that what is in question in this bordering 
is not a limit (Schranke) that knows no exteriority, but a threshold 
(Grenze), that is, a point of contact with an external space that must 
remain empty.116
Agamben’s notion of the ‘threshold’ has a number of resonances with the figure 
of the arch since it materially and geometrically creates a threshold, and at 
the same time it is a figure of ‘singularity’ or, to return to the ‘Transcendental 
Aesthetic’, an ‘appearance’. This is both a ‘whole’ in itself and ‘belongs to a 
whole’, since structurally an arch is primarily a part of something – that is, the 
architecture and engineering of a building,117 rather than only ever being the 
116 Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael Hardt 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), p. 67. Agamben’s emphasis. 
117 This excludes the triumphal arches originating in Rome, such as those 
for Titus, Constantine and so on. Whereas for Wheeler, the architectural 
arch became the ‘symbol of Empire’, in Mortimer Wheeler, Roman Art and 
Architecture (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973), p. 153. Wheeler’s use of 
example of the arch to assert this point is testament to the centrality of the arch 
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thing itself, and that:
Whatever, in this sense, is the event of an outside. What is thought in 
the architranscendental quodlibet is, therefore, what is most difficult to 
think: the absolutely non-thing experience of a pure exteriority.118
Agamben further states:
The threshold is not, in this sense, another thing with respect to the 
limit; it is so to speak, the experience of the limit itself, the experience of 
the being – within an outside.119
This is a compelling and useful distinction and can be applied to the space 
created by the arch, since it remains within the boundaries of its own 
construction. The concept of the threshold is both the delineation of the inside 
and outside, where both exist simultaneously.
The nature of such demarcations is further raised in the construction of Kleist’s 
arch as a metaphor and as a diagrammatic drawing marking out the geometry 
of space (Fig. 1.9). By drawing the lines of the arch Kleist has drawn attention 
to the way space is made: not just of the arch itself as architecture, but the 
void has made space – the space is made through the drawing of its boundary. 
Since, if there is an arch, there is a space. The construction of the arch 
questions the concepts of boundary and limit: is the arch the edge or the end 
of the architectural construction, or is it the beginning of space? The arch is 
interstitial in architecture, not an or the end point. In his investigation of place, 
Casey explores these concerns:
This discussion leads us to distinguish between boundary and limit 
[…] For limit, like shape, belongs primarily to what is limited and only 
secondarily to what does the limiting (e.g., a container) […]120
Malpass and Thiel further suggest that, while Casey derives this theory 
fromAristotle, the difference between Kant and Aristotle is that:
[…] Aristotle uses the notion of boundary, together with that of 
containment, to characterise place, Kant uses the idea of place together 
with containment, to characterize the idea of boundary.121
as the visual icon of Roman architecture, engineering and political power.
118 Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 67.
119 Ibid. p. 68.
120 Casey, The Fate of Place, p. 63.
121 Jeff Malpas and Karsten Thiel, ‘Kant’s Geography of Reason’ in Reading 
Kant’s Geography, p. 198.
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While for Malpas and Theil this leads to the assertion that boundary is 
specifically geographical for Kant and therefore an aspect of the topographic, 
for Casey boundary is demarcated and delineated place, as defined by Aristotle. 
But, for Casey, this is not without problems:
To be a boundary, by contrast, is to be exterior to something or, more 
exactly, to be around it, enclosing it, acting as its surrounder. As such, 
a boundary belongs to the container rather than to the contained – and 
thus properly to place as the inner surface of the containing vehicle 
[…]122
Yet, while Casey’s propositions can be applied to identify the problem of the 
spatial properties of the arch, neither of these quite defines what is at work 
in the geometry of the arch. Malpas and Theil123 further take up the question 
of what the boundary may imply in their discussion of Kant’s analysis of the 
boundary in the Prolegomena. For Kant the boundary or boundedness is 
spatial and located:
Boundaries (in extended things) always presuppose a space that is 
found outside a certain fixed location, and that encloses that location; 
limits require nothing of the kind, but are mere negations that affect a 
magnitude insofar as it does not possess absolute completeness.124
Kant suggests that space is interrupted or intersected by the boundary, but 
that limit, because it is located is ultimately partial. Whereas Malpass and 
Thiel argue ‘[…] limits are merely negative so that the assertion of a limit need 
involve no commitment to anything that stands outside or goes beyond that 
which is limited’125 and therefore suggest that the limit has a singular or unified 
purpose, whereas the boundary is geographic because it is connected to the 
horizon and to place. However, if as Malpas and Thiel say, that ‘[…] a limit 
involves only a negation […]’126 would it mean that the stones that comprise 
the arch, since they construct the limit, become a negation? The problem of the 
limit here for Malpas and Thiel is that, in order to argue for it in such a way, 
the conception of the limit as a negation of the extent of space is necessarily on 
a horizontal plane and not a vertical geometry or architectural construction.
122 Casey, The Fate of Place, p. 63.
123 Malpas and Thiel, ‘Kant’s Geography of Reason’, in Reading Kant’s 
Geography, pp. 206–10.
124 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics: With Selections 
from the Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. by Gary Hatfield (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 106. See no. 57 ‘Conclusion On 
determining the boundary of pure reason’, pp.111. [4:351 – 4:357 especially 
4:352 and 4:354]
125 Malpas and Thiel, ‘Kant’s Geography of Reason’, in Reading Kant’s 
Geography, p. 206.
126 Ibid. p. 207.
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Returning to the example of the arch, the added complexity here is that the 
arch is not specifically a limit or a container. It makes space but holds nothing 
other than itself in place; there is a boundary. But, contrary to Casey, even 
though the boundary is a ‘surrounder’ and the stones of the inner surface of 
the arch become its limit, at the same time, the arch is dependent on place – 
it is, to return to Agamben, a threshold. In the space of the arch where does 
one find oneself? What happens when Kleist, or anyone, walks through the 
arch? Traversing the threshold created by the arch can only exist in time; and 
therefore time displaces the boundary or boundedness.
In the ‘Doctrine of Method’, towards the end of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant directs the discussion to questions of the use, context and limits of critical 
and practical reason, and moves towards a summation that:
All interest of my reason (the speculative as well as the practical) is 
united in the following three questions 
What can I know? 
What should I do? 
What may I hope? 
The first question is merely speculative. […] 
The second question is merely practical. As such to be sure, it can 
belong to pure reason, but in that case it is not transcendental, but 
moral, and thus it cannot be itself a subject for our critique. 
The third question, namely, if “I do what I should, what may I then 
hope?” is simultaneously practical and theoretical […] For all hope 
concerns happiness, and with respect to the practical and moral law it is 
the very same as what knowledge and the natural law is with regard to 
theoretical cognition of things.127
The integration of concepts in the ‘Doctrine of Method’ allows Kant to reflect 
on the potential that reason itself is a practice, which both proposes and 
answers such questions as these. But further, this articulates the knowledge of 
knowledge, or what one knows (or does not know) is self-consciousness. Later, 
in his Lectures on Logic, prepared for publication by Jäsche in 1800, Kant 
indicates an outline of what philosophy is, how reason works, what the work of 
reason is, what reason enacts, and what reason proposes:
[…] the system of philosophical cognitions or of cognitions of reason 
from concepts. That is the scholastic concept [Schulbegriff] of this 
science. According to the worldly concept [Weltbegriffe] it is the science 
of final ends of human reason.128
127 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 677.
128 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, trans. and ed. J. Michael Young 
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In this discussion Kant turns again to the three questions above and considers 
what they ask of philosophy, adding a further question, ‘4. What is man?’129 He 
clarifies the purposes and methodology for each of the questions: ‘Metaphysics 
answers the first question, morals the second, religion the third, and 
anthropology the fourth.’130 These questions, while indicating the intention, 
purpose and methodology of philosophy for Kant, lead his reader towards this 
series of ‘final ends’ and at the same time mark out the space of the individual 
subject. As such, through these ‘final ends’ Kleist, as the most traumatised 
reader of Kant, was inculcated into the Critique. The pared down clarity of 
Kant’s first three questions above has not only been embraced, but could have 
been written by Kleist himself, since these questions became the leitmotifs, 
impetuses and explorations at the heart of his writing. However, where Kant 
searched for the limits of reason, Kleist found its collapse.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 537.
129 Ibid. p. 538. These questions are referred to in Elden’s and Mendieta’s 
Introduction to Reading Kant’s Geography, p. 8 and in p. 14 notes. However, 
they translate question 4 as: “What is the human being?” and consider the 
anthropological also as geography.




as architecture, as contested territory, as abyss
This chapter, divided into three parts, considers uncertainty a manifestation of 
collapse. The first two parts analyse Kleist’s experimental prose writing – the 
short story Das Erdbeben in Chili and the novella Michael Kohlhaas – embody 
collapse in terms of material occurrence and an expression of uncertainty. The 
third part explores spatial collapse in Kleist’s concept of the abyss.
Part 1
Collapse as architecture
1. Earthquake and the architecture of collapse 
In Das Erdbeben in Chili (The Earthquake in Chile), written in 1807, 
collapse is demonstrated as the collapse of a city and the agencies of society. 
The events of the story are shown to occur ‘at the same time’. Through the 
event of an earthquake, Kleist represented part of the narrative as occurring 
simultaneously. An excavation of vertical collapse, destruction and the 
demarcation of architectural space and place in Kleist’s story Das Erdbeben in 
Chili are the principal means by which Kant’s pre-critical theory is considered 
and analysed. The Lisbon earthquake had a considerable effect on the Catholic 
Church in Lisbon, and the battleground between the church and a laity 
influenced by Enlightenment thought concerned the contestation of the notion 
that the earthquake was divine punishment for moral laxity. In the story, Kleist 
further demonstrates how the role of the church, as the divine arbiter of God’s 
will, could be cruelly brought to bear on the survivors of a catastrophe. In the 
immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the church takes advantage of the 
collapse of social order, standing by as mob rule wreaks arbitrary punishment 
and revenge for the disaster.
Kleist’s extrapolation of the metaphor of the (not yet) collapsing arch, to his 
own state of being, to a subjective collapse that he could not contemplate 
befalling him at that moment because he felt so certain about his future with 
Wilhelmine, develops:
[…] from this thought I derived an indescribably heartening consolation, 
[…] that I too would not collapse, even if all my support were removed!1 
1 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 76.
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Both the physical and internal concepts of collapse are powerfully linked by the 
way they presage their own occurrence, as though, by identifying the metaphor, 
such a collapse was bound to happen. Kleist’s image of the arch that stays 
upright even though ‘all the stones tend to collapse at the same time’2 suggests 
that in order for the architecture of the arch to fail, a disaster of some kind has 
to occur as a natural phenomenon or as a wilful and destructive act, but that 
when such a collapse happens it is decisive and complete.
Kleist’s observation about the arch being held up because the stones want 
to collapse engenders the unsaid of architecture: that an arch as a technical, 
designed and engineered construction is collapse held in temporal abeyance. 
His remark is provocative and transgressive. Kleist’s seemingly empirical 
reflection is held together as the inertia of its philosophical, metaphorical 
and material destruction. Kleist’s concept of the imminently collapsing arch 
appears at a significant historical moment at the turn of the eighteenth century, 
when Europe was riven by war and chaos. The arch is an object in time, yet 
it is possible to suggest that the unity of the system may ultimately fail, that 
it can collapse. Shortly after making this observation, Kleist read Kant’s 
critical writing and his avowedly unshakeable faith in his understanding of the 
world collapsed. Some Germanistik literary critics have given considerable, 
and undue, credence to the comparison between this personal incident and 
the story Das Erdbeben in Chili, creating confusion between the fictional 
earthquake and Kleist’s state of being. Reading Kant’s Critique was clearly 
a thought-changing event, which caused great internal anguish for Kleist. 
Through considering Kant’s pre-critical earthquake essays3 and the concept of 
uncertainty drawn from critical philosophy, together with Kleist’s earthquake 
story, an interpretation of Kleist’s thinking can be proposed. 
The construction of architectural and temporal space is represented as 
destruction in Kleist’s story Das Erdbeben in Chili. The opening lines locate it 
in the real event of the 1647 earthquake in Santiago, Chile. However, there is 
compelling evidence to suggest that the story drew on the historical event of the 
catastrophic earthquake that destroyed Lisbon sometime after 9 o’clock in the 
2 Ibid.
3 These were published as: Von den Ursachen der Erderschütten bei 
Gelegenheit de Ungücks, welches die westliche Länder von Europa gegen 
das Ende des vorigen Jahres betroffen hat [AK1:417–27] (Concerning the 
Causes of the Terrestrial Convulsions on the Occasion of the Disaster which 
afflicted the Western Countries of Europe towards the End of Last Year) 
(January 1756); Geschichte und Naturbeschreibung der Merwürdigsten 
Vorfälle des Erdbebens… [AK1:429–61] (History and Natural Description of 
the Most Remarkable Occurrences associated with the Earthquake) (February 
1756); and Fortgesetzte Betractung der seit einiger Zeit wahrgenommenen 
Erdesschütterungen [AK 1:463–72] (Further Observation on the Terrestrial 
Convulsions which have been for Some Time Observed) (April 1756). See: 
Kant, Natural Science, pp. 327–73.
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morning on All Saints’ Day, 1 November 1755.4 Recent seismologists calculate 
the scale of the earthquake as being close to magnitude nine5 with the epicentre 
located about 100 kilometres to the south-west of Lisbon, in the Atlantic on 
the Azores-Gibraltar transform fault.6 The earthquake itself, as well as the fires 
and tsunami that followed, left much of Lisbon and its harbour in ruins; other 
towns and cities on Portugal’s Atlantic coast, as well as in Spain and Morocco, 
were also badly affected.7 By contrast, the 1647 Santiago earthquake in Chile 
was not affected by tsunami and fire; this reference was probably used by Kleist 
because of its convenience as a remote, though earthquake prone, location. 
According to Kant, the Lisbon earthquake and subsequent tsunami were felt 
and observed throughout Europe, where the physical shocks and evidence of 
the earthquake were felt and recorded as far away as Scandinavia, England 
and Ireland. This may have contributed in part to the empathy for the disaster 
throughout Europe. In Lisbon there was considerable loss of life; an estimated 
ten to fifteen thousand perished from a population of about 275,000. The 
earthquake inevitably had serious consequences for Portugal’s economy, which 
was prosperous, but badly regulated and mainly reliant on gold and diamonds 
from its colonies in Brazil.8 
The scale of the Lisbon earthquake caused the certainties of the Enlightenment 
to fragment;9 it was, after all, the destruction of a rich European capital.10 
The aftershocks seemed to augur a period of uncertainty and instability. This 
event has been described by Dyness as the first ‘modern disaster.’11 Dyness 
defines this notion of modernity in relation to the earthquake as taking two 
forms: firstly, as the disruption of Enlightenment thought; secondly, and most 
importantly, as provoking a response by the state to the emergency, where 
4 To a lesser extent there is a connection to the earthquake nine years earlier in 
Lima and Callao, Peru, 1746. 
5 Magnitude: 8.6. Earthquake: Lisbon, Portugal. 1 November, 1755. 
6 Transform fault: when two plates move in opposite directions.
7 See See Jean-Paul Poirier, ‘The 1755 Lisbon disaster, the earthquake that 
shook Europe’ European Review, Volume 14, Issue 2, (May 2006), 169–80. 
(p. 172). <http://journals.cambridge.org/ERW> [accessed: 3 December 2013]. 
Poirier notes that in Lisbon the Tagus River rose about 5 metres and penetrated 
250 metres inland, but further south in Cadiz the tsunami of 15 metres high hit 
the city causing considerable damage. The tsunami travelled across the Atlantic 
to the Caribbean.
8 The Portuguese economy was tied to England through the 1703 Methuen 
Treaty(s). England negotiated lower duties on port and wine than with 
France; in exchange Portugal took British wool and grain. Though initially 
this relationship was advantageous, Portugal became increasingly financially 
dependent on England. See David Birmingham, A Concise History of Portugal 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 62–64.
9 See T.D. Kendrick, The Lisbon Earthquake (London: Methuen, 1956), 
and also T. E. Braun, and J. Radner, eds. The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755: 
Representations and Reactions. 
10 In 1755 Lisbon was the fourth largest city in Europe.
11 Russell R. Dyness, ‘The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755: the first modern 
disaster’, in The Lisbon Earthquake of 1755: Representations and Reactions, 
pp. 34–49. 
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the state took charge, organized disaster relief, and accepted responsibility 
for reconstruction. The scale of the loss at the time of the earthquake is 
measureable in terms of the missing and destroyed material of Portugal’s 
culture, the kind of collections that later became national treasures: 
architecture, libraries, art galleries.12 The earthquake in Lisbon in 1755 was 
a historical marker, a moment that appeared as the harbinger of significant 
change in thought and culture and, as a consequence, it seemed to usher in 
a series of collapses across Western Europe.13 The Europe of the present day 
emerged from and is recognizable in these events. 
It is unclear why Kleist chose to explore this theme fifty years after the 
Lisbon earthquake. There were other literary manifestations of the 1755 
disaster in Lisbon. The best-known representation of the earthquake is 
Voltaire’s Candide of 1759. Significantly for Kleist, the earthquake also 
featured in the work of Sturm und Drang writers, Jakob Lenz and Johann 
Uz.14 However, most importantly for Kleist, Kant wrote three separate essays 
on the Lisbon earthquake, applying practical scrutiny to observations by 
Lisbon survivors and hypothesising as to the cause of the calamity. They 
were published as pamphlets in 1756,15 the earliest coming out in January 
1756. Kant subsequently refers to earthquakes in his 1763 essay ‘The only 
possible argument in support of a demonstration of the existence of God’. The 
essay tries to map a demarcation between religion and natural philosophy.16 
Kendrick’s historical and theological account of the earthquake, The Lisbon 
Earthquake,17 discusses the demise of ‘optimistic’ thinking suggested by 
Leibniz. The position Kendrick primarily advances is that Candide is a satire 
on the end of Leibniz’s ‘theódicée’ characterised by Voltaire as ‘tout est bien’18 
or the idea that everything happens for the best in the best of all possible 
worlds. There is a tendency by scholars to over-determine the importance of 
Voltaire’s thinking in relation to Leibniz; however, a key feature of the novel 
was composed as a response to Rousseau’s letter to Voltaire of 18 August 1756. 
12 The losses included, for example: collections of Italian renaissance painting, the 
recently finished opera house, and the Camero Convent library lost 70,000 books. 
13 These revolutions were: the industrial revolution in Britain, which was 
the most long lasting, then American independence, and lastly the French 
revolution, followed by the Napoleonic war as a pan-European war, not ending 
until 1815 four years after Kleist’s suicide in 1811.
14 See Poirier, ‘The 1755 Lisbon disaster, the earthquake that shook Europe’, 
European Review, p. 178, who states that Johann-Peter Uz wrote Das 
Erdbeben (The Earthquake) in 1769 and Jakob Michaël Lenz wrote Die 
Landplagen (The Menace) in 1769 drawing on the Lisbon earthquake.
15 See note 6.
16 Kant, ‘The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of 
the Existence of God’, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770, pp.107–195, 
especially, pp.107–50.
17 Kendrick, The Lisbon Earthquake, published in 1956 to coincide with the 
Lisbon bicentenary, it focused on the end of ‘optimism’ and the earthquake’s 
effect on theological concerns in the latter part of the eighteenth century.
18 Ibid. p. 119–41.
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Rousseau’s controversial letter mounted a critique of the pessimism of Voltaire’s 
poem, Poème sur la désastre de Lisbonne, published in April 1756. Early on, he 
states: 
All my objections are, then, directed at your poem about the Lisbon 
disaster, because I expected from it effects worthier of the humanity 
that seems to have inspired it. You charge Pope and Leibniz with 
insulting our evils by maintaining that all is well [or: good], and you so 
greatly magnify the picture of our miseries that you heighten our sense 
of them; instead of the solace I had hoped for, you only distress me.19
Kendrick erroneously adds that Kant was a follower of Leibniz’s ‘optimistic’ 
thinking, though he qualifies this by suggesting that this was because Kant 
was only at an early stage in his career.20 Yet, the evidence of Kant’s writing, 
especially before the Lisbon earthquake, does not bear out Kendrick’s claim. In 
his early work, Kant documented the writings of Leibniz and other prominent 
philosophers, but this did not necessarily constitute an attachment to them.21 
The progression of Kant’s work after the essay on Leibniz exhibited an 
inclination towards natural philosophy. Between 1754 and 1755 Kant wrote 
four essays on natural philosophy. The best known of these, from 1754, was 
‘The question, whether the Earth is ageing, considered from a physical point of 
view’.22 Larsen notes that Kant’s ‘[…] grappling with the limits of what can be 
grasped by the human mind on the grounds of theodicy makes him sensitive to 
what’s coming’.23 At the time of the earthquake in Lisbon, Kant was concerned 
to amass the available observations and evaluate the evidence, concentrating 
19 ‘Letter from J. J. Rouseau to M. de Voltaire 18 August 1756’ in Jean Jacques 
Rousseau, The ‘Discourses’: and other early political writings, trans. and ed. by 
Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 232–33. 
There is a secondary literature on Kleist and Rousseau, some of which analyses 
Das Erdbeben in Chili, for example, Steven Howe, Heinrich von Kleist and 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau: Violence, Identity, Nation (New York: Camden 
House, 2012). Rousseau will not be analysed in this theis.
20 Kendrick, The Lisbon Earthquake, p. 131.
21 See Kant, ‘Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces and assessment 
of the demonstrations that Leibniz and other scholars of mechanics have made 
use of in this controversial subject, together with some prefatory considerations 
pertaining to the force of bodies in general 1746–1749’, in Natural Science, pp. 
1–155. The title alone gives a concise précis of Leibniz’s work.
22 See Kant, Natural Science, pp. 165–81, the other essays included in this text 
are: ‘Examination of the question whether the rotation of the Earth on its axis by 
which it brings about the alteration of day and night has undergone any change 
since its origin and how one can be certain of this which [question] was set by 
the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin as the prize for the current year 1754, 
Universal natural history and theory of the heavens or essay on the constitution 
of and the mechanical origin of the whole universe according to Newtonian 
principles’ 1755, and ‘Succinct exposition of some meditations on fire’ 1755. 
23 Svend Erik Larsen, ‘The Lisbon earthquake and the scientific turn in Kant’s 
philosophy’, European Review, Volume 14 Issue 03, (July 2006), 359–67, p. 
361. <http://journals.cambridge.org/ERW> [accessed 3 December 2013] 
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exclusively on the natural event. Throughout his studies of earthquake, Kant 
adhered to material and spatial understandings of the earth through the 
field of natural philosophy, which subsequently provided the basis for his 
lectures on geography, on which he worked and presented for the next forty 
years. Even though the interpretation of the event of the Lisbon catastrophe 
was a repositioning of Kant’s thinking, he did not embark upon the first of 
the Critiques until more than twenty years later. Furthermore, Kant did not 
specifically define the Lisbon earthquake as an aesthetic. In contradistinction to 
this, Regier’s contention is that the Lisbon earthquake is a ‘foundational’ ruin24 
and therefore sublime; he is consequently drawn into the temptation to define 
Kant’s work on the Lisbon earthquake as an aesthetic. In order to suggest 
this, Regier bypasses the empirical methodology of Kant’s natural philosophy 
and subsequent geography in pursuit of a contracted sense of the spatial as 
‘distance’, because ‘the sublime is the category that theorizes the creation of 
this type of distance’25 and, as such, Regier is able to posit that, if Lisbon was 
sublime, it was also residually ‘ruins’,26 or a ruin, or the ruin. Regier continues, 
suggesting that ‘the ruins become foundational and serve as a stabilizing 
grounding and in creating a discourse on the sublime.’27 However, this is a 
limited and overly literal interpretation of Kant’s (much) later work on the 
aesthetic as being directly contingent on his previous writing about the Lisbon 
earthquake Regier further asserts this by stating that in:
[…] the Critique of Judgement he writes “in presenting the sublime 
in nature the mind feels agitated […], while in an aesthetic judgement 
about the beautiful in nature it is in restful […] contemplation. This 
agitation (above all its inception) can be compared with vibration.”28
Regier concludes this argument by suggesting that:
[…] the heart of the “scientific reception” lies in the disruptive moment 
of a nearly mythologized secularization, the sublime relies on the 
moment of total breakdown – a breakdown that, as Kant’s own 
vocabulary betrays, resembles an earthquake.29
However, there is no evidence in the earthquake essays or in the later natural 
philosophy expounded through the lectures on geography that Kant saw the 
collapse of Lisbon as an indication or expression of the sublime, but rather, his 
method for the analysis of the phenomena was applied through the empirical 
24 Alexander Reiger, ‘Foundational Ruins: The Lisbon Earthquake and the 
Sublime’ in Ruins of Modernity, Hell and Schönle, eds., p. 357.
25 Ibid. p. 364.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. p. 365.
28 Ibid. p. 371.
29 Ibid. 
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method as natural philosophy. The desire to establish a link between Kant’s 
agitation of mind, of the progression and development of thought and the 
events of the earthquake in Lisbon are constructed specifically as internalised, 
but the consequent problem is that this tends to imply that historical events are 
affect rather than experience. In revisiting the events of the Lisbon earthquake 
for the story Das Erdbeben in Chili, Kleist follows Kant’s empirical model by 
demonstrating awareness of historical details and personal accounts of the 
aftermath of the earthquake in Lisbon using them to effect in the story. In Das 
Erdbeben in Chili collapse occurs both as earthquake levels a capital city and 
as the disorder of social breakdown. As with most earthquakes, the devastation 
lies in the proximity between people and architecture; in Das Erdbeben in Chili 
Kleist gives literary form to the terrain of collapse in space and time. 
2. Kant’s pre-critical phase as method
Kant’s three scientific essays written and published within the six months 
following the earthquake in Lisbon are a speculation on and theory about 
the causes of earthquakes and are based on the available research on seismic 
activity. The significance of the essays lies in Kant’s consideration and 
exploration of the event entirely as ‘natural science’. The essays predominately 
endeavour to bring together the available scientific knowledge of earthquakes 
and to hypothesise as to their causes and outcomes by considering the 
events only as natural philosophy. Porter notes that, ‘From the 1750s 
onwards, traveller-naturalists all over Europe began to fix their attention on 
volcanoes and earthquakes,’30 both in connection to and independent of the 
Lisbon earthquake, which were the sources that Kant pursued. Kant later 
acknowledges that his work in natural philosophy and geography is reliant on 
sources from elsewhere, rather than personal observation:
Thus we extend our knowledge through the testimony of others, as 
if we had lived through the world’s entire past. […] But we must note 
that every experience of another person is imparted to us either as a 
narrative or as a description. The former is a history, the latter is a 
geography.31
30 Roy Porter, The Making of Geology: Earth Science in Britain 1660–1815 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 123.
31 Kant, ‘Physical Geography’, in Natural Science, p. 447. Kant's emphasis.
Kant had a deep and abiding interest in other places and kept abreast of 
developments and explorations into new places throughout his academic career. 
In the chronology of Kant’s writings, the work on geography immediately 
followed the three earthquake essays and came before the critical philosophy, 
and should be seen in the context of his perception of himself as natural 
philosopher, though little of this material was published in his lifetime, 
Friedrich Theodor Rink (1770–1811), Kant’s friend and colleague edited and 
published an authorized edition of the ‘Physical Geography’ in 1802, following 
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In their paper, ‘Kant’s Theory of Earthquakes and Volcanic Action’, Reinhardt 
and Oldroyd noted Kant’s view that in the voids under the earth and the sea 
there was:
[…] a considerable amount of material – sulphur and iron – which 
could ‘ferment’ when acted upon by water, leading to subterranean 
conflagrations and upheaval of the Earth’s crust.32
Based primarily on the observations of others, Kant proposed a chemical 
explanation of the cause of earthquakes. Kant suggested that the centre of the 
Lisbon earthquake was under the sea, which was one of the few points that 
later science proved correct. Reinhardt and Oldroyd further conclude that, 
while Kant’s writings on earthquakes and volcanism did not contribute much 
to the development of geological understanding, their abiding importance rests 
in:
Kant’s manner of thinking about nature in his early, pre-critical phase, 
evidencing his wish to formulate a “universal natural history”, capable 
of accounting for all natural phenomena. In fact, one might say that 
the occasion of the Lisbon earthquake provided him with a welcome 
opportunity to show how his theories could be deployed for explanatory 
purposes when required.33
From these comments by Reinhardt and Oldroyd it is possible to consider 
three significant points about Kant’s earthquake essays. The first is that, in this 
early work theorising natural phenomena, the manner in which Kant applied 
a methodology to evaluating the data observed and collected by others, was 
to determine that he must limit himself solely to natural phenomena. Kant’s 
the 1801 publication of ‘Physical Geography’ by Johann Jakob Wilhelm and 
Gottfried Vollmer under Kant’s name without permission. Kant was too 
old and ill for the task of publishing. ‘Physical Geography’ is based on the 
lectures on geography Kant did forty-nine times from 1756 to 1796; the work 
is dependent on what was known at the time and accounts of other explorers, 
travellers, and natural philosophers. Kant set out the terms and defined the 
field of inquiry through his lectures on geography. The geography lectures 
were a sizeable part of his output; the only courses he taught more were logic, 
fifty-six times and metaphysics, fifty-three times. This opens up questions as to 
how Kant saw himself, that by maintaining and continuing his work in natural 
philsosphy thoughout his life suggests that Kant did not consider himself to be 
purely a critical philosopher and that his development in critical philosophy 
was not a linear aspiration, but one that sat alongside his work in natural 
philosophy and geography. In the next generation, Novalis also moved between 
the scientific and philosophical.
32 O. Reinhardt and D.R. Oldroyd, ‘Kant’s Theory of Earthquakes and 
Volcanic Action’ Annals of Science 40, (1983), 247–72. (p. 249). <doi: 
10.1080/00033798300200221> [accessed: 27 July 2009]. They further note 
that this hypothesis was well-known and advanced some time previously by the 
French scientist Nicholas Lémery in 1706.
33 Ibid. p. 252.
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early work is referred to as ‘pre-critical’ by Reinhardt and Oldroyd, and has 
all the hallmarks of an empirical method. This shift from observation, or 
empirical method, to critique was neither straightforward nor unproblematic 
for Kant, and this movement anticipates Kleist’s own trajectory after reading 
Kant. This assertion by Kant that earthquakes are phenomena of nature leads 
to the second point: that, by adopting this position, Kant is able to assert that 
earthquakes are not ascribed to divine intervention. The third point raised 
above is again a methodological one: Kant identifies that history is best left to 
the historians. 
The earthquake essays offer insights into how Kant describes himself, how he 
perceives his role and method as a natural philosopher. In the opening lines of 
the first essay he says:
Great events affecting the fate of all mankind properly arouse a 
commendable curiosity, stimulated by all that is extraordinary and 
[concerned with] questions as to its origins. In such case[s], the natural 
philosopher’s obligation to the public is to give an account of the 
insights yielded by observation and investigation.34
Kant’s essays are of historical importance as a contemporary account of 
collecting, archiving and evaluating the available knowledge quickly emerging 
from the experiences and observations of survivors near the epicentre of 
the Lisbon earthquake. Curiously, proliferation of these rapidly published 
pamphlets documenting personal experiences of the disaster in Lisbon 
did not subsequently translate into a long-lasting collective memory of the 
catastrophe.35 Kant clearly indicates thoughtful interest in the personal 
accounts of those who survived the earthquake and sympathy concerning 
the human tragedy, and that he values their testimonies, but as a natural 
philosopher he must not venture into that territory. This offers interesting 
insights into Kant as a reader. He concludes the first part of the second essay 
by suggesting that a history of the personal accounts of those who experienced 
the earthquake in Lisbon should be collected, and although it is reasonable 
to assume that he has read many of the available documents and pamphlets 
by those who witnessed the dreadful events, he nevertheless concludes that he 
would not be the best person to write such a history:
34 Kant, Natural Science, p. 330. 
35 In the (re)discovery of Herculaneum in 1738 and Pompeii in 1748 the 
historical ‘authentic ruin’ proved more captivating than comprehension 
and retention of the contemporary disaster of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake. 
This perhaps subsumed a long-lived memory of the catastrophe in Lisbon. 
See Andreas Huyssen ‘Authentic Ruins: products of modernity’ in Ruins of 
Modernity, Hell and Schönle, eds., pp. 17–28.
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Everything horrible, which the imagination can represent to itself, 
must be collected, in order in some measure to figure to one’s self the 
consternation, in which men must be when the earth under their feet 
moves and is torn with convulsions, when everything around them 
falls to the ground, […] But I leave this history to more able hands, and 
shall here describe the work of nature only, the remarkable natural 
circumstances, which accompanied the dreadful event, and their 
causes.36
Kant said in his first earthquake essay that the natural philosopher’s obligation 
to the public is to give an account of the insights yielded by observation 
and investigation. In doing so, Kant demonstrates that he is a scholar of 
considerable principle who will not evade his duty; but that he must necessarily 
confine himself to his own field in order to best help the public understanding 
of the probable causes of the earthquake. Kleist ventured into this field of 
personal testimony produced in the aftermath of the Lisbon disaster in Das 
Erdbeben in Chili. Kleist uses the story to speculate on how the material 
collapse of the architecture that makes a city inevitably becomes the collapse 
of the institutions of law, church and state, and how this wreaks havoc on the 
cohesion of the society as a whole. 
Returning to the second point suggested by Reinhardt and Oldroyd’s comments 
concerning the importance of Kant’s pre-critical writings, the secular nature of 
Kant’s earthquake essays is of real historical importance because, by limiting 
himself to science, or to an empirical method, Kant both scrupulously avoids 
ascribing any moral judgement concerning the cause of the cataclysm and at 
the same time avoids doctrinal inference from any conclusions he may draw. 
This separation of natural philosophy from organised religious thought has 
great significance for later writers, especially for the exponential development 
of scientific thought and writing in the nineteenth century. Larsen notes, with 
reference to the ‘scientific or empirical turn in Kant’, that ‘[i]n the three texts, 
all reference to divine teleology have vanished; instead Kant is trying his best 
to stay with material, causal explanations.’37 Consequently, Kant’s method of 
outlining a secular basis for the earthquake essays may be of more importance 
to the imperative of the subsequent independent development of science than 
whether he actually arrived at the correct theory for the causes of earthquakes. 
Regrettably, Kant’s three essays on earthquakes are often dismissed because 
his theories were not proved correct by later science. In the two popular and 
36 Immanuel Kant, Essays and Treatises on moral, political, religious and 
various philosophical subjects, from the German by the translator of ‘The 
Principles of Critical Philosophy’, In Two Volumes Vol. II (London: published 
William Richardson 1799), p. 100.
37 Larsen, ‘The Lisbon earthquake and the scientific turn in Kant’s philosophy’, 
European Review, p. 362. 
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oddly anglophile narratives of the Lisbon earthquake, Paice and Shrady38 are 
concerned to establish the importance of a hypothesis suggested in 1760 by the 
Reverend John Michell39 concerning the notion that an earthquake produced 
waves in the earth, and who also hinted at the idea of faulting. Although this 
was ultimately proved a viable hypothesis by later scientific theory, at that 
stage the idea was so tenuous as to be not immediately applicable or taken 
up by other natural philosophers. Michell, like Kant, had worked from the 
publications and pamphlets of first-hand observers from Lisbon. However, 
Kant’s scientific turn did not just lead up to and end with the 1755 earthquake, 
as Larsen implies; rather, his search for a greater understanding of the earth 
occasioned by the Lisbon catastrophe went well beyond this period into Kant’s 
study of geography and the geographic, which was conducted alongside the 
Critiques.40 
In Kant’s three essays there is very little reference to moral punishment or 
possible supernatural causes of earthquakes, though they are mentioned 
as a frame to the essays. Kant says in the opening paragraph of the second 
earthquake essay, written in 1756, and the most substantial of the three, 
Geschichte und Naturbeschreibung der Merwürdigsten Vorfälle des Erdbebens 
[…], that:
Even the terrible instruments of the visitation of the human species, the 
shakings of countries, the raging of the ocean, that is violently agitated 
to its very bottom, the volcanoes or mountains that cast out flames, 
summon men to contemplation, and are not less implanted in nature (by 
God) as a just consequence of constant laws, than other usual causes of 
incommodity [unpleasant consequences], which are holden [sic] more 
natural, only because we are better acquainted with them.41 
There is mention of God here, but it is only cursory, as an afterthought, 
whereas the primary emphasis is on nature. This is something that Kant would 
revisit in his essay from 1763, ‘The Only Possible Argument in Support of a 
38 E. Paice, Wrath of God: the great Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 (London: 
Quercus, 2008), pp. 219–20; and N. Shrady, The Last Day: wrath, ruin and 
reason in the great Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 (New York: Viking Penguin, 
2009), pp. 141–42
39 Reverend John Michell (1724 –1793), English Natural Philosopher; member 
Royal Society whose research included geology, gravity, magnetism. His 
1760 Royal Society lecture was entitled: Conjectures concerning the Cause, 
and Observations upon the Phenomena of Earthquakes; particularly of that 
great Earthquake of the First of November 1755, which proved so fatal to the 
City of Lisbon and whose Effects were felt as far as Africa and more or less 
throughout almost all Europe.
40 See ‘Physical Geography’ in Kant, Natural Science, pp. 434 – 679. Kant 
lectured on geography forty nine times from 1756 to 1796. 
41 Kant, Essays and Treatises on moral, political, religious and various 
philosophical subjects, 1799, p. 95. See also Kant, Natural Science, pp. 327–73. 
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Demonstration of the Existence of God’. For the moment, Kant is concerned 
with the material ground: 
We know pretty completely the surface of the earth, when the 
ampliation* is concerned. But we have under our feet a world still, with 
which we at present are but little acquainted.42
Nevertheless, while it seems generally agreed upon that the secular drive 
of Enlightenment thinking was temporarily halted in the responses to the 
Lisbon earthquake, this was not true for Kant – the earthquake appears 
to have motivated him to find a solution in natural philosophy, that is, a 
secular interpretation, and as such this becomes part of his identification and 
explication of and move towards critical thinking. Later in 1756, the same 
year as the earthquake essays, Kant first offered lectures on geography, and 
continued to do so for the subsequent forty years. Reading Kant’s work from 
his pre-critical phase provides understandings of the development of Kant’s 
method of thinking as it moved from observational to critical. The importance 
of Oldroyd and Reinhardt’s identification and discussion of this pre-critical 
phase of writing as Kant’s thinking suggests that the progress and application 
of hypotheses about natural phenomena were important for his development of 
autonomous reason.
3. Collapse and Das Erdbeben in Chili
The story Das Erdbeben in Chili was Kleist’s first completed story, written in 
1806 and published in 1807. It is a grim and violent tale of cruelty, arbitrary 
disaster and revenge set in the context of an earthquake. Throughout the 
story Kleist asks that, if the foundation of the ground beneath our feet is 
not certain, then what certainties remain? The story suggests that if this is 
the case, then nothing is certain. If Das Erdbeben in Chili is explored as an 
experimental work, as a site where Kleist gives form to Kant’s philosophical 
considerations, the story can be interpreted for its complex philosophical and 
historical possibilities. It is reasonable to speculate that Kleist was familiar 
with Kant’s three earthquake essays, and the location of Chile was probably 
based on reading them. For example, Kant says: ‘[…] Peru and Chile are more 
subject to frequent quakings than all the other countries in the world.’43 For the 
purposes of the narrative, Chile was far away, and a Spanish Catholic colony 
created further potential material concerning the relationship of the church to 
the disaster. In Das Erdbeben in Chili, Kleist takes up the personal history that 
42 Ibid. (*translator’s note: Enlargement of knowledge, in contradistinction to 
exactness; extension opposed to intension), p. 96.
43 Translated in Reinhardt and Oldroyd, ‘Kant’s Theory of Earthquakes and 
Volcanic Action’, Annals of Science, p. 255. 
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Kant has decided to eschew and considers what such a vertical collapse might 
produce. In Kleist, as with Kant, there is no special interest in the ruin as an 
aestheticized architectural space; however, in Kleist’s writing, there is a deep 
and mordant interest in the ruination of his characters. 
In Das Erdbeben in Chili architecture is presented as something that can 
confine, limit, conceal and be destroyed. In Kleist’s style of writing a relentless 
matter-of-factness drives the narrative and there is no concern or interest 
in inner states of being. It is through the intersection of the characters with 
architectural space that this story is delineated, and by outlining these 
structures Kleist creates a model where he may demonstrate and experiment 
with Kant’s ideas. The first sentence opens, setting the story in the moments 
before the earthquake:
In Santiago, the capital of the Kingdom of Chile, at the moment of the 
great earthquake of 1647 in which many thousands lost their lives, a 
young Spaniard called Jerónimo Rugera was standing beside one of 
the pillars in the prison to which he had been committed on a criminal 
charge and was about to hang himself.44
Kleist’s narrative does not follow a conventional dramatic build-up to a terrible 
event – the earthquake – but instead follows the outcome of the catastrophe, 
where the disaster creates and changes both space and time for the two central 
characters of the story, only for it to be cruelly and irrationally snatched 
away from them. Notably, Kleist’s first paragraph above parallels the opening 
statements of Kant’s first earthquake essay, which in itself speaks of the 
precariousness of architecture Kant notes, ‘We dwell peacefully on ground the 
foundations of which are battered from time to time. We build unconcernedly 
on vaults whose pillars sometimes sway and threaten to collapse.’45 Kant’s 
hypotheses on the causes of earthquakes are based on the idea of the instability 
of subterranean material, derived from known principles of how those materials 
may behave, or fail. Kant’s thoughts are connected to the ground as the place 
and foundation for architecture, consequently leading to a consideration of 
architecture likewise as a material that may be potentially unstable. 
Kleist is concerned with the precise moment of the earthquake. The opening 
44 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p. 51. Kleist and two 
companions who, like himself were discharged Prussian officers were detained 
in Boulogne in February 1807, then transferred to Fort de Joux in March 1807 
and subsequently to Châlons-sur-Marne prison until their release in July 1807. 
During his imprisonment Kleist continued writing; this was the stimulus for the 
story Die Verlobung in St Domingo (Bethrothal in Santo Domingo) 1811 and 
is represented in Das Erdbeben in Chili.
45 Translated in Reinhardt and Oldroyd, ‘Kant’s Theory of Earthquakes and 
Volcanic Action’, Annals of Science, p. 253. 
91
image of the story locates the central character against a pillar that, for the 
moment, holds up the prison and is to be the means by which he was going 
to hang himself. Kleist has precisely plotted place and time in this opening of 
the story: place is the prison, and time becomes the space between the point 
at which the protagonist gives up all desperate hope of escape and when he 
was going to hang himself, into which imminence the earthquake strikes. In 
his 1756 essay, Kant is also concerned with the precise time of the earthquake: 
‘The moment, at which this shock happened, seems to be the most accurately 
determined at 50 minutes past nine o’clock a.m. at Lisbon.’46 He further charts 
the precise time when the tremors were felt in different parts of Europe. Kleist’s 
account of the physical actuality of the earthquake parallels the accounts of the 
Lisbon earthquake in 1755. According to Kendrick’s history, the earthquake 
took place at about 9.30 am on All Saints’ Day on Saturday, 1 November 1755, 
and while this is less accurate than Kant’s precise sense of time, Kendrick 
outlines the three shocks that were felt about a minute apart:
The first alarm was a rumbling noise […] then there was a brief pause, 
and a devastating shock followed lasting over two minutes, that brought 
down roofs, walls, façades of churches, palaces and houses and shops in 
a dreadful deafening roar of destruction.47
For Kant the exact data on time appear to be one of the few certainties 
available, and he is concerned to record it, whereas later historians are less 
concerned with such precision of time, as it had little bearing on subsequent 
scientific knowledge. Kant did not offer any comment on the observations 
by survivors of the separate shocks, even though in Lisbon there were three 
distinct shocks close together. The earthquake in Lisbon was cast as a 
significant European event:
Almost all over Europe, including Scandinavia, the water in rivers, 
canals, lakes, and ponds and springs was seen to be suddenly disturbed 
or to rise and fall in an abnormal manner.48
In Das Erdbeben in Chili, the background to Jerónimo’s predicament was that 
he had been tutor to Doña Josefa, the only daughter of the richest nobleman 
in the city, who thought he had become too close to her and threw him out. 
Her malicious brother discovered them in a secret rendezvous; she then is 
forced into a convent, where a chance encounter in the garden allowed the 
46 Kant, Essays and Treatises on moral, political, religious and various 
philosophical subjects 1799, p. 103.
47 Kendrick, The Lisbon Earthquake, p. 24.
48 Ibid p. 25. This is the first observation of the phenomena later identified as 
seismic seiches. <http://earthquake.usgs.gov/learn/topics/seiche.php> 
[accessed: 2 February 2014] 
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lovers to consummate their liaison. Subsequently Josefa had a baby, causing ‘an 
extraordinary public stir’.49 The Archbishop insisted that both be put on trial, 
and they were condemned to death. The narrative framework is presented in 
spatial and architectural terms: the father’s house, the convent, the garden, the 
cathedral and the prison. These buildings are the family, the church, the law. 
Later, in the havoc following the earthquake, Kleist portrays the collapse of 
these very buildings and institutions that separated the lovers and caused them 
such anguish. It is through the proximity to and agency of architecture that 
Kleist demonstrates the prurient interest the rare occurrence of an aristocratic 
execution has generated:
In the streets through which the culprit was to be led to her execution 
the windows were rented, the roofs of the houses were partly 
dismantled, and the pious daughters of the city invited their female 
friends to witness with them […] 50
This morbid and grotesque spectacle is about to be destroyed by the 
earthquake. 
Jerónimo’s escalating and intense sense of desperation and panic is emphasised 
in the insurmountable architecture of his confinement: bolts, locks, bars, and 
impenetrable walls. He is running out of time, and frantically prays to an 
image of the ‘Holy Mother of God […] convinced that she alone could save 
him now.’51 This suggests a possible inversion in the interpretation of the 
cause of the disaster in the story, that in praying to be saved, Jerónimo has 
unconsciously asked God for the earthquake; an idea contrary to the position 
of the church, in both the story and the real event in Lisbon in 1755, where the 
church blamed the earthquake on the godlessness of the people. This paradox 
both reveals Kleist’s humour and shows him working with the themes of 
uncertainty derived from reading Kant. Time is the key element brought into 
play in order to demonstrate the simultaneity of events: Jerónimo hears the 
bell toll the last journey of Josefa to her execution and, unbeknownst to all, 
the time leading up to the earthquake is also being counted. The earthquake 
dramatically ruptures the interlocked relation between the time and space of 
Josefa’s execution and Jerónimo’s desperation. Time is precariously poised 
between imminence and advancement. The spaces between the tolls of the bell 
mark out the small increments of advancing time; in this sense the scene evokes 
a Kantian notion of time and space. 
Jerónimo resolves to end it all, ‘[…] when suddenly, with a crash as if the very 
49 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p. 51.
50 Ibid. p. 52.
51 Ibid. p. 52. 
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firmament had shattered, the greater part of the city collapsed, burying every 
living thing beneath its ruins.’52 Kleist uses the moment of the earthquake to 
invert Jerónimo’s circumstances from certain death to grasping on to life: 
[…] great cracks appeared in the walls all round him, the whole edifice 
toppled towards the street and would have crashed down into it had not 
its slow fall been met by that of the house opposite, and only the arch 
thus formed by chance prevented its complete destruction.53 
The collapse of the goal is at the same time both experienced and observed by 
the horror-struck Jerónimo: he simultaneously witnesses the progression of 
the collapse of the building, where the slow collapse of the prison happens in 
real time, and concurrently the frightful circumstance of the earthquake has 
made time, momentarily, stand still. The collapsing wall is met by the wall 
opposite, and the consequent ‘arch formed by chance’ by the random disaster 
creates a threshold through which Jerónimo can pass as he survives and 
escapes. The arch created by the collapse of the prison walls has created time 
as well as space. The remainder of the story takes place in the time created by 
escape from both the intended use of the prison architecture as the means of 
his suicide, and the provisional architecture made by the earthquake through 
which Jerónimo is able to escape. The collapsing building demonstrates how, 
in the cataclysm of an earthquake, architecture can be remade by chance. 
This image of the two walls collapsing together has a corollary in the initial 
metaphor of the arch where Kleist observed that ‘[…] all the stones tend to 
collapse at the same time’54 in the moment of the earthquake an arch is made 
because the walls of two collapsing buildings fall towards each other at the 
same time.
Earthquakes in cities, towns, or villages are massive architectural events. 
Kleist describes the kind of death and destruction occurring as a result of 
earthquake where crushing, entrapment, burning and drowning cause most 
of the casualties – circumstances well documented in the Lisbon earthquake 
of 1755. Unlike Kant, Kleist identifies the concept of separate tremors55 within 
the earthquake, and these become temporal spaces that the narrative can 
momentarily inhabit. For example, ‘He was scarcely outside when a second 
tremor completely demolished the already subsiding street.’56 Jerónimo darts 
and weaves through the collapsing Santiago, which is represented as an 
architecture in turmoil:
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid. p. 53.
54 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 76.
55 The observation of separate shocks was not something that reached Kant.
56 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories p. 53.
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Panic-stricken […] he ran over wreckage and fallen timber towards one of 
the nearest city gates, while death assailed him from all directions. Here 
another house caved in, scattering its debris far and wide and driving him 
into a side street; here flames, flashing through clouds of smoke, were 
licking out of every gable and chased him in terror into another […] 57
Kleist has depicted the consequences of an earthquake on the architecture of 
a city and its inhabitants with considerable understanding, which could only 
come from reading first-hand accounts written by survivors of a recent event of 
the magnitude of the earthquake in Lisbon in 1755. 
Following the moment of the earthquake, Kleist now changes time from the 
forward movement marked by the bell, to one of simultaneity. The destruction of 
the city returns to the tension of the arch, because the earthquake has caused the 
city to behave as if it were the arch, where collapse occurs ‘at the same time’. The 
earthquake is a singular, simultaneous upheaval. In his essay on the earthquake 
in Lisbon, Walter Benjamin quotes from an Englishman living in the city:
There was a shattering noise, as if all the buildings in town were 
collapsing at the same time. My house too, was profoundly affected: the 
upper stories instantly collapsed, and the rooms I was staying in swayed 
so much that all the utensils came crashing down. I truly thought 
57 Ibid.
2.1 The Ruins of Lisbon 1755, 
German copperplate,  
artist unknown.
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my last moment had arrived, for the walls were bursting apart and 
great stones were falling out of the joints – all the beams seemed to be 
supported by thin air.58
There are a number of parallels here with Kleist’s ideas; the suggestion above 
that everything in the city was ‘[…] collapsing at the same time’ mirrors Kleist’s 
notion about the stones of the arch. The unnamed Englishman explains how 
he survived for accidental and arbitrary reasons, because he was not dressed at 
the time; and as with the fictional Jerónimo, the Englishman describes how he 
escapes to higher ground beyond the city. In The Ruins of Lisbon (Fig. 2.1),59 
a contemporary German engraving depicting the aftermath of the 1755 Lisbon 
earthquake, the background shows the turbulent effect of the earthquake on 
the city’s architecture – buildings are roofless, walls have fallen, and among the 
debris the striking and repeated visual motif is that of the destroyed and broken 
arch in a state of partial collapse. 
Kleist parallels the actual events following the earthquake in Lisbon, where 
the surviving populace fled the city en masse to the open countryside, since, in 
the aftermath of the earthquake, the first instinct was to flee the uncertain and 
precarious architecture of the city. Kendrick notes that there was a:
[…] desperate scramble to get out of Lisbon by frightened mobs of 
hysterical people, clutching crucifixes and images of saints, and bits 
and pieces of belongings, all trying to reach open country. Almost every 
section of the population was represented among the refugees.60
In the open country outside Lisbon, people lived for many months in tents and 
huts, too frightened to dwell in anything more substantial. The open landscape 
seemingly offered a sense of safety because of the absence of any permanent 
architecture. A young English nun, Kitty Witham, wrote to her mother about 
her experience of surviving the Lisbon earthquake. She carefully describes the 
series of provisional, temporary structures that they lived under because of the 
fear of further tremors, each becoming a little more substantial and longer-
term:
58 Walter Benjamin, ‘The Lisbon Earthquake’ in Selected Writings Volume 
2, 1927–1934, trans. by Rodney Livingstone and others, ed. by Michael 
W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, Harvard University, 1999), p. 539. Benjamin draws on contemporary 
observations of the Lisbon earthquake for his 1931 radio broadcast. He focuses 
on personal, eyewitness accounts of the earthquake published as pamphlets, 
which created horror and fascination in the most powerful earthquake in 
recorded in European history.
59 This engraving is dated 1755, but since the earthquake occurred on 1 November 
1755, it is seems unlikely an engraving of this detail could appear before the end of 
1755, even though the news of the event spread quickly.
60 Kendrick, The Lisbon Earthquake, p. 36–37
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We layed under a pair tree, covered with Carpett, for Eight days, I and 
some others being so vere frighted every time the wind blode the tree, 
I thought we was going, so could not possible rest there, so we went to 
the Open air and slept there with much Pleasure, then the good fathers 
made us anothr little place with sticks and Covered with Matts, where 
some of us rested there a few Nights with the two fathers who came 
to us that Morning and glad to see us all alive as we was to see them. 
We have got a Wooden houes made in the garden, where the two good 
fathers and aboute half of us lives and lays there, but we lye in our Cloes 
I have never lain without my Cloes since All Saints. [sic] 61
Even the royal family were not exempt from the same state of abject panic and 
fear of further collapse of their city. At the time of the earthquake, the royal 
family were staying at one of their residences at Belem:
[…] but they moved at once into a suite of tents in an open space close 
at hand, and there they stayed for nine months until a big quadrangular 
wooden lodging […] had been erected for them62
The royal family occupied this provisional city for a considerable time, and a 
great number of the populace followed suit. In the engraving of The Ruins of 
Lisbon the foreground shows a tightly packed city of tents being established 
– figures are carrying bedding and bundles to the tents, families are shown 
in various states of activity, from talking to working, people have their arms 
raised towards heaven, and one woman is caught as she falls in a faint. In the 
upper left background, figures are shown still running from the city. Such 
provisional living arrangements following the earthquake demonstrate both 
fear of further collapse of the city and the uncertainty of return. 
As the narrative of Das Erdbeben in Chili continues, corresponding to the 
events that occurred in Lisbon, Jerónimo reaches the rural outskirts, faints in 
exhaustion and, regaining consciousness, sees Josefa and their child. They are 
overjoyed and believe divine miracle has saved them. In her concurrent story, 
the earthquake intervenes moments before her execution; she escapes, and 
rushes to rescue their baby from the convent:
[…] which was already collapsing all round her […] She was just about 
to embrace the Abbess when the latter […] was ignominiously struck 
dead by a falling gable, together with nearly all her nuns.63
61 Birmingham, A Concise History of Portugal, p. 74.
62 Kendrick, The Lisbon Earthquake, p. 40.
63 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p. 56.
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The death of the merciful Abbess as well as the vengeful Archbishop, who 
condemned the lovers to death, highlights the irreconcilable contradiction that 
both the good and the bad are equally killed by earthquake. The fact that in 
Lisbon casualties occurred while people were inside churches, worshipping on 
the morning of All Saints’ Day, caused great consternation for the church, which 
sought to re-establish it authority by trying to coerce the frightened populace into 
the belief that the earthquake was God’s retribution and punishment on a godless 
city. Yet, Poirier notes that at the time of the earthquake in Lisbon, ‘Monks and 
priests made up a sixth of the population […]’,64 which is a sizeable percentage. 
In the chaos caused by the disaster in the story, the lovers squeeze through the 
fissures of space and time created by the earthquake. After Jerónimo and Josefa 
are reunited outside the city walls, a rural interlude ensues, which is both an 
idyll and in which the narrative reconvenes and converges into their shared 
story. The refuge outside the city is not presented as a conditional one, where 
nature is restorative and the city is destructive, but the location is more of a 
place that is not defined by architecture: not the place of their troubles, and 
not the collapsing city. While they are in the forest they meet an aristocratic 
acquaintance of Josefa’s who asks if Josefa will nurse his sickly infant, whose 
mother is injured. She agrees to share, and they are taken into the family circle 
of Don Ferando and Doña Elvira. 
Jerónimo and Josefa are lulled into believing that there might be a ‘spirit of 
reconciliation’65 in the aftermath of the earthquake, they agree to petition for 
clemency. The party decide to go to mass at the only surviving church, though 
Doña Elvira’s sister has an unknown sense of dread, of ‘unhappy foreboding’.66 
The thanksgiving is led by one of the oldest canons: ‘[…] pointing to a crack 
in the wall of the cathedral, he called yesterday’s earthquake a mere foretaste 
of that day of doom, a shudder ran through the whole congregation.’67 The 
genuine terror of further tremors is manipulated by the canon as fear of the last 
judgement. As with the events following the earthquake in Lisbon, moral laxity 
was held up as a reason for the disaster. In Das Erdbeben in Chili the canon 
particularly cites the actions of the young lovers and, believing they were dead, 
‘consign[s] their souls to all the princes of hell’.68 This indeed ensues, as the 
priests stand by while the congregation turns into a vengeful, murderous mob 
that confront and attack the party. This is the last reference to any member of 
the clergy in the story; they become an absence, collapsing into the void they 
have initiated, as amoral lawlessness gains the upper hand. The intense respite 
64 Poirier, ‘The 1755 Lisbon disaster, the earthquake that shook Europe’, 
European Review, p. 170.
65 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p. 59.
66 Ibid. p. 62.
67 Ibid. p. 63.
68 Ibid. p. 64.
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of happiness and optimism of the reunited lovers and the presence of their child 
is thus short-lived, and is not enough to save them from the opprobrium of the 
angry rabble: ‘And the whole assembly of Christians in that temple of Jesus 
raised a cry of ‘Stone them! Stone them!’69 Jerónimo’s own father confirms that 
he is indeed Jerónimo Rugera, then kills him. The frenzied crowd, mistakenly 
taking the second sister-in-law as Josefa, kill Doña Constanza. Josefa is 
recognized and slain by her family’s cobbler, Master Pedrillo, who:
Then, drenched with her blood, he shrieked: ‘Send her bastard to hell 
after her!’ and pressed forward again, his lust for slaughter not yet 
sated. […] but Master Pedrillo would not give up until he had seized one 
of the infants by its legs, dragged it from Don Fernando’s grasp, and 
after whirling it round in the air above his head, dashed it against one of 
the pillars of the church.70
Thus the deaths of Jerónimo, Josefa, their friends, including Doña Constanza 
and mistakenly Don Fernando’s child, Juan, are absorbed into the very 
architecture of the church against the walls and the pillars. 
In the final, intense and curious coda to the story, Don Fernando and Doña Elvira 
adopt Jerónimo and Josefa’s child Felipe, who, having survived the collapse of the 
law and of the morality of the church, becomes the piece of wreckage to which 
Don Fernando clings. Throughout the story, the vivid descriptions have a visceral 
and material quality. Kleist is more interested in the function and operation of 
Catholicism as form rather than content: Catholicism gives the story its narrative 
pretext, rather than a governing moral principle. Kleist demonstrates hypocrisy 
and the descent into amorality. The church does not carry out the execution of 
the lovers, but leaves it to the frenzied mob. However, in outlining the extremes 
of punishment and revenge sanctioned by the church, Kleist does seem to revel 
in violence. In the aftermath of the Lisbon earthquake, the Inquisition saw an 
opportunity to re-establish its authority, but the blame and fear generated caused 
such trepidation that the outcome forced the opposite – further sanctions against 
the Jesuits were implemented by the effective leader of the reconstruction, Marquês 
de Pombal.71 Within days of the earthquake in Lisbon, in order to establish power 
over a frenzied and chaotic populace, and to prevent opportunistic looting, there 
were swift reprisals and as many as thirty-five72 executions took place. An example 
of this can be seen in the middle ground of the engraving of The Ruins of Lisbon, 
where two figures are shown being strung up on a gibbet. 
69 Ibid. p. 65.
70 Ibid. p. 66–67.
71 Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (1699–1782) statesman and king’s 
envoy took effective leadership after the earthquake. He organized relief and 
reconstruction and repressed unrest from the aristocracy and the Jesuits.
72 Kendrick, The Lisbon Earthquake, p. 50.
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In Das Erdbeben in Chili the underlying question of God is subsumed as the 
law and the will of the Catholic church and as a precondition for the plot 
to advance. As the buildings of the church crack and collapse, the church’s 
response to the disaster causes its moral authority to be compromised. The 
underlying and unuttered question for Kleist seems to be: has faith in the 
concept of God also collapsed? In the third reflection of Kant’s 1763 essay, he 
struggles to balance the existence of God with science and natural phenomena: 
‘Something is subsumed under the order of nature if its existence or its 
alteration is sufficiently grounded in the forces of nature.’73 This suggests that 
nature, in acting as a force, operates within its own order, rather than that of 
the will of God. Kant further writes, ‘Such events are also called, quite simply, 
natural events of the world. On the other hand that which is not subsumed 
under such a ground is something supernatural.’74 In this essay Kant appears to 
be retreating from or qualifying the position he put forward in the earthquake 
essays, where he stated that the earthquakes were solely the effect of natural 
forces, and now it may be surmised that, on reflection, Kant feels compelled to 
include God into the natural order. Nevertheless, he does retain much of the 
perspective advanced in the earthquake essays, saying that such phenomena 
are:
[…] attributed to a natural cause. And that attribution implies that the 
event in question was a misfortune, not a punishment: man’s moral 
conduct cannot be a cause of earthquakes according to a natural law, 
for there is no connection here between the cause and the effect.75 
As with Kant’s view here, in Das Erdbeben in Chili Kleist analyses this lack 
of connection between the cause and the effect – that the moral laxity of 
Jerónimo and Josefa are not to blame for the earthquake in Santiago. Kleist 
demonstrates that the lovers are not really wicked – they did not kill or injure 
or steal – and implies that they do not deserve the punishment of execution as 
auto-de-fé meted out by the church. The earthquake spared them and killed 
their executioners; the earthquake demolished the walls, streets and spaces that 
confined and separated them. The physical and random collapse of the city 
created provisional architecture made by the earthquake, which became their 
temporary means of escaping their fate. At the centre of this disaster Kleist 
creates a paradox: at the very moment of the collapse of the prison an arch 
is created, so that instead of falling down a structure is made, and instead of 
dying Jerónimo grasps on to life, only to die in the collapse of the society itself. 
73 Kant, The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the 
Existence of God’, in Theoretical Philosophy 1755–1770, p. 146.
74 Ibid. pp. 146–47.
75 Ibid. p. 147.
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4. Internal, social and moral collapse
In Das Erdbeben in Chili the material collapse caused by the earthquake is 
paralleled by the collapse of certainty in the social order. This is shown as 
the uncertain hold of civilized society in a far-flung colony. Any optimism 
that social formations can offer its constituents are destroyed; the central 
characters’ hopes are dashed, trammelled by the ruthlessness and ghastly 
bloodlust perpetrated by a congregation inside a cathedral, who not only kill 
the lovers and one of their friends, but, worst of all, also Don Fernando’s baby. 
In the rural interlude enjoyed by the reunion of Jerónimo, Josefa and their baby 
they hope the cataclysm of the earthquake may have made their society more 
tolerant and lenient towards their misdemeanours. 
All of Kleist’s dramatic and fictional writing exists after he had read Kant’s 
critical writing. Encountering the uncertainty of truth in Kant’s critical writings 
had a bearing on how Kleist represented the collapse of hope in Das Erdbeben 
in Chili. In her essay, ‘No Way Out: Heinrich von Kleist’s Erdbeben in Chile’ 
[sic], the key position of Luanne Frank’s argument centres on her question: ‘Why, 
for Kleist, was uncertainty not an option?’76 She proposes that the answer to 
this is suggested in Heidegger’s 1942–43 seminar, adding that ‘the culture Kleist 
inherited was hard-wired for certainty’,77 further arguing that:
Rationally speaking, he could see that there was no certainty […] At the 
same time, he could not relinquish certainty, anchored as he was in an  
epistème grounded in its faith in this concept – an epistème for which  
certainty was the very meaning of truth.78
The assertion by Luanne Frank is that Kleist remained locked into the early 
formation of empiricism and the concept of uncertainty was not a viable 
intellectual possibility, even though the collapse of certainty was a repeating 
motif at the heart of Kleist’s writing. Luanne Frank’s misreading of Kleist 
rests on the emotive assertion that Kleist’s encounter with Kant is an ‘[…] 
“earthquake”. And earthquake for Kleist […] means Lisbon’.79 This comparison 
unhelpfully merges Kleist’s inner state of being, his story Das Erdbeben in 
Chili, with the real historical event of 1755 in Lisbon. The application of 
earthquake as a metaphor for an internal state is over-determined. Other 
scholars have also been drawn into this metaphor; for example, Karlheinz 
76 Luanne Frank, ‘No way out: Heinrich von Kleist’s Erdbeben in Chile’, in The 
Lisbon Earthquake of 1755: Representations and Reactions ed. by Theodore 
Braun and John Radner, Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 2 
(Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 2005), p. 278.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid. p. 147. 
79 Luanne Frank, ‘No way out: Heinrich von Kleist’s Erdbeben in Chile’, in The 
Lisbon Earthquake of 1755: Representations and Reactions, p. 268.
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Stierle suggested that Kleist suffered ‘ “[ein] Beben des Bewusstseins” (a 
quaking of consciousness)’,80 though this observation seems a more appropriate 
description of the effect on Kleist’s thinking, as it suggests the disturbance and 
agitation of his perception of the world. 
In contradiction to her view about Kleist’s internal state, Luanne Frank further 
asserts that he read Kant’s earthquake essays and they ‘riveted Kleist’.81 She 
additionally suggests that there is a notion of collapse as ‘ “der Zusammensturz 
des Allgemeinen” (the collapse-in-upon-itself of the general)’,82 which is 
explained as Kleist’s ‘abandonment of the general for the particular’.83 This 
interpretation of collapse for Luanne Frank is one where collapse can only 
crumple on top of itself as emotional breakdown and, as such, can only 
be inner and psychic. She does not suggest further conceptual readings of 
collapse as philosophical, moral, social or architectural – as well as psychic 
– all of which are described and articulated by Kleist. Werner Hamacher’s 
essay on Das Erdbeben in Chili, suggests that the primary theme of Kleist’s 
work is ‘accidentality’84 that Zufall (accident, chance) comes from a ‘collapse 
of the rules’.85 Hamacher refers to Kleist’s letter delineating the arch which 
may fall, suggesting that collapse operates only inasmuch as it is an action 
of ‘accidentality’86 as it leads to a fall, both religiously and psychologically. 
Neither Luanne Frank nor Hamacher suggest the potential interpretation of 
collapse in and of itself.
In the murderous and bloodthirsty conclusion to Das Erdbeben in Chili, Kleist 
identifies the Roman Catholic Church as a social order that can collapse at the 
very moment it is trying to wrest control over its flock. The crack in the wall 
of the Dominican cathedral presaged doom for the church, since the structural 
damage is architectural and material as well as worldly and political.When 
the canon and the priests abdicate all responsibility and abandon Jerónimo 
and Josefa to their miserable fate as the congregation turns into a murderous 
mob, the moral credibility of the church itself is destroyed. The outcome of the 
earthquake is a collapse of the church’s potential to represent the last remnant 
and hope of civilization – without falling down, the church has collapsed. The 
most appalling representation is material and architectural: the death of Don 
Fernando’s baby, by the frenzied Don Pedrillo who ‘dashed it against one of the 
80 Ibid. p. 269. Quoted from Karlheinz Stierle ‘Das Beben des Bewusstseins: Die 
narrative Strukture von Kleist’s Das Erdbeben in Chili’.
81 Ibid. p. 266. Luanne Frank does not give a source for this.
82 Helmut J. Schneider ‘Der Zusammenstürz des Allemeinen’, quoted in Ibid. p. 269.
83 Ibid. 
84 Werner Hamacher, Premises: Essays on Philosophy and Literature from 
Kant to Celan, trans. by Peter Fenves (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996) p. 267.
85 Ibid. p. 268. 
86 Ibid. pp. 270–271. 
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pillars of the church’87 – the structural device holding up the church is now the 
material cause and site of the baby’s gruesome death. There were no pillars of 
the church, those praiseworthy individuals in a congregation, to come forward 
and provide any sense of justice or righteousness. In this instance the morality 
of the congregation too has failed, or collapsed, when no one intervened to 
stop the murderous rabble, such as the high-ranking naval officer known to 
Josefa and Don Fernando, who appears through the throng, but does nothing, 
except to lend Don Fernando his sword. Returning after the killing spree ‘[…] 
assured him that although his own inaction during this terrible event had been 
for various reasons justified, he now keenly regretted it.’88 For Kleist, hypocrisy, 
too, is another form of collapse. 
During the course of the story, Kleist delineates three forms of justice. Firstly, 
that of the church: in this instance, a reference to the Inquisition, which 
had considerable power in Lisbon prior to the earthquake in 1755; secondly, 
divine justice that may or may not have caused the earthquake; and thirdly, 
the summary justice of the lynch mob. Following the earthquake in Lisbon, 
Thomas Chase, an Englishman born in Lisbon, recorded his fear of the 
behaviour of the people after the disaster, who believed that this was the 
punishment of Judgement Day: ‘It was impossible to guess what turn their 
furious zeal might take against that worst of criminals, a Heretic! This made 
me dread the approach of every person.’89 This offers insight into the deaths 
of the two main characters of Das Erdbeben in Chili, who are punished by 
the church and the mob, but specifically and significantly did not receive 
divine punishment by the earthquake. In elaborating the collapse of hope in 
the latter part of the story, Kleist begins by proposing the dilemma, that if the 
earthquake was divine punishment, why were the lovers able to avoid death? 
How was it a ‘divine miracle’90 that they were not killed by the cataclysm? In 
this sense this idea matches Kant’s caveat regarding the perception of disastrous 
natural phenomena, namely, that they do not, and cannot, punish a populace. 
In the story, the collapse of hope in the aftermath of the earthquake, where 
Jerónimo and Josefa’s belief in the uplifting ‘divine miracle’ that spared them 
from death in the cataclysm, takes the form of their aspiration for clemency. 
It is the role of the church as arbiter of the law and the agency that may offer 
a merciful reconsideration of the lovers’ punishment that Kleist explores, to 
chilling effect. In the first part of the story the archbishop insisted they be tried 
and punished for their affair in the convent and for their illegitimate child; 
however unfair and excessive this trial seemed in producing the punishment of 
execution, there was the semblance of a judicial process, whereas in the end – 
87 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p. 67.
88 Ibid. p. 67.
89 Poirier, ‘The 1755 Lisbon disaster, the earthquake that shook Europe’, 
European Review, p. 171
90 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p. 55.
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the outcome of lynching innocent and guilty alike by a rabble – the effects or 
the consequences dreadfully outweighed the causes. 
As such, in Das Erdbeben in Chili the collapse of justice is a structural 
collapse whereby justice can be interpreted as the internal, unseen pillars 
holding up society, similar to the way Kleist had imagined, when he conjured 
the arch metaphor, that his internal state of being would weather all kinds 
of vicissitudes. The collapse of justice is analogous to the physical collapse of 
the fabric of the city, though Kleist does not resolve at which point justice fell 
apart – before the earthquake or after it – and leaves the question open as a 
moral conundrum. This story anticipates the question of the collapse of justice 
explored in Michael Kohlhaas, written a year later, in 1808. Though Das 
Earthquake in Chili is his earliest published story, Kleist had already produced 
a considerable amount of dramatic writing and tended to work on a number 
of pieces simultaneously.91 In his stories and novellas Kleist experimented and 
engaged with the philosophical ideas concerning the collapse of certainty, 
and the uncertainty of the veracity of truth that emerged after he read Kant’s 
critical writing. In Das Erdbeben in Chili a number of complex themes 
coalesce with reference to the real historic event of the earthquake in Lisbon in 
1755: the breakdown of social formations, the materiality of architecture, the 
philosophical questions raised by Kant’s natural philosophy and Critiques – for 
Kleist, all these manifested as collapse. 
91 For example, previously in 1803, Kleist was working on the plays Der 
zebrochne Krug (The Broken Jug) and Amphitryon and the novels Die Familie 




Collapse as contested territory
1. The threshold: borders and spatial collapse in Michael Kohlhaas 
In the long novella Michael Kohlhaas, first published in 1808 then re-worked 
and published again in 1810, the theme of collapse is represented as the collapse 
of justice.92 The story centres on the slippage of justice between the borders of 
two states. In this novella Kleist explores the eponymous Kohlhaas’s crusade for 
justice as a dispute waged across a horizontal terrain, a battle that is spatialized as 
territory and border. The border between the two states is a space, but it is also a 
place, a specific site, and owing to the existence of this boundary, whether arbitrary 
or not, Kohlhaas is placed – he cannot be nowhere. The story is set in the past 
– in the sixteenth century – and was suggested to Kleist by his friend Pfuel, who 
read a historical account of the execution of the merchant Hans Kohlhase in the 
Märkische Chronik of Peter Hafftiz.93 The merchant Hans Kohlhase, was publicly 
beheaded in 1540 after a spree of robbery, pillage and killing, a consequence of 
his rights having been abused by the Elector of Saxony. Maass notes that this 
subject was one Kleist felt a particular affinity for, in the way the historical account 
matched, ‘[…] his insistence on absolutes’.94 Subsequent to the historical execution 
of Hans Kohlhase near Berlin, the site was referred to as ‘Kohlhasenbrück’,95 the 
name chosen as the village of Kleist’s central character. The real events took place 
in the sixteenth century, at a time when Luther began to identify and separate the 
laws, rights and duties of the church from those of the state and the individual. 
This was presented in his political text On Secular or Temporal Authority (Von 
Weltlicher Oberkeit) of 1523, the significance of which, according to Elden was 
that:
Luther repudiated any claim by the church to exercise power over temporal 
affairs. […] Instead, for Luther, Christians live in two kingdoms – that of 
92 Exploration of the incomprehensibility of justice in Michael Kolhaas was an 
important source and starting point for Kafka’s Der Prozeß (The Trial)(1925). 
Kafka’s literary executor, Max Brod, recalls Kafka reading Kleist to him. 
Kafka read it publicly:
11 December. In Toynbee Hall read the beginning of Michael Kohlhaas. 
Complete and utter fiasco. Badly chosen, badly presented […] Read wildly 
and badly and carelessly and unintelligibly. And in the afternoon I was 
already trembling with eagerness to read, could hardly keep my mouth shut. 
Franz Kafka, The Diaries of Franz Kafka, ed. by Max Brod, (London: Penguin 
Books 1982), p. 124. In Der Prozeß and Das Schloß (The Castle) there is 
repetition and alliteration the names of the central character, K. – Kleist, 
Kolhaas, Kafka, (even Kant). 
93 Noted in Maass Kleist: a biography pp. 107–108
94 Ibid. p. 106.
95 It was in the present day district of Wannsee; strangely very near the site of 
Kleist’s suicide in 1811.
105
Christ and that of the world.96 
In Kleist’s story Luther features as a significant figure, especially for his moral 
rectitude and trustworthiness, and as a matter of historical authenticity, 
because Luther had written a letter to Hans Kolhase on 8 December 1534.97 In 
the circumstances of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Kleist 
locates the story within the real problems caused by the large number of states 
that made up Germany in the century prior to unification, when the borders 
between them created on-going political difficulties; this was particularly so 
in the context of the Napoleonic wars, when various states were occupied 
and allegiances were shifting and changing. In this novella Kleist explores the 
uncertainty of place through borders, states, territory and war, where that 
uncertainty leads to collapse as an individual’s search for legal clarification and 
restitution engenders a moral crusade that ends in disaster. 
The question of a located place raises questions about territory, as Elden notes:
Territory is not simply land, in the political-economic sense of rights of 
use, appropriation, and possession attached to place; nor is it a narrowly 
political-strategic question that is closer to a notion of terrain. Territory 
comprises techniques for measuring land and controlling terrain. 
Measure and control – the technical and the legal – need to be thought 
alongside land and terrain.98
He further asserts that, ‘[t]erritory, then, as a word, concept, and practice, is 
a historical, and political question.’99 For Elden the history of the concept of 
territory emerges as the state begins to identify itself. He notes that ‘territorium 
is a very rare word in classical Latin’100 and even in the Renaissance: ‘Despite 
how Machiavelli is often read, and translated, he did not have a concept of 
territory and did not see political power as preeminently related to land.’101 
In Machiavelli power is located in the will, might, riches, lineage and body 
of the prince through the structures of feudal hierarchies. The political 
reasoning of the Reformation changed the thinking concerning territory. This 
was demonstrated in Germany through Luther and later followed through 
in the work of the German jurist and political adviser Andreas von Knichen 
in his book De sublimi et regio territorii iure 1600. The book’s significance, 
according to Elden, is Knichen’s arguement that ‘Jurisdiction is permanently 
attached to territory’,102 a position from which the law has never retreated. 
96 Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013) p. 256.
97 See Mehigan, Heinrich von Kleist: Writing After Kant, p. 82, footnote 20. 
98 Elden, The Birth of Territory, pp. 322–23.
99    Ibid. p. 328.
100 Ibid. p. 278.
101 Ibid. p.14.
102  Ibid. pp. 286–87.
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Thus the practice and history of territory is one where place is territorialized 
and is generated through shifting interpretation and claims over place, but 
this is  enacted through time and through fluctuating social imperatives which 
may not necessarily be universally beneficial. Consequently, territory can be 
determined and interpreted according to law, however hastily the latter may 
have been assembled. 
The Kleist novella centres on Michael Kohlhaas, an honest and righteous horse 
trader, who was born in Brandenburg and owned property in Saxony, which 
made him a subject of both, and therefore legitimately existing and operating 
between both states. The sorry tale begins when Kohlhaas encounters a new 
tollgate beside a castle as he crosses into Saxony to sell some horses; he pays the 
toll, only to be told that he must now have a permit to cross the border. The 
construction of the tollgate returns to Kleist’s concept of the arch that might 
collapse; here the arch can be interpreted as a vertical threshold, and that, by 
traversing such a threshold a material and technical change occurs, a collapse 
– not of the arch but of the certainty between the territories. As the means of 
crossing or causing permeability between the borders, the tollgate or threshold 
defines and frames the border. It is also a reminder of Agamben’s point that 
the threshold is not, ‘[…] the experience of the limit itself, the experience of the 
being – within an outside’.103 Kohlhaas experiences the limit materially and as 
an arbitrary demarcation, and for him it is the incomprehension of being ‘within 
and outside’. In this sense, the limit reached is defined in political terms because 
Kohlhaas fails to comprehend the application of power over the entry into a 
territory, or the defining of territory and who are, or may be, the subjects of that 
territory or place.
How does the boundary operate? In order to elucidate this, the perspectives of 
geography, space, place and history intersect as concept, practice and conflict can 
be considered. In the introduction to his Physical Geography, Kant stated that, 
‘Physical Geography is thus a general outline of nature, and, because it is not 
only the ground of history but also that for all other possible geographies […].’104 
He lists these as mathematical, moral, political, mercantile and theological 
geography;105 as such, geography is clearly seen as the deep connection between 
physical terrain and those who live in and on it. While the ‘ground of history’ 
may be indicative of the history of nature and the natural formation of the 
earth, Physical Geography is primarily constructed as a physical description 
of place, especially gathered by eighteenth-century exploration, but Kant does 
not specifically rule out philosophical, political, moral and theological histories 
– in other words, the idea that discourse exists over space. Malpas and Thiel 
103 Agamben, The Coming Community, p. 68.
104 Kant, Natural Science, p. 451. Kant’s emphasis.
105 Ibid. pp. 451–52.
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argue that a connection exists between the concepts of the spatial developed in 
Kant’s Critique of Reason and in his Physical Geography, because from two 
perspectives he identifies the complexities and questions of geometries of space 
and the experience and practice of what is encountered in a place.106 They argue 
that the geographic informs Kant’s thinking in the Critique of Reason, especially 
in relation to the concept of the boundary, space and limit. They refer to the 
Prolegomena where Kant argues that space is found outside the boundary.107 
Kant further suggests that: 
[…] in all boundaries there is something positive (e.g., a surface is the 
boundary of a corporeal space, yet it is nonetheless itself space; a point is 
the boundary of a line, yet is nonetheless a locus in space), whereas limits 
contain mere negations.108
In this instance Kant brings together a number of themes: geography, science and 
geometry, but specifically does not close them off or separate them. However, 
Malpas and Thiel further argue:
The manner in which Kant characterizes the idea of boundary invokes 
the geographical […] but Kant’s characterization is also explicitly 
topographical inasmuch as the idea of boundary is directly connected 
with the idea of a location or place.109 
Returning to The Fate of Place, Casey’s study of the progress and shift of 
Aristotelian place as it is supplanted by concepts of space developed by Kant and 
later modern philosophers, Casey suggests that, ‘[w]hereas for Aristotle sensible 
things are located squarely in places, for Kant places themselves are located in 
space as parts of it.’110 Malpas and Thiel refer to the idea of the boundary, partly 
referring to Casey. In Aristotelian terms, Casey argues that place is bounded, 
limited and divided, ultimately creating a line that marks and separates two 
places:
Even if it is composed of points, a boundary must be at the very least 
linear in character if it is to function in this simultaneously en-closing and 
closing off manner: hence its affinity with the idea of a “borderline”.111
106 See Malpas and Thiel, ‘Kant’s Geography of Reason’ in Reading Kant’s 
Geography, p. 198.
107 Quoted in Ibid. p. 197–98. This is from, Immanuel Kant Prolegomena to 
Any Future Metaphysics: With Selections from the Critique of Reason, trans. 
Gary Hatfield in (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.106, and 
discussed in Ch. 1 of this thesis, note 121.
108 Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 108.
109 Malpas and Thiel, ‘Kant’s Geography of Reason’, in Reading Kant’s 
Geography, p. 198.
110 Casey, The Fate of Place, p. 193.
111 Ibid. p. 63.
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The linear nature of the boundary as ‘borderline’ or margin between two 
states, whether as geometry, space, location, or site further suggests that it is 
possible to move between these two separately defined spaces, and that the 
boundary creates the limit that defines, and also defines the separation between 
them. 
In Michael Kohlhaas the encounter with the ‘borderline’ causes the chain of 
events that lead to both external and internal collapse, of someone who was 
‘one of the most honourable as well as one of the most terrible men of his 
age’.112 While these may seem to be contradictory forces in the character of 
Kohlhaas, Kleist demonstrates that his desperate bid for justice warped him 
into something ‘terrible.’ The moment the initial collapse of justice occurs at 
the new tollgate, when Kohlhaas’s ‘fair-mindedness’113 is tested as he is told 
he must not only pay a toll but needs a state permit as well, and he starts to 
be ‘angered by these illegal and extortionate demands’,114 his sense of moral 
outrage escalates and his judgement is impaired by his anger. As surety for the 
permit he leaves two of his horses and one of his grooms while he completes 
his business in Leipzig and Dresden. Kohlhaas says he has ‘crossed the 
border seventeen times in his life without such a document’.115 At the outset, 
Kleist closely maps the place where the events occur – between Brandenburg 
and Saxony, on the river Elbe near a large castle on the Saxon side of the 
border – making it clear that the subsequent predicament for Kohlhaas is one 
determined by territory, but that at the same time he has equal entitlement to 
be in both states. In Dresden, Kohlhaas finds that the permit is unnecessary 
and that he was the victim of an opportunistic conspiracy committed by the 
tollgate keeper and the castle warden, but one endorsed by the new Junker 
(squire) of the castle, Wenzel von Tronka. He returns to find that his groom 
has been assaulted and thrown out of the castle and his horses malnourished. 
Kohlhaas seeks redress in the law, demanding punishment of the Junker, his 
horses returned in their former condition, and compensation for himself and 
his groom. The court dismisses his case, as the Junker’s influence extends 
through aristocratic family connections and his attempts to seek justice are 
thwarted: consequently ‘[…] his sense of justice made him a robber and a 
murderer’.116
The scale of Kohlhaas’s redress is disproportionate to the humiliations inflicted 
on him at the tollgate, the injury to his groom and the poor condition of 
his horses; his ‘road to hell was paved with good intentions’.117 As the story 
112 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p. 114.
113 Ibid. p. 114.
114 Ibid. p. 116.
115 Ibid. p. 115.
116 Ibid. p. 114.
117 Largely attributed to St. Bernard of Clairvaux, Apothegm, c.1150.
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progresses, Kleist’s deliberation asks at which point could Kohlhaas have given 
up his pursuit of a fair or reasonable outcome to his troubles. Michael Kohlhaas 
can be analysed in spatial and architectural terms: the collapse or  ruinous fate 
for Kohlhaas happens in the moment when place – the borders between two 
states, here Brandenburg and Saxony – becomes territorialized, and therefore as 
terrain that is divided it is potentially a site for dispute and conflict. This terrain 
is a horizontal plane mapped by Kohlhaas’s attempts to move freely across it. 
The two states are differentiated by their relationship and interpretation of the 
law: Brandenburg is apparently more fair and reasonable towards its subjects, 
though the von Tronka family’s influence is shown to stretch into Brandenburg 
as well, whereas Saxony is rife with corruption, such as that perpetuated 
by the von Tronkas. In this instance Kleist demonstrates how the law maps 
the territory of the two states in the story, which corresponds to the advent 
of jurisdiction over territory and how this was variously interpreted, both 
historically in the sixteenth century, and in his contemporary setting of the 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Elden notes, ‘[…] territory is a word, 
a concept, and a practice, and the relation between these can only be grasped 
historically.’118 In the novella Michael Kohlhaas there are two histories of 
territory implied: firstly that of the sixteenth century in Luther’s interpretation; 
and secondly that of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which appeared 
in the political and historical writings of Leibniz, who stated:
Territory is a name common to a civitas or a dominion or a tract of 
land [terrae tractui]. But in addition to its fundamental meaning, it 
also expresses the aggregate of laws and rights, […] territory signifies 
the whole of laws and rights which can come to obtain in an inhabited 
portion of the earth.119 
Thus for Leibniz the laws over the territory conferred rights to those inhabiting 
that space. And he further explicates this: ‘Hence there arises what the 
German jurists call territorial superiority [Superioritatem territorialem – 
i.e., Landeshoheit] or the high right of territory [sublime territorii jus].’120 
For Leibniz territory creates a momentum of its own, that its very existence 
determines its rights. Leibniz adds:
I call jurisdiction the right of deciding cases or of handing down 
judgements and of coercing obstinate private persons. I say that this 
right of coercing (which the ancient jurists called Imperium) lies in being 
able, when necessary, to use force on stubborn people.121
118 Elden, The Birth of Territory, p. 7.




These comments seem to tell the story of Michael Kohlhaas, who was that 
‘obstinate private person’ described by Leibniz and who became the subject 
of ‘force’ by the law. More particularly, this demonstrates the way in which 
Kleist’s story is located within the histories and elaboration of the meanings 
and laws of territory in Germany from Luther to Leibniz. 
The horizontal territory is intersected by two significant vertical, architectural 
elements – the gate and the castle. The first architectural construction is the 
tollgate: it is a border, a threshold, a liminal space, and recalls Kleist’s image 
of the imminently collapsing arch. At the very moment that Kohlhaas crosses 
the threshold, or passes through the arch, or in this instance, the tollgate, a 
series of collapses occur and he is rendered powerless simply by both his need 
to cross the border and his belief that he is entitled to do so, yet the moment 
that he does so, his fate is sealed. Kohlhaas’s traversal of the space of this 
threshold sets in motion the calamitous events of the story. The question arises 
here, in relation to Kleist’s analogy as to what the mechanisms are that keep 
the arch or, in this instance, the tollgate standing. There is no reason why 
the tollgate should continue to stand between these two states, as Kohlhaas 
quickly proves that both the toll and the permit have no validity in law. But, 
further, it is established that it is the arbitrariness of the law conferred as 
aristocratic privilege that keeps it in place. At what point, as he crosses this 
threshold, is Kohlhaas beyond the border between the two states and is in 
one place or another? Faced with the dilemma he encounters, was there a 
point where he could have turned back and given up his attempt of continuing 
further into Saxony and sold his horses elsewhere? It appears not – Kohlhaas is 
unable to concede, because it is established that he is equally a subject of both 
Brandenburg and Saxony, and that he vowed to see that justice was done. 
Kohlhaas is one who can legitimately live in two states, is entitled to freely 
cross the borders between them. As such, Kohlhaas has no deep attachment 
to one place, nor any sentimental or heartfelt sense of home, even though the 
village of Kohlhaasenbrück, ‘still bears his name’122 suggesting the continuity of 
his family in the region. In the novella, the village was likely so-named because 
it was where the story’s originating figure, Hans Kohlhase, was executed, thus 
adding a further layer of doom. Kohlhaas journeys from place to place initially 
in his pursuit of justice, and when that fails, as vengeance. During the course of 
the narrative Kohlhaas covers considerable distances, through traceable places 
which are the mapped co-ordinates of the territory of the two states; he goes 
to Berlin, then capital of the Kingdom of Prussia; in the state of Brandenburg 
he travels to the city of the same name, and also to Potsdam and Mühlberg; 
in the state of Saxony to Leipzig, Wittenberg and to Dresden, its capital. 
Unsurprisingly, these journeys in the eastern states of Germany were familiar to 
122 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p. 114.
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Kleist, (see Appendix) and were just some of the places he repeatedly visited in 
his own restless and troubled wanderings. 
2. The collapse of certainty: jurisdiction and geography 
In the course of the story Kleist questions the relation of the individual to the 
law: What should a reasonable man do to achieve a fair result? Are Kohlhaas’s 
actions ethical? The second significant architectural motif, after the tollgate, 
is that of the castle – this structure is equated with power. The scale of this 
‘magnificent castle on Saxon soil’123 and the dominance of this implacable 
edifice becomes an unyielding agency of the aristocracy, and its nepotistic 
relationship with the state. The castle is the seat of the von Tronkas and the 
site of their despotism: they exert influence over the court in Dresden where 
Kohlhaas took his petition for restitution and compensation and where ‘[…] in 
consequence from a higher level, had dismissed his case out of hand’.124 When 
Kohlhaas encounters the tollgate, he queries its authority and is told that it 
is ‘State privilege, conferred on Junker Wenzel von Tronka’,125 who inherited 
the title on the death of his father. A change of Junker means a change of 
circumstances for those within the proximity of the castle. For Kleist, the castle 
represents the power aristocratic authority can exert on the state, acting in 
such manner because it does not expect its autocratic actions to be scrutinized, 
since those actions are enclosed and hidden in the fabric of the castle. The 
story opens with two breaches of the law: firstly the illegal construction of the 
tollgate and the requisition of a permit to cross the border; and secondly the 
assault on his groom and the poor condition in which Kohlhaas finds his horses 
when he returns to claim them. The failure to achieve a reasonable resolution to 
a straightforward claim through the agency of the law created a gulf between 
the citizen and the law. The themes of the impenetrability of agencies of the 
state identified as law, and as power over individual liberty, determine the 
eponymous character’s fateful actions in Michael Kohlhaas. They were later 
important to Kafka, and this novella126 had a bearing on two of his novels, 
principally Der Prozeß (The Trial) but also Das Schloss (The Castle), where 
architecture embodies the state.
This is the central drama and drive of the narrative where Kohlhaas’s obsession 
123 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p.114.
124 Ibid. p. 127.
125 Ibid. pp. 114–15.
126 Kafka preferred the 1808 version where the ending led Kohlhaas towards a legal 
redress to the initial wrongs at the beginning of the story, but were not resolved before 
his execution. In the 1810 ending, legal redress was achieved, and power shifted to 
the drama of Elector of Saxony’s abject desperation about the gypsy’s prophesy in 
Kohlhaas’s possession. Kafka’s preferred ending parallels the lack of resolution before 
the law for Josef K. in Der Prozeß (The Trial). See Letter 9–10 February 1913, in Franz 
Kafka, Letters to Felice, p.187. 
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with achieving justice impels him towards its final and bitter end, binding it 
to the axiom ‘For the sense of justice outweighs all else’,127 yet here it not only 
outweighs, but tips all other balances. Kohlhaas is unable to abandon his cause:
[…] it was now his duty to the world at large to exert all his powers in 
securing redress for the wrongs already perpetuated and protection for 
his fellow citizens against such wrongs in the future.128 
In this moment the search for justice becomes a vainglorious one: Kohlhaas 
believes he is impelled to act for the greater good. Kohlhaas is not naïve or 
unworldly – he is ‘well schooled in the world’s ways’,129 and acts from the 
perspective of the urbane and fair-minded citizen. Following his experience 
at the border, Kohlhaas attempts to unravel the intricate connections of the 
nobility in order to obtain justice. He encounters the governor of Brandenburg, 
to whom he tells the story of his injustice and the injury to his groom and 
horses, and who agrees to help him. The chain of petition moves slowly 
from the governor of Brandenburg to the Elector, who then refers it to the 
Elector of Saxony. Eventually Kohlhaas is informed that he is considered ‘a 
vexatious litigant [… and] that the State Chancellery wished in any event not 
to be troubled with any further contentions and complaints of this sort.’130 
Kohlhaas is deeply insulted, the letter makes him ‘foam with rage’,131 and thus 
begins his revenge. He (temporarily) disposes of his properties in Brandenburg 
and Saxony, and tries to persuade his wife to go to her aunt’s in Schwerin, 
in the state of Mecklenberg, exclaiming that he is jettisoning the property 
because, ‘I do not wish to remain in a country where I and my rights are not 
defended.’132 A crucial point is established – Kohlhaas believes himself to be 
a citizen rather than a subject, and being a person with rights that should be 
protected motivates his actions. Yet, in the course of his retribution there is 
little appreciation that he accepts and understands himself to be under the 
jurisdiction of the law of territory that Leibniz identified. At the same time 
there is a sense of modernity in this perception, which echoes the development 
of the rise of the concept and legal determination of the citizen occurring in 
many of the social upheavals of the late eighteenth century.
The pursuit of justice continues on a trajectory of disaster, a juggernaut 
that cannot be turned or stopped. Kohlhaas’s wife attempts to present his 
petition in Berlin; however she is mortally injured trying to reach the Elector 
of Brandenburg. At his wife’s lavish funeral, Kohlhaas receives news that his 
127 Maass, Kleist: a biography, p. 108. This was the axiom underpinning his 
play Die Familie Schroffenstein.
128 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p. 121.
129 Ibid. p. 131.
130 Ibid. p. 130.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid. p. 134.
113
petition to the Elector has failed. Kohlhaas vows revenge, issuing his own legal 
edict ‘ “by virtue of the authority inborn in him” ’133 intended to legitimize 
his vengeance. He sets fire and razes the castle. Driven by his desire to find 
the Junker, who had swiftly disappeared, he encounters his relative, Junker 
Hans von Tronka and ‘hurled him into a corner, dashing his brains out against 
the stones’,134 which parallels the death of the baby in the cathedral in Das 
Erdbeben in Chili and the depiction of murder absorbed into the architecture 
that had oppressed the characters. The castle burns all night:
When morning came the entire castle had been burnt out, leaving 
nothing but walls and no one but Kohlhaas and his seven men in it. […] 
Hard as it was for him, he had to admit that the expedition to the castle 
had failed […]135 
This raid demonstrates collapse: not just of the castle itself, but also the 
righteous vengeance of Kohlhaas as a collapse of judgement, which led him 
to murder the wrong person. However, this failure leads him to declare war 
on Junker Wenzel von Tronka, and into ‘the hellish torment of unsatisfied 
revenge’.136 He gathers many followers, especially among the servants from 
the castle and the disgruntled populace, and continues burning, pillaging, 
sacking towns and villages, frequently crossing the border between the two 
states. Kohlhaas repeatedly returns to the city of Wittenberg and after it had 
been burned a third time the citizens demonstrate their anger against the state 
blaming their leaders for their inability to regulate members of their own ruling 
class. The Junker Wenzel von Tronka is paraded through the ‘wreckage of the 
town’ and as the ‘bane of Wittenberg and the ruin of Saxony’.137 
In a short time the reasonable and prosperous horse dealer has become a man 
of war: wearing armour, bearing a sword, amassing followers and gaining a 
‘most formidable military reputation’.138 Kleist’s inquiry in Michael Kohlhaas 
is that, having embarked on war in order to achieve justice, if justice does not 
prevail, where can he go to bring about an end to it? How is peace brought 
about? The novella becomes an exploration of the relationship between 
the citizen and the state, or more particularly the two states of Saxony and 
Brandenburg, and how they interpret their laws differently, since one is despotic 
and the other more enlightened. Kant explored the themes of the restitution 
of peace and of the relationship of the individual to the law, republicanism 
and the shifting perceptions of the role of the state in his political writings 
133 Ibid. p. 137.
134 Ibid. p. 139.
135 Ibid. p. 140.
136 Ibid. p. 142.
137 Ibid. p. 146.
138 Ibid. p. 144.
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produced in the 1790s. Kant sets out to determine the principles that create the 
conditions  of peace in the ‘First Definitive Article of a Perpetual Peace: The 
Civil Constitution of Every State shall be Republican’ 1795, where he states: 
A republican constitution is founded upon three principles: firstly, the 
principle of freedom for all members of a society (as men); secondly, 
the principle of the dependence of everyone upon a single common 
legislation (as subjects); and thirdly, the principle of legal equality for 
everyone (as citizens). […] it only remains to ask whether it is the only 
constitution which can lead to a perpetual peace.139 
He further clarifies that ‘Republicanism is that political principle whereby the 
executive power (the government) is separated from the legislative power.’140 
Throughout this piece Kant searches for an articulation of the conditions 
that will ensure peace. However, even at the time, these writings came under 
scrutiny and criticism, for example by Friedrich Schlegel, who offered a 
different and more sceptical view of republicanism in response to Kant’s:
The minimum of civil freedom is contained in the Kantian definition. 
The medium of civil freedom is the right to obey no external laws other 
than those which the (represented) majority of the nation has really 
willed and the (supposed) universality of the nation could will. […] what 
Kant defines as external legal equality in general is only the minimum in 
the infinite progression to the unattainable idea of political equality.141
The merits of each position are of less concern here than the attention of 
thought and argument directed to the politics of the role of the citizen in a 
republic in civil society. Written, published and presented during an on-going 
war, underlying both Kant’s and Schlegel’s perspectives is a sense that at 
the end of it all society will be differently constituted. Even though Kant is 
searching for ways of making peace viable, he nevertheless acknowledges the 
conditions that can produce war: ‘But under a constitution where the subject is 
not a citizen, and which is therefore not republican, it is the simplest thing in 
the world to go to war.’142 These are the conditions that Kohlhaas finds himself 
in: that his sense of himself as a citizen of Saxony has been taken away when 
he attempts to freely cross the border via the threshold of the tollgate, and 
consequently he embarks on war.
139 Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, ed. by Hans Reiss, trans. by H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 99–100.
140 Ibid, p. 101.
141 Friedrich Schlegel ‘Essay on the Concept of Republicanism occasioned by 
the Kantian tract “Perpetual Peace” ’, in Frederick Beiser, The Early Political 
Writings of the German Romantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 97.
142 Kant, Political Writings, p. 100.
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The vengeance that Kohlhaas wreaks over the state of Saxony is spatial, 
geographical and territorial. The key point about territory is that it concerns 
power, Foucault articulates this: ‘Territory is no doubt a geographical notion, 
but it’s first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain 
kind of power.’143 Foucault further questions his own perspective on territory 
in relation to space and geography and asks: ‘But can you be sure that I am 
borrowing these terms from geography rather than exactly where geography 
itself found them?’144 He answers himself quoting from previous writing:
The point that needs to be emphasized here is that certain spatial 
metaphors are equally geographical and strategic, which is only natural 
since geography grew up in the shadow of the military. A circulation 
of notions can be observed between geographical and strategic 
discourses.145
Foucault extrapolates this in the argument that power is exerted over territory 
and that power is demonstrated and enacted through war conducted over 
the space of that territory. Edward Said was critical of Foucault’s lack of 
engagement in relation to the politics of territory; for Said the politics of 
geographical history and experience were clear: ‘Just as none of us is outside 
or beyond geography, none of us is completely free from the struggle over 
geography.’146 In Society Must be Defended, Foucault discusses war as an 
outcome of the exercise of power over territory, as philosophical and judicial 
discourse:
[…] unlike the philosophico-juridical discourse organized around the 
problem of sovereignty and the law, the discourse that deciphers war’s  
permanent presence within society is essentially a historico-political 
discourse, a discourse in which truth functions as a weapon to be used 
for a partisan victory […]147
This summary by Foucault was written in 1976 and appeared before Giles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari advanced their concept of the ‘war machine’ 
in Mille Plateaux (1980). In this theme of the ‘war machine’, Deleuze and 
Guattari may have intended to extend and respond to Foucault’s position on 
the concept of war as discourse over territory. Deleuze and Guattari connect 
143 Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden, eds., Space, Knowledge and Power: 
Foucault and Geography (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 176.
144 Ibid. p. 177. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (London: Vintage, 1994), p. 6.
147 Michel Foucault, ‘Course Summary’, in “Society Must be Defended”: 
Lectures at the Collège de France 1975–76, trans. by David Macey (London: 
Penguin Books, 2004), p. 270. 
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the war machine to ideas of ‘deterritorialization’,148 as it is more concerned with 
ideas of dematerialization in relation to the formations of the state apparatus 
than it is about questions of space and the spatial. Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘war 
machine’ is a philosophical-poetic concerning the sweeping forces of change, 
but one that is in itself de-located – the war-machine has proximity but not 
location:
It is necessary to reach the point of conceiving the war machine as itself 
a pure form of exteriority, whereas the State apparatus constitutes the 
form of interiority we habitually take as a model […]149
They make particular reference to Kleist and his writing as an exemplar of this, 
and suggest that Kleist is the first to invent this kind of exteriority in literature:
Throughout his work, Kleist celebrates the war machine, setting it 
against the State apparatus in a struggle that is lost from the start. […] 
As for Kohlhaas, his war machine can no longer be anything more than 
banditry.150
However, there may be a slippage between war time and ‘war machine’. In 
reality, for Kleist there was no time or life outside of war – from his entry into 
the army in 1792 at the age of fifteen until his death in 1811, war was the only 
state of existence, always present or imminent. 
Deleuze and Guattari define the war machine as exteriority, as action, force 
and movement. Kleist’s writing does have a relentless forward movement, 
but this is different from Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of exteriority. Kleist’s 
exteriority is exterior for no other reason than that it is not interior: that is 
specifically not interior, not subjective, not the private space of the unuttered 
thought, not determined by ontological states creating an acceptance of the 
concept by defining what it is not; where exteriority may be seen in part as 
the application of Kantian uncertainty. As a result, this model of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s ‘war machine,’ although it seems a persuasive metaphor, quickly 
reaches its limit and becomes a tautological construction. Even though Kleist’s 
writing does have an inexorable movement to a bitter end, ultimately this is 
different from Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of exteriority. For Kleist this not 
so much exteriority as a demonstration of Kantian uncertainty, which in and 
148 See: Giles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, trans. and foreword by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1994), pp.140n and ‘Of the Refrain’, pp. 311–50. The 
concept ‘deterritorialization’ is developed in relation to the ‘abstract machine’ 
that is the structure of language; advanced with reference to Noam Chomsky 
and Michel Foucault.
149  Ibid. p. 354.
150 Ibid. pp. 355–56.
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of itself is not specifically exterior. While it is true that Kleist’s writing has an 
exteriority that Deleuze and Guattari identify, this suggestion is not the whole 
story of Kleist’s writing, since what is implied by this comment is that there is 
no interiority. The interior dimension of Kleist’s writing is constructed through 
directing the reader to the application of philosophical propositions. Kleist’s 
work is varied but the repeating motif is uncertainty in an unpredictable 
world, and the interior void of unknowability between people and knowledge 
(consciousness and unselfconsciousness). 
3. Law, society and the citizen 
The collapse of justice in Michael Kohlhaas is represented by the violence of 
his retribution: he becomes an outlaw and a murderer leading an insurrection 
because he was denied justice. The loss of certainty in justice meant that he had 
nowhere to turn but to insurgence. However, Kohlhaas’s war is only a short 
part of the narrative. Georg Lukács identifies the social bind of the ‘insoluble 
dialectic of justice’151 faced by Kohlhaas:
These contradictions culminate in the realization that it is typical of 
class society that the individual must either submit unconditionally to 
the injustice and lawlessness of the ruling classes or is forced to become 
a criminal in the eyes of society, indeed in terms of his or her own 
morality.152 
It is the settlement of hostilities into a strange, uneasy and ultimately uncertain 
armistice that takes over for the remaining two thirds of the story as the 
wheels of justice in Saxony and Brandenburg turn slowly. This entails the 
machinations of the two states in their attempt to settle peace and decide 
on punishment for Kohlhaas. The representation of the relationship of the 
individual to the state becomes the uncertain and complex resolution of the 
story. It was previously established that Kohlhaas and his wife were Lutheran, 
and that Luther is a most ‘venerable’ figure, a man of moral judgement and 
insight. Luther (1483–1546) is an interesting historical choice for Kleist to 
include, not only because he was a contemporary of the historical Kohlhase, 
151 Georg Lukács, ‘The Tragedy of Heinrich von Kleist’, in German Realists 
in the Nineteenth Century, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Paul Keast, ed. and 
introduction by Rodney Livingstone (London: Libris, 1993), p. 40. In his 
1936 Marxist analysis of Kleist, Lukács is largely critical of Kleist with the 
exception of Michael Kohlhaas and Die zebrochne Krug, yet describes him as 
the ‘greatest writer of German Romanticism’, p. 3. Lukács sees a contradiction 
between Kleist’s modernism and his ‘conservative Junkersim’ and that ‘he 
remained an officer of the Old Prussian school’, p. 20. An analysis of class in 
Kleist is viable, but outside this study. 
152 Ibid.
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but also because Luther was deeply connected to the state of Saxony.153 
The intervention by Luther as the most respected and revered person of his day is 
also that of an incorruptible figure who does not represent any side in the dispute 
other than the rightness of the law. However, in the face of Luther’s reasoning 
and the temporary amnesty he arranged,154 Kohlhaas maintains an intransigent 
belief in justice as a certainty. Luther and Kohlhaas enter into a debate about 
justice and the role of the state, discussing his case and attempting to find a 
resolution, though not without argument. Luther sets out to regard Kohlhaas 
as an ethical man and issues the proclamation in the hope of ‘[…] inducing 
Kohlhaas to return within the confines of ordered human society; and in the 
belief that there was an element of integrity in the incendiary’s heart […]’.155 
Upon reading Luther’s proclamation ‘accusing him of injustice’156 Kohlhaas 
clandestinely meets him, telling him this would be true and his war would be 
a crime if ‘society had not cast me out’.157 Luther reacts with alarm, asking: 
‘Has there ever, so long as states have existed, been a case of anyone, no matter 
who, becoming an outcast from society?”158 When Luther questions whether 
it is indeed possible for anyone to be outside of the state, he is suggesting a 
construction of the state as both territory and concept. Kohlhaas answers, ‘ “I 
call that man an outcast,” […] “who is denied the protection of the law!” ’159 In 
short, Luther and Kohlhaas ask what exactly is represented by the state and what 
is beyond the state. Kant outlines the concept of the outlaw as: 
For if the subject […] were then to offer resistance to the authority 
currently in power, he might by the laws of this authority (i.e. with 
complete justice) be punished, eliminated or banished as an outlaw 
(exlex).160 
Kant suggests here a sense that, to be an outlaw is to be beyond the jurisdiction 
of the law, as though there were a boundary of inside and outside the law as a 
spatial determination. Kohlhaas returns to the original moment when justice 
broke down crossing the tollgate, as Lukás notes: ‘Kohlhaas is a normal person 
153 Luther studied and later taught at the University of Wittenberg. Posting his 
Ninety-five Theses on the door of All Saints Church in Wittenberg in 1517 
was the beginning of the Reformation. Pope Leo X excommunicated Luther in 
1521, and he was regarded by the papacy as an outlaw. While Luther was not 
inherently radical, he was nevertheless an indirect supporter of the Peasants 
War of 1524 to 1525, which may have an additional bearing on the story of 
Kohlhaas’s insurrection.
154 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p.154.
155 Ibid. p. 149.
156 Ibid. p. 151.
157 Ibid. p. 152.
158 Ibid. p. 152.
159 Ibid. p. 152.
160 Kant, Political Writings, p. 143.
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who makes very modest, very moderate demands of society’,161 even despite 
the disproportionate scale of what came after. The loss of certainty Kohlhaas 
suffers is the loss of truth, but the question Kleist raises here is: can a state 
deliver justice that is based on a notion of truth that is absolute? Early on it is 
clarified that Kohlhaas’s ‘experience had already given him a realistic sense of 
the imperfection inherent in the order of the world’162 demonstrating that he is 
not overly idealistic and has realistic expectations of what the world can offer. 
Underlying the historical elements of the sixteenth century setting of Kleist’s 
story were the explorations into the relationship of the individual to the law 
and to the state that arose during the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Kant followed the political study of Perpetual Peace with The 
Metaphysics of Morals in 1796, where he outlined the relationship of states to 
each other, and of individuals to the law and to the state. Curiously, Kant does 
not refer to Leibniz’s political writing on the state as jurisdiction over territory. 
Kant’s theory of right is less spatialized than Leibniz’s study of territory and the 
law, but nevertheless in terms of Kleist’s investigation of an individual’s search 
for justice, throughout the novella there are echoes of Kant’s thoughts on right. 
For Kant, ‘a state (civitas) is a union of an aggregate of men under rightful 
laws’,163 and he further adds:
The members of such a society (societas civilis) or state who unite for 
the purpose of legislating are known as citizens (cives), and the three 
rightful attributes which are inseparable from the nature of the citizen 
as such are as follows: firstly, lawful freedom to obey no law other 
than that to which he has given his consent; secondly, civil equality in 
recognising no-one among the people as superior to himself […] and 
thirdly, the attribute of civil independence which allows him to owe his 
existence and sustenance not to the arbitrary will of anyone else among 
the people, but purely to his own rights and powers as member of the 
commonwealth […] 164
Kant identifies the layers of the modern state and the citizens within in it who 
know that they have entitlements under the law. Following on from the earlier 
Perpetual Peace, in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant devotes a good deal of 
space in this essay to the things that can go wrong or fall apart with ideas of 
right, the individual and the state. Consequently, in the context of this work 
Kant is concerned with an uncertain or unsettled political situation, when he 
argues:
161 Lukás, German Realists in the Nineteenth Century, p. 40.
162 Ibid. p. 121.
163 Kant, Political Writings, p.138.
164 Ibid. p. 139.
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[…] the a priori rational idea of a non-lawful state will still tell us that 
before a public and legal state is established, individual men, peoples 
and states can never be secure against acts of violence from one another, 
since each will have his own right to do what seems right and good to 
him, independently of the opinion of others.165 
Kant further clarifies that:
[…] it is a state devoid of justice (status iustitia vacuus), for if a dispute 
over rights (ius controversum) occurs in it, there is no competent judge 
to pronounce legally valid decisions.166
This is the situation represented and explored in the novella, where Kohlhaas 
has lost his citizenship and freedom because of a despotic and arbitrary law 
casually constructed for short-term benefit. In the state ‘devoid of justice’ – in 
this instance, Saxony – the question as to where the ‘legally valid decision’ 
was is pertinent to Kleist’s inquiry into the collapse of justice. It is clear from 
the start that the ‘legally valid decision’ collapsed when a charge for passing 
through the tollgate was imposed, and as a consequence a chain of disastrous 
events ensued. In the course of the novella Kohlhaas validates his actions by 
issuing a series of writs styled as his own laws of entitlement. The first writ 
is entitled ‘Declaration under the Writ of Kohlhaas’,167 in the second writ, 
nailed on to a church door, Kohlhaas declares himself ‘[...]“a freeman of the 
Empire and the world, subject to God alone”.’168 In issuing these edicts he has 
forfeited his ability to negotiate, and declares war. However, what kind of 
man of war is Kohlhaas? He could be considered an honest man waging war 
against a despotic ruling class, and that because the certainty of citizenship 
has been removed – the uncertainty explored is the arbitrary variability of 
interpretations of the law. However, questions concerning the pursuit of 
justice by an individual such as Kohlhaas return us to Kant’s propositions in 
the ‘Doctrine of Method’ near the end of the Critique of Reason169 where he 
asks how the individual subject can both use and reach the limits of reason. 
In the novella, Kleist explores Kant’s propositions since most of Kohlhaas’s 
undertakings lie within the questions of what is knowable and how one should 
act, and it is not until near the end that he realizes that he has completely 
exhausted all hope. The novella can be effectively scrutinized and analysed in 
terms of the collapse of certainty as the means of unlocking the dilemma of the 
initial collapse of justice. 
165 Ibid. p. 137. Kant’s emphasis.
166 Ibid.
167 Kleist, The Marquise of O– and Other Stories, p. 140.
168 Ibid. p. 143.
169 Kant, Critique of Reason, p. 677. See Ch. 1, note 127 of this thesis.
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Just as with Kleist’s letters, and in particular the arch letter, there is a 
materiality in the production of the documents on which the law is inscribed: 
petitions, papers, and writs, to the final piece of paper given to Kohlhaas by 
a gypsy woman. While Mehigan argues that these writs and petitions should 
be seen as a series of contracts in the legal and social realm,170 however, it is 
through the physical, material and even visceral relationship of the documents 
to place that gives them power and agency in the narrative. This is particularly 
so with the gypsy’s secret prophesy about the fate of the Elector of Saxony’s 
dynasty transferred on to the paper that turns this mysterious document into 
a talisman of considerable potency. The talisman creates a shift and partial 
redistribution of power, although of a secretive and supernatural kind, but one 
that gives final equality to Kohlhaas and at the same time torments the Elector 
of Saxony, even from beyond Kohlhaas’s grave. However, with this curious 
addendum to the 1810 version of the story, Kleist may be hinting at something 
else: that is, the invocation of ancient folkloric superstitions or witchcraft as 
beliefs predating the advent of organised law, which suggests a further collapse 
of the law of the modern state. Kohlhaas wears the talisman as an amulet 
and, while it does not protect Kohlhaas from his fate, it protects his own 
descendants and has the opposite effect on the Elector of Saxony’s line. When 
Kohlhaas swallows the talisman before his execution he literally embodies the 
power of that magic, and takes the secret to the grave, which drives the Elector 
of Saxony to collapse in a swoon of apoplexy. The Elector of Saxony suffers the 
loss of certainty and, along with the reader, will never know what was written 
in the prophecy. The uneasy ending lies in the collapse of the rationality of the 
law as it is subsumed by superstition and uncertainty.
In Michael Kohlhaas the collapse of justice happens because justice as a 
whole is made up of smaller parts, like the individual stones of the arch. 
The seemingly trivial legal claim by one individual – here the restoration of 
the horses to good health and compensation for his groom’s beating – is an 
exemplar of all justice. Kohlhaas takes the concept of the indivisibility of 
justice as far as it can possibly and logically go, until it too breaks down into 
superstition. Consequently, if a citizen is not extended that protection of the 
law, regardless of the scale of the grievance, then not only justice has collapsed, 
but the state itself has, since the state is both the embodiment and the means of 
implementing the law.
Several months after he first read Kant’s critical writing, Kleist went to Paris, and 
wrote to Wilhelmine observing the effect of libraries full of Rousseau, Helvetius 
170 See Mehigan, ‘Heinrich von Kleist’s Concept of Law, with Special Reference 
to “Michael Kohlhaas” ’, in Heinrich von Kleist: writing after Kant, pp. 68–83. 
Mehigan argues that Rousseau’s theory of the social contract is of importance 
to the Kohlhaas story as a ‘contractualist discourse’, p. 72. 
122
and Voltaire’s books wondering what had been achieved by these works, how 
they had affected the perception of the state, and identifying the problematic 
relationship between truth and state: ‘Does it care about Truth? The state? A 
state knows no advantage that it cannot reckon in percentages. It wants only to 
implement Truth.’171 In Michael Kohlhaas, truth is subsequently implemented; 
but only in order to expedite matters. Even though Kohlhaas wins his case, it is a 
pyrrhic victory, since he is sentenced to death because of his actions as a brigand. 
In the fight for certainty everyone loses – Kohlhaas and his wife lose their lives, 
and the children have lost their parents; the state loses credibility in the eyes 
of its subjects just as they are poised to become citizens; and truth loses as it is 
compromised beyond recognition through the collapse of justice. Ultimately the 
question is asked as to whether such collapse is irreconcilable.
171 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 124.
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Part 3
Collapse and the space of the abyss
1. Space and the abyss
In 1802, Kleist ended his relationship with Wilhelmine and declared himself a 
writer. He dismissively ends their engagement thus:
[…] where now, it matters not whether in pleasure or displeasure, I have 
committed myself to my writing […] Dear Girl, write me no more, I 
have no other wish than very soon to die. H.K.41172 
In the connection between writing and death, it is possible that this comment – 
rather than representing a desire to die – suggests that, for Kleist, the moment 
of becoming a writer is one of collapse. Like the stones of the arch, this collapse 
is similar to his suggestion that in the arch ‘[…] all the stones tend to collapse 
at the same time’; in this instance, the moment of declaring his commitment to 
writing is an all-engulfing collapse. 
Kleist struggled to find his place in the world. He returns to the refrain of 
uncertainty:
Ah, that we should require a lifetime to learn how to live, and only in 
death know what Heaven intended for us! – Where will this wavering 
spirit of mine lead me, striving for everything, and discarding it 
indifferently as soon as it is touched?173
Throughout the letters, and inflected in the prose and plays, there is a 
constant iteration of Kleist’s desire to find a way to live in the world, but this 
is always doomed to end in collapse. This insight by Kleist as the metaphor 
of the ‘wavering spirit’ (der schwankende Geist) is a compelling and poetic 
one, revealing his perpetual uncertainty, his vacillations, that his equivocal 
relationship with the world meant that at any time, collapse was imminent. 
Over the course of the following nine years until his death, Kliest’s existence 
was precarious, intense and in a state of perpetual movement,174 of wandering 
and traversing Europe in the restless hope of finding a place in the world, while 
at the same time producing a prodigious amount of writing in the form of 
novels, novellas, stories, plays, anecdotes, aphorisms and reviews.
172 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough p. 148
173 Ibid. p. 121
174 See Appendix. The extant 228 of Kleist’s letters that were collected and 
published give a good indication of his constant and restless movement.
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The fate of the wanderer is portrayed in Nietzsche’s rhyming prelude to The 
Gay Science:
27. The Wanderer 
‘The path ends! Abyss and deadly science loom!’ 
You wanted this! Your will strayed to its doom!  
Now wanderer, stand! Be keen and cool as frost! 
Believe in danger now and you – are lost.175
In Nietzsche’s verse there is a presentiment of death emphasized through the 
end of the path, the ‘abyss’, the sense of ‘doom’ and of being ‘lost’. Reading this 
in connection to Kleist, Nietzsche’s lines are redolent of Kleist’s circumstances 
– his fascination with the abyss, the problem of ‘deadly science’. This strikes 
against Nietzsche’s forcefully direct address to someone unnamed: ‘You wanted 
this!’; while ‘Your will strayed to its doom!’ and ‘you – are lost’, read in the 
context of Kleist’s wandering and death, are also striking reminders that Kleist 
was the author of the majority of the various forms of collapse that happened 
to him. This poem echoes Kleist’s own state of being, whereby the wanderer 
is always situated on an uncertain edge looking beyond, and where wandering 
may reach an ultimate embodiment of loss and collapse. Kleist had written 
to Wilhelmine, when he first felt compelled to travel following the turmoil of 
reading Kant’s critical writing:
[…] now I seem to be bound on a journey to foreign parts, without point 
or purpose, without any idea of where it will lead me. At times on this 
journey I have felt as though I were heading straight for my abyss – 176
The idea of travelling without ‘point or purpose’ seems to characterize of all of 
Kleist’s travels. The recurrent motif and concept of abyss in Kleist’s writing is 
one in which the conceptual and material nature of the geology and geography 
of the abyss combine and construct an image that spatializes death, but the 
abyss is also collapse as geology, as geography, as space, and as an aesthetic. 
Considering this suggestion of Kant’s critical thinking in the light of geography, 
perhaps Kleist’s intention to deal with the breakdown of his previously 
held convictions by ‘walking and thinking’ is less far-fetched a plan than it 
may otherwise seem. Given the lack of a certain destination, Kleist’s travels 
become more abstract, so that space is more important than place. The abyss 
is personalized as ‘my abyss’; it is not clear if this is where Kleist believes 
he is heading as a collapse, or as a kind of personal terror or negation, but 
175 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Adrian del Caro (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 16.
176 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 113.
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nevertheless this implies that he will somehow be engulfed or sucked into the 
space of the abyss, that it is a vortex from which he cannot escape, a collapse. 
And as he describes it as ‘my abyss’ he further suggests that the abyss needs 
someone to contemplate it, that it is a relational space. But how is the abyss 
identified? The abyss is defined by the geography of the features around it and 
as a spatial poetics. The abyss is a recurring motif in Kleist’s writing: it is a 
void observed, experienced and imagined as spatialized collapse. Yet, the abyss 
is also material, geological and a feature of topography. What is the difference 
between an abyss and the abyss? The former suggests a place, a bounded 
interior space, a geographically or geologically determined formation. And the 
latter suggests an aesthetic, an internal construction, a space of imagining, of 
territorialized fear, an engulfing unknown. Is the abyss situated? How big is the 
abyss? Is the abyss always uncertain? Is the abyss knowable? These questions 
might be reduced to one: what constitutes the limit in relation to the abyss? 
It is useful to return to Kant’s conclusion to the Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics, where he comments that, ‘limits […] are mere negations that 
affect a magnitude insofar as it does not possess absolute completeness’.177 
Therefore, if the abyss is taken to be space, then the way in which the limits 
[Schranken] can be ignored or overlooked does not mean that they are absent, 
but rather that, as limits, they not only contain ‘negations’ but suggest that the 
abyss itself is a negation, and as such the abyss suggests a sense of nothingness. 
This may be because the abyss evokes a particular quality of space: a fearful 
maw into which something or someone could disappear (or collapse).
Further, as with the previous discussion on the geometry of the arch, and 
returning to Casey’s observations in ‘From Void to Vessel’, he suggests that the 
void is both spatial and temporal:
Void, then exists between place and time: as if to say that to get out of 
place is to get into the void and to get into time is to get out of the void. 
Time is therefore one way of avoiding, indeed to devoiding the void – 
emptying its emptiness by introducing measured cadences and reliable 
rhythms into its abyss.178
This suggests that the abyss is spatial, and throughout Casey’s discussion of 
the void there is no further elaboration of what a concept of abyss may be. 
For Casey, the abyss has a hollowness and resonance, but he does not identify 
this as space, while the ‘[…] void were it to exist, would be place-like’.179 
However, this place-likeness begins to create place because the void seems 
to be something. Though this may be inherent in the meaning of the Greek 
177 Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 106, [4.352].
178 Casey, The Fate of Place, p. 67. Casey’s emaphasis.
179 Ibid. p. 67
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word itself as a bottomless chasm and ‘primal chaos’180 making the abyss 
incalculable. Yet, the idea of abyss raises questions concerning where it begins 
and ends, and returns to Casey’s exploration into the distinction between 
boundary and limit.181 Casey suggests that ‘[f]or Aristotle, the limit is found 
within place, indeed as part of place itself’,182 but if this is considered with 
reference to the abyss, what actually ‘does the limiting’?183 If the boundary 
is ‘exterior to something’,184 what is the ‘something’? In the abyss there is an 
implied limit, but not a defined boundary, or an edge that contains the abyss. 
The boundary of the abyss is unsaid, but is not absent. Whereas, an abyss 
is located, material and geographic and the ‘boundary […] enclosing it’185 is 
geological, it is an edge, even if it is uncertain and subject to change.
If the space of the abyss as a philosophical and spatially poetic concept is 
considered as the most unknowable of spaces, then it inevitably becomes 
associative with the concept of death. Kleist had a fascination with death; 
he spoke of his own abyss as ‘my abyss’, elucidating that the abyss was both 
an internal and external space always waiting to engulf him, and that his 
relationship to death was solipsistic.
2. Abyss and death
Kleist commented on death with considerable intensity in his letters; however, 
despite this, it did not necessarily suggest that his death by suicide would 
inevitably follow, but rather that his fascination with death as chronic 
uncertainty should perhaps be seen in the context of the early loss of his 
parents, and against a background of a war-ravaged Europe, where young men 
faced death in battle. Lukács notes that, ‘For Kleist and for the people Kleist 
created, death is an omnipresent abyss that is both enticing and at the same 
time makes the blood run cold.’186 There was deep internal conflict about death 
in Kleist’s letters. For instance, in July 1801 he tells Wilhelmine of an incident 
whilst travelling on the Rhine, when the boat was caught in a storm and the 
passengers feared that it would overturn:
180 Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, ed., E.M. Kirkpatrick, (Edinburgh: W & 
R Chambers, New Edition, 1987), p. 6, ‘bottomless gulf […] the supposed water-
filled cavity under the earth: hell: apparently measureless chasm’; see also Oxford 
Dictionary of English Second Edition Revised (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), p. 7: ‘(the abyss) a catastrophic situation seen as likely to occur’ […] from 
Greek abussos “bottomless” from a– “without” + bussos “depth”.’
181 See discussion of this in Chapter 1 of this thesis, pp. 76-79.
182 Casey, The Fate of Place, p. 55.
183 Ibid. p. 63.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
186 Lukács, German Realists in the Nineteenth Century, p. 19.
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Each person, forgetting the others, clung to one of the beams, and I did 
so too, to save myself. Ah, there is nothing more disgusting than this 
fear of death. Life is the one possession that only has value when it is 
held lightly.187 
Asking how it is possible to value life – that it is not chosen, and it is 
incomprehensible, immediately follows Kleist’s observation concerning his 
own actions. In the moment of an unforeseen accident he instinctively clung on 
to life. This was revisited in Das Erdbeben in Chili, when the intervention of 
the earthquake stopped Jerónimo’s suicide plan and he hung on to life. There 
is an anecdote dating from this time which illustrates Kleist’s rehearsal of 
suicidal thoughts. During an outing with Pfuel and Rühle188 and other friends 
to Wannsee, the place where he later died, Kleist suggested to the party that 
the most effective way of committing suicide would be to row out into the 
lake, having heavily loaded one’s pockets with stones in advance, and then to 
shoot oneself in such a way that the weight of the stones would ensure falling 
backwards into the lake, thus making doubly sure of death.189 While there is a 
mordant quality to this comment, it also makes evident recurrent thoughts of 
suicide. For Kleist, suicide may have been an end to uncertainty, according to 
Blanchot, who described it as being:
[...] the passage from the certainty of an act that has been planned, 
consciously decided upon, and vigorously executed, to something 
which disorientates every project, remains foreign to all decisions – 
the indecisive and the uncertain, the crumbling of the inert and the 
obscurity of the nontrue. […] There is in suicide a remarkable intention 
to abolish the future as the mystery of death: one wants in a sense to kill 
oneself so that the future might hold no secrets […]190
The avoidance of an unknown future described by Blanchot, may have been 
the kind of thinking which militated Kleist’s actions. While Kleist is concerned 
with death as personal and self-referential, he either does not comment 
on the death of others, or is curiously untouched by the deaths of friends 
187 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 115.
188 Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern, a Prussian officer, was one of Kleist’s 
life-long friends from his time in the King’s Guards Regiment at Potsdam. 
Rühle later attended Scharnhorst academy, where Carl von Clausewitz also 
attended. Rühle returned to the army in 1806 in Prince Hohenlohe’s corps in 
1806 and by 1834 was a lieutenant-general.
189 See footnote, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 96. And, Maass Kliest: a biography, p. 36. 
190 Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature, trans. and introduced by Ann 
Smock (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 104. Though 
Blanchot mainly considers the representation of suicide in literature, in the 
course of his discussion of the stoic suicide of Arria wife of Caecnia Poetus, 
p. 100, he describes Kleist’s suicide as ‘[…] passion which seems to reflect the 
immense impassivity of death […]’, p. 102. However, this is a misreading of 
Kleist’s thinking about death and his own suicide. 
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or colleagues. He does not mention other writers on the subject, such as 
Novalis,191 who also had a preoccupation with death based on personal grief, 
even though Kleist admired and published his writings,192 nor did he concern 
himself with the looming shadow of mass death on the battlefields of the 
Napoleonic wars, though he worried about how his friends Pfuel and Rühle 
were in the war.193 It is unclear what Kleist felt about his cousin, Carl Otto von 
Pannwitz, shooting himself when Kleist was seventeen, especially as they had 
previously made a suicide pact.194
Kleist died in a suicide pact with a terminally ill woman of the same age, on 
21 November 1811. Kleist’s suicide is a tragedy of choice, of an appalling 
decision ultimately made because he could no longer find a way of living with 
himself, his lebensplan long ago fallen away. There has been a tendency to 
interpret Kleist’s life and oeuvre in the terms and manner of his death, but it 
seems a retrograde step to read his life and work in terms of this early death, 
since he did not create his work with the plan that he would actually kill 
himself: his death does not really tell us or give us further insight into how 
to read his work. Even though he had his lebensplan, it was always in danger 
of collapsing, yet he did not live his life in the shadow of death – despite his 
repeated speculations about how to best commit suicide. While death was 
a preoccupation and suicide a recurring possibility for Kleist, in the letters 
and prose he does not come across as suicidal, in the accepted sense of the 
modern idea of a suicidal person as one of depressive, perpetually low feelings, 
immobility and a perceived ineffectual relationship with the world. Despite 
their heightened emotional states, the Sturm und Drang writers were not 
specifically suicidal. The publication in 1787 of Goethe’s epistolary novel, Die 
Leiden des jungen Werther (The Sorrows of Young Werther) had caused a 
sensation, since – as a result of his unrequited love for Lotte – Werther kills 
himself. Kleist knew the work and wrote a subversive and droll anecdote 
undermining Goethe’s novel.195 Even though few of his family and friends 
would have been surprised as to the nature of his demise, Kleist’s suicide can 
be interpreted as collapse – yet, it is hard to determine when the final moment 
of collapse actually occurred. The last letters Kleist wrote show a frenetic 
and exultant sense of purpose, organizing his last things and his intention to 
voluntarily die – they do not and cannot ultimately provide all the reasons for 
191 Motivated by the death of and grief for his 15 year old fiancée, Novalis 
wrote considerably about death, see Hymns to the Night, 1800.
192 Kleist was invited by the Hardenberg family to publish Novalis’s collected 
works. See Maass, Kleist: a biography, p. 137.
193 See his impassioned letter to Pfuel, 7 January 1805, when Pfuel is about to 
return to the army, and also letter to Ulrike, 24 October 1806, when Kleist 
expresses concerned about how Pfuel and Rühle are in the war, in Kleist, An 
Abyss Deep Enough, p.159–60 and p. 167.
194 See Maass, Kleist: a biography, p. 11 and 7.
195 See Kleist, ‘A More Recent and Happier Werther’, in An Abyss Deep 
Enough, pp. 281–82.
129
such a drastic action to end uncertainty, nor precisely what his thinking was at 
the fateful moment when he made the decision to kill himself. In the letter to 
Marie von Kleist of 10 November 1811, he identifies a rawness of feeling and 
that life has become intensely painful:
But I swear to you, it is quite impossible for me to go on living; […] I 
have at last become so vulnerable that the smallest offense, which every 
person’s feelings are subject to in the ordinary course of things, causes 
me twice and three times the pain.196
Unusually, in this letter he makes a link between himself and the historical 
moment in which he finds himself, that he can neither escape nor change it:
Of course it is true that, I, quite as much as they, have lacked the power 
to put these out-of-joint times to rights; I feel, however, that the will that 
lives within my heart is very different from that of those who go about 
repeating this witty allusion: 
The time is out of joint; O cursed spite, 
That I was ever born to set it right! 
and, in short, I wish to have nothing more to do with them.197
This letter conveys a sense of dislocation with the world, and a sense that he 
can no longer comprehend it or find a place in it, but also a sense of bad timing, 
or being out of his time. While the suicide letters reveal his disconnection 
from the social realm, there is no sense that Kleist is seeking revenge, nor is he 
196 Ibid. p. 201.
197 Ibid. p. 202. Kleist quotes Hamlet I.v.188, it is the last speech in Act I. Kleist 
chooses this reference and interprets it as the disconnection with his own time, 
rather than the more obvious ‘To be or not to be’, which can be interpreted as 




















manipulating the guilt of others. The consequence for Kleist was death, and as 
with so many of his previous journeys, Kleist was not alone – he entered into 
a suicide pact with Henriette Vogel, a woman with terminal cancer, whom he 
met through the Berlin literary circle with which he was involved. The sense of 
a final journey is echoed in one of her last letters to her husband, Louis Vogel, 
where death is described as though she were embarking on a voyage, that she 
is Kleist’s fellow traveller: ‘Kleist, who wishes to be my faithful companion in 
death as he was in life, will attend to my passage and then shoot himself.’198 
And inevitably for Kleist, death was spatial, a collapse. He wrote to Marie von 
Kleist, ‘[…] you will understand that my one exulting concern can only be to 
find an abyss deep enough to leap in with her’.199 In this description, Kleist is 
looking for a material place, an abyss with a deep, but finite end, a bounded 
place, in which he can conceal himself and Henriette Vogel.
In the eighteenth century attitudes to suicide were changing. Persuaded by 
Enlightenment thinking, Friedrich II (1712–1786) decriminalized suicide in 
Prussia in 1751. Hume asks in his essay ‘On Suicide’ from the mid-1750s: 
What is the meaning then of that principle, that a man, who tired of 
life, and haunted by pain and misery, bravely overcomes all the natural 
terrors of death, and makes his escape from this cruel scene: that such a 
man, I say, has incurred the indignation of his Creator by encroaching 
on the office of Divine Providence, and disturbing the order of the
198 Maass, Kleist: a biography, p. 282.
199 Letter to Marie von Kleist, Berlin, 19 November 1811, in Kleist, An Abyss 
Deep Enough, p. 203. 









universe? […] This is plainly false; the lives of men depend upon the 
same laws as the lives of all other animals […]200
While in this reflection Hume identifies the acceptance of suicide as an end 
to personal suffering, he further asks, ‘Has not everyone, of consequence, the 
free disposal of his own life? And may he not lawfully employ that power with 
which nature has endowed him?’, thus arguing that suicide is separate from 
religious and judicial constraint, while also asking the contentious question 
of who owns the individual. Hume referenced the novel La Nouvelle Héloïse 
(The New Eloise) (1760), where Rousseau explored questions of suicide, though 
in a more qualified manner by presenting pro and contra positions as two 
letters responding to each other, thus avoiding committing himself to a specific 
stance on suicide: ‘When our life therefore becomes a misery to ourselves, and 
is of advantage to no one, we are at liberty to put an end to our being.’ And 
prophetically, given the nature of Kleist and Henriette Vogel’s deaths, Rousseau 
ended the first letter:
O what a pleasure for two sincere friends voluntary to end their days 
in each other’s arms, to intermingle their latest breath, and at the same 
instant to give up the soul which they shared in common! What pain, 
what regret can infect their last moments? What do they quit by taking 
leave of the world? They go together; they quit nothing.
Notwithstanding these two views, the subject of suicide remained the cause 
for debate among Enlightenment thinkers who were not unanimous in their 
acceptance of the morality and decriminalization of the act. Kant was resolutely 
opposed to suicide; this position may have had its origins in his Pietist upbringing 
as much as in his advocacy of forbearance as the duty of the individual:
[…] to preserve one’s life is one’s duty, and besides everyone has 
an immediate inclination to do so. […] They preserve their lives in 
conformity with duty, but not from duty. By contrast if adversities and 
hopeless grief have taken away the taste for life; if the unfortunate man, 
strong of soul, more indignant about his fate than despondent or dejected, 
wishes for death, and yet preserves his life, without loving it, not from 
inclination, or fear, but from duty; then his maxim has a moral content. 
However, despite the shifting positions on suicide as an act, the problem 
of the body of the suicide remained, and both the Protestant and Catholic 
churches in northern Europe were strict concerning the burial of suicides, 
and tended to retain the dishonoured or ignominious burial until late in the 
200 David Hume, Essays on Suicide and the Immortality of the Soul. By the late 
David Hume, Esq. With remarks by the editor. To which are added, two letters
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nineteenth century. In his study of the suicide’s body, Craig Koslofsky observed 
that ‘[…] suicide could transform an honourable member of the community 
into an outsider, leaving a dishonoured body whose proper place of burial 
was uncertain’.201 This was something that both Kleist and Henriette would 
have been aware of, and embarked on their suicide uncertain as to what 
would happen to their bodies and where they would be buried, unentitled to 
an honourable funeral. According to the official report of the court officer, 
following examination by the court physician and police officials, Kleist and 
Henriette Vogel were buried hastily on the same day at 10 o’clock at night 
in the place where they died by the lake, Kleiner Wannsee. But, even by the 
standards of the time, this was a clandestine and covert internment, designed 
to avoid overt attention to the double suicide, and even perhaps the possible 
inference that Kleist was having an affair with a married woman. News of 
Kleist and Henriette’s double suicide spread quickly, including an editorial 
in London in The Times,202 the sensation transcending (momentarily) the 
contemporary mass death caused by war. It is rare that the place of civilian 
death and the place of burial should be one and the same. 
It was therefore a moving gesture of remembrance that the brothers Grimm 
visited and covered the unmarked grave mounds with branches of pine in the 
Prussian custom.203 The outcome of burying Kleist and Henriette Vogel in a 
shared grave where they died has given the graves more poignancy than most 
other literary graves. A century later Kleist’s family honoured the grave and 
paid tribute by erecting a stone marker.204 There is a sense that in their shared 
grave – away from family plots or internment in family vaults, away from a 
churchyard with the ordinary dead – they are isolated, that their double suicide 
has marooned them where they died, on the banks of the Kleiner Wannsee. 
Their grave, banished from the cemetery, the church, and the city, has created 
on suicide, from Rousseau’s Eloisa. A New Edition, (Basil, Printed for the 
editor of the Collection of English classics, Sold by James Decker, Printer and 
Bookseller, 1799), p.6. This essay would not have been freely available abroad, 
written in the early 1750s it was briefly circulated, then suppressed by Hume, 
later published posthumously in 1777, a year after his death.
201 Craig M. Koslofsky ‘Controlling the Body of the Suicide in Saxony’, pp.48–
63, in Jeffrey R. Watt, ed., From Sin to Insanity: Suicide in early modern Europe 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 52. In this chapter Koslofsky 
notes that in Saxony burial of suicides in churchyards was permitted but the 
graves were located beside the perimeter walls, or just outside and depended on 
the circumstances and ability to petition the case to the church in question.
202 The Times, 28 December 1811, p. 2. 
203 The brothers Grimm visited and wrote a description of the graves. See Maass, 
Kleist: a biography p. 300. The Grimms’ collected the Abendblätter and had 
the most complete collection of its six-month run; they particularly liked the 
Anecdotes, see Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, translator’s note, p. 257.
204 The grave stone has been replaced several times and the wording on it 
has changed, Max Ring selected the quote from Kleist’s play the Prince 
of Homburg ‘Nun. O Unsterblichkeit, bist du ganz mein!’ (Now. Oh 
immortality, you are all mine), Act V, scene 2. On the other side of the stone, 
where both names appear, Ring includes a quote from one of his own poems.
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an island, a separateness that is spatialized and has become, in Foucault’s 
terms, both a ‘crisis heterotopia’ and one of those ‘heterotopias of deviation: 
those in which individuals are put whose behaviour is deviant with respect to 
the mean or the required norm’.205 Foucault further defines the cemetery as 
heterotopic, saying that:
The cemetery is certainly a different place compared with the ordinary 
cultural spaces, and it is a space that is connected to all the other 
emplacements of the city or the society or the village […] Up to the end 
of the eighteenth century, the cemetery was placed in the very heart of 
the city next to the church.
Thus in the usual course of things the cemetery is part of the city, it is an 
architectural construction that is part of the fabric of urban space. For Kleist  
and Henriette Vogel, their grave by the Kleiner Wannsee, away from the cities 
of Potsdam and Berlin, is doubly a ‘crisis heterotopia’ – an island determined by 
their deaths as collapse.
It is through the analysis of the spatialized geographies of Kleist’s restless 
movement, wandering from place to place, never remaining anywhere for very 
long that Kleist produced all of his literary oeuvre. Yet, the peripatetic life of 
constant disconnection allowed him to produce work that did not conform to 
the modes of its time. While Kleist may have felt ‘out-of-joint’ with his times, 
this sense of uncertainty of place is the locus of his modernity. The perception 
of space is further emphasised as Kleist envisages the abyss as an unknowable 
endless void. Shortly before he died, Kleist wrote to Marie von Kleist:
Really, it is curious how everything I undertake these days collapses; 
how the ground under my feet, whenever I manage to try taking a firm 
step, slips from under me.206
The perpetual condition Kleist speaks of, in which the ground beneath is 
uncertain and foundations are in an unstable state, meant that uncertainty was 
inescapable and collapse always a possibility.
205 Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, p.180.
206 Kleist, An Abyss Deep Enough, p. 198. Towards the end of his life his sister-
in-law, Marie von Kleist had become his closest friend; he had also proposed a 
suicide pact with her.
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Chapter Three
Stone: history, material, place, island
This chapter experiments with materiality and uncertainty from the starting 
point of the stone used to construct the arch. The link between material 
and collapse is explored. Like the seas surrounding the oceans of Novalis’s 
thoughts, interdisciplinary knowledge from other places is brought together as 
material histories, natural philosophy, architecture and place.
1. Collecting theories of the earth 
I have been on my journey of discovery, or on my pursuit, since I saw 
you last, and have chanced upon extremely promising coastlines – which 
perhaps circumscribe a new scientific continent. – This ocean is teeming 
with fledgling islands.1 Novalis
The study of the earth was a pervading preoccupation in the eighteenth 
century, and much of it centred on the passion for collecting. The ‘new 
scientific continent’ Novalis identifies centres on the material from the earth, 
the uncharted terrains of knowledge forming islands. While some consider 
geological interest as defining eighteenth century scientific inquiry, others have 
considered it as a precursor to the emerging science of geology in the first part 
of the nineteenth century, yet this thinking was prefaced by the writing on the 
earth in the seventeenth century by prominent figures in the history of science: 
Robert Hooke (1635–1703), and also by Leibniz (1646–1716). The eighteenth 
century development of theories of the earth, in which Kant participated, 
concerned the instability of the matter and material foundation beneath our 
feet.
Kant’s interest in natural philosophy was fundamental to the expansion of 
his later critical thinking and was the subject of his earliest published works, 
‘Thoughts on the true estimation of living forces […]’2 1746 was a summary of 
the arguments of Leibniz, Descartes and Newton, with particular reference to 
1 Novalis letter written to members of the Romantic Circle in Jena, September 
1798, quoted in Introduction, Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: 
Das Allgemeine Brouillon. (The General Notebook) trans., ed. and introduced 
by David W. Wood (Albany: State University New York Press, 2007), p. xi. 
Novalis’s emphasis.
2 ‘Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces and Assessment of the 
Demonstrations the Leibniz and Other Scholars of Mechanics Have Made Use of in 
this Controversial Subject, Together with Some Prefatory Considerations Pertaining 
to the Force of Bodies in General’ in Kant, Natural Science, pp. 12–155. 
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theories of motion. While this was an exploration of the merits of the debates 
advanced by these scholars, it is of significance that Kant viewed this as a 
study of natural philosophy. This was followed in 1754 by an essay on what 
external forces may affect the rotation of the axis of the earth, and in the 
same year he wrote a key essay in terms of his interest in the material of the 
earth: ‘The question, whether the Earth is ageing, considered from a physical 
point of view’3 established an interest in the geographic as well as the material 
or geological. These questions and interests were brought into sharp focus 
a year later, in 1755, when a series of disasters above and below the ground 
gave impetus to the question of how to theorise what is under our feet. The 
earthquake that devastated Lisbon in 1755 was widely felt throughout Europe 
and had a significant impact on the certainties of Enlightenment thinking. By 
early 1756 Kant published three essays that attempted to theorise the causes 
of earthquakes. The second and longest of the earthquake essays provided as 
detailed a map of the outward spread of the effects of the Lisbon earthquake 
as Kant could assemble, preceded by a discussion of the possible causes of 
earthquakes, which centred on subterranean conflagration and chemical 
imbalance: 
The [recent] earthquakes have revealed to us that the surface of the 
Earth is full of vaults and cavities, and that mines with manifold 
labyrinths running everywhere are hidden beneath our feet. […] All 
these caverns contain blazing fire, or at least an inflammable material 
requiring only a slight excitation to rage violently and shatter or even 
split the overlying ground asunder.4
In these statements Kant demonstrates a desire to come to terms with the 
precariousness of the foundation of the earth and to address the limits of 
knowledge about what is at a deeper structural and material level, reasoning 
that gaining further understanding derived from as many first-hand sources as 
possible may provide understandings of how those subterranean vaults can fail. 
Kant’s natural philosophy was in advance of a deep interest in the material 
history of the earth by other German scholars and writers; this was later 
manifested by figures such as Goethe and Abraham Werner (1749-1817) 
in obsessive collecting and efforts to find a viable system for classifying 
mineralogy and geology in the latter part of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. This centred on the concept that geological material held knowledge 
and that collecting it added to the accumulation of knowledge. Goethe’s 
polymathic thinking in literary and scientific realms was unified through his 
concepts of nature. He was an avid collector: beginning in 1770 he amassed a 
3 Ibid. pp. 165–81.
4 Kant, Natural Science, pp. 340–41.
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mineralogical5 collection of 18,000 items by the time of his death, which was 
valued at one third of his estate;6 he went to some trouble and risk collecting 
material, making careful notations from where an example was found.7 
Goethe’s collecting was part of his serious endeavour as a scientist and was 
further emphasized in his first official role for the Weimar court supervising the 
reopening of the copper-silver mine at Ilmenau, which ended in failure when 
little ore was found and the mines flooded. Through this position Goethe was 
put in touch with the Freiberg Mining Academy, which was founded in 1765 
and was the first centre for the advanced study of mining and geology. Goethe 
met its well-known director, Abraham Werner, who also had an equivalent 
private mineralogical collection. Hamm notes that Goethe’s mineralogy 
collecting was in alignment with his times, and had an ‘important place in the 
cultures of natural history in the eighteenth century, at a time when collections 
specializing in minerals began to appear all over Europe’.8 A central theme 
Goethe followed from Werner was the concept that mineralogy could yield 
knowledge. Werner’s work was widely known; his chemically ordered system 
sought a viable method of classification and was arranged, as Hamm notes, 
‘[…] into four large groups: earths and stones, salts, inflammables and metals’.9 
However, in the proliferation of eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
classifications, Werner’s system did not prevail.10 For both Werner and Goethe 
the alpha and omega of mineralogy was, as Goethe wrote, granite, which: 
[…] forms the fundament of our earth, a fundament upon which all 
other mountains rest. It lies unshakably in the deepest bowels of the 
earth; its high ridges soar in the peaks which the all-surrounding waters 
have never risen to touch. This much we know of granite and little 
else.11
Sullivan suggests that for Goethe the significance of granite lay in ‘[…] nature’s 
eternal Werden or becoming’.12 This expressive condition of becoming is also 
consistent with a chemical view of mineralogy. 
5 ‘Mineralogical’ was the terminology of the time covering: minerals, rocks 
and fossils. See, E.P. Hamm ‘Unpacking Goethe’s collections: the public and 
the private in natural-historical collecting’ The British Journal for the History 
of Science, Vol. 34 Issue 3 (September 2001), 275–300 (p. 283). <doi: 10.1017/
S0007087401004423> [accessed 28 April 2014] 
6 Ibid. p. 278.
7 See ‘table of Granite from the Harz formation series’ in Ibid. p. 290.
8 Ibid. p. 281. 
9 Ibid. p. 284.
10 See Ibid. p. 284, and footnotes 28–30.
11 J. W. Goethe, Scientific Studies Volume 12. Goethe: The Collected Works, 
trans. and ed. by D. Miller (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 131.
12 Heather I. Sullivan, ‘Collecting the rocks of time: Goethe, the romantics and 
early geology’ European Romantic Review Vol. 10, Issue 1–4, (September 2001), 
341–70 (p. 342). <doi: 10.1080/10509589908570085> [accessed 28 April 2014] 
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The poetics of mineralogy met practice, when Novalis became one of Werner’s 
students at the Freiberg Mining Academy in 1797, after previously studying law 
at Jena. While Novalis was studying at Freiberg he began, but did not finish, 
the poetic and evocative rumination on learning and nature, Die Lehrlinge 
zu Sais (The Novices of Sais) (1797–1800). It is a unique, elliptical, reflective 
discourse based on multiple voices exploring the relationship of nature, science 
and art; he describes the teacher, generally regarded as embodied by Werner: 
He gathered stones, flowers, insects of all sorts and arranged them in 
rows of many different kinds. […] he roamed the earth saw distant 
lands and seas, new skies, strange stars, unknown plants, beasts, men, 
went down into caverns saw how the earth was built in shelves and 
multicolored layers, and pressed clay into strange rock forms.13
The role of the collector is an ambivalent one, singular and obsessed with 
ordering. In the course of the piece, Novalis makes a plea for the indivisibility 
of nature as the source of the thinking of science and poetry, and that nature 
cannot be set apart:
Scientists and poets have, by speaking one language, always shown 
themselves to be one people. What the scientists have gathered and 
arranged in huge, well-ordered stores, has been made by the poets into 
the daily food and consolation of human hearts; the poets have broken 
up the one, great, immeasurable nature and moulded it into various 
small, amenable natures.14
The later, unfinished Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine 
Brouillon, (1798–99), which Novalis began at Freiberg, was inspired by the 
encyclopaedia of Denis Diderot and Jean-Baptiste D’Alembert, published between 
1751 and 1772, but he eschewed their alphabetical and chronological order. Notes 
for a Romantic Encyclopaedia was an ambitious plan for an encyclopaedia of 
science, philosophy and poetry. Despite its unfinished state, it was ordered and 
organized, and built around a structure where nature, poetry, art, philosophy, 
logic, mathematics, medicine and science are interconnected as crystalline 
multiple facets of knowledge each carefully and tightly linked to the other. These 
connections arose in Novalis’s practical training in the field, and his role as an 
administrator and later director of Saxon salt mines at Weissenfels. The link 
between practice and poetics is a recurring theme in the Romantic Encyclopaedia; 
in the sections devoted to mineralogy it is clear that Novalis planned a more critical 
assessment of the obsessions of mineralogy, collecting and classifying:
13 Novalis, The Novices of Sais, trans by Ralph Manheim, illustrations by Paul 
Klee (New York: Archipelago Books, 2005), p. 7.
14 Ibid. p. 25.
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<Werner’s introduction to the oryctognostic system must be criticized. 
Something is lacking in his classification – Where is his principle of 
necessity – and where is his principle of completeness?> 
<First of all, external symptomatics must be dealt with by itself – 
independently of the meaning and the indication of the symptoms – just 
like language within grammar […] / Werner has only useful prosaic 
oryctognosy in mind – this is already something intermediate, a feeble 
attempt at mineralogical systematics or synthesis in the broader sense.>15 
Novalis captures the sense that classification was a linguistic as well as a 
taxonomic, scientific endeavour, and that the synthesis of interpretation, 
classification and language could not resolve every systemic problem. This 
perspective on contemporary mineralogy was a critique of the methods of 
geological practices and the manner of the expansion of knowledge in the 
field. The unique quality of the Romantic Encyclopaedia lay in its intention to 
always be working from multiple perspectives and disciplines. 
A further critique of the obsession for collecting lay in the work of Tieck, a 
friend and contemporary of Novalis’s and Kleist’s, whose strange tale, Der 
Runenberg (The Rune Mountain) (1802), tells the story of Christian, a man 
who leaves his life on the plains, and captivated, enters the terrain of the high 
mountains; he meets a stranger and is inculcated into the Runenberg, both as 
mountain and mine – he becomes part of the inside and the outside, tantalised 
by the idea that the runic mountain will confer knowledge or wisdom. After 
nearly falling from a high path he encounters a vista in the mountain through 
which he is dazzled by the naked figure of woman. She hands him a golden 
tablet inlaid with precious stones, he collapses in a faint and falls from the 
mountain. When he wakes he has lost the precious object, and fearing the 
madness of this knowledge of the mountain, he returns to the plains, marries 
and lives an industrious, prosperous agrarian life. A stranger passes through 
their midst leaving in their keeping a fortune in gold, which – as the mineral 
from the caverns of the mountain – drives him mad and away from home. 
Lured by the ‘savage stones’16 he leaves his wife to sink into destitution. 
Christian disappears in the mine in the mountain. When he eventually returns, 
he declares: 
“[…] I have brought along with me the richest treasures which 
imagination can conceive or heart can desire. Look here and wonder!” 
15 Novalis, Notes for a Romantic Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon, 
No. 533, p. 95. Oryctognosy: mineralogy [obs.]
16 L. Tieck and E.T.A. Hoffmann, Novellas of Ludwig Tieck and E.T.A. 
Hoffmann, trans. by Thomas Carlyle, introduction by Eitel Timm (Columbia, 
NY: Camden House, 1991), p. 109.
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There upon he loosed his sack and shook it empty: it was full of gravel, 
among which were to be seen large bits of chuck-stone, and other 
pebbles.17
All hope of fortune has collapsed and turned to dust. Tieck’s story of obsession  
and misfortune has some connection to Kleist’s style, though it predates it. 
Der Runenberg is a sly and knowing critique of the obsessive collecting of 
the mineralogists. These tales and accounts of stone as an object of obsession, 
collected, hoarded and studied, return us to the materiality of Kleist’s question 
about the construction of the arch, emphasizing the cut stones themselves 
which construct the arch, and that stone as a material has potential for a fateful 
outcome if the imminent collapse of the stones happens. Kleist’s formulation 
raises the unsaid of architecture: that something devised and constructed 
embeds collapse within its form. 
2. Britain, Portland and geological time
The ‘promising coastlines’ of the ‘new scientific continent’, so poetically identified 
by Novalis, had to some extent been proposed and navigated by Hooke more 
than a century before, and the ‘fledging islands’18 found their correspondence in 
Robert Hooke’s own island narrative and experience on the Isle of Wight, where 
his theories were grounded in empirical observation. Ideas about the earth took 
a fascinating turn in Britain in the seventeenth century with the remarkable 
polymath, Robert Hooke, described by Oldroyd as ‘[…] inventor (especially of 
scientific instruments), astronomer, physicist, microscopist, musician, philosopher 
of science, mathematician, surveyor, architect, and much besides’.19 Hooke was a 
significant figure in establishing and expanding the cultures surrounding theories 
of the earth, as secretary and curator of experiments for the newly founded 
Royal Society, he ensured the Society’s survival.20 From the mid-seventeenth and 
throughout the eighteenth century, as Porter notes ‘[…] Earth science was gaining a 
social base hitherto unknown’,21 and this began to coalesce into intellectual circles. 
The early topics discussed by the Royal Society were based on the material and 
agency of the earth: minerals, fossils, earthquakes, continental theories and so on.22 
The society initiated the first large-scale public collection of mineralogy and fossils 
in England, which was followed by a similar collection at the Ashmolean. As the 
17 Ibid. p. 115.
18 Novalis 1798, quoted in introduction, Novalis Notes for a Romantic 
Encyclopaedia: Das Allgemeine Brouillon, p. xi.
19 David Oldroyd, Earth Cycles: A Historical Perspective (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 2006). p. 35.
20 Ibid.
21 Roy Porter, The Making of Geology: Earth Science in Britain 1660–1815 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 3. Porter’s emphasis.
22 Ibid. pp. 16–22.
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emergent field was predicated on collecting and collections, Hooke cautioned:
The use of such a Collection is not for Divertisement and Wonder and 
Gazing, as ‘tis for the most part thought and esteemed […] but for the 
most serious study of the most able Proficient in Natural Philosophy.23
Hooke had a longstanding interest in the material of the earth – he lectured 
on theories of the earth from 1667 onwards. Although not published in his 
lifetime, his lectures included significant studies concerning the outcome of 
earthquakes, A Discourse of Earthquake (1668), and on cycles of the earth. 
Hooke was censured because his theories were contrary to biblical doctrine. By 
the end of his life his innovative and bold propositions had retracted to include 
ideas of the ancients and he became a ‘scriptural geologist’,24 however, this does 
not undermine the perspicacity of his earlier theories.
A significant aspect of Hooke’s work lay in his contribution to establishing 
the study of geoscience via fossils. This came in part, as Oldroyd notes, from 
his birthplace on the Isle of Wight where he observed the strata in the chalk 
cliffs, a place near Portland where giant fossil ammonites, ‘snake stones’, were 
found.25 At that time fossils were not recognized as previously living organisms 
but were referred to as ‘figured stones’,26 as having a similarity to animals 
and plants. However, with the advent of Hooke’s publication, Micrographia, 
in 1665, where the fossils he selected and illustrated as part of the study were 
supplemented by images – as Porter notes, the ‘fossil identifications above all 
were newly aided by high quality engravings’27 – a resultant combination of 
the technologies of printing and Hooke’s application and demonstration of 
his microscope laid the foundation for the further study of fossils.28 Hooke’s 
lectures were based on his observations of the location of fossils, and Odlroyd 
notes that this was important for geoscience because:
The first theme was the occurrence of fossils in strata and arguments 
that they were the petrified remains of former organisms rather than 
“sports of nature” or the product of some mysterious “Plastik of 
Vegetative Faculty working in Stones”.29 
23 Quoted in Ibid. p. 17.
24 Oldroyd, Earth Cycles, p. 40; other theories of the earth were advanced in such 
works as Oliver Goldsmith’s History of the earth and animated nature (1774). 
25 Ibid. p. 35.
26 Porter, The Making of Geology, p. 46. 
27 Ibid. p. 36.
28 See Ibid. pp. 46–53, ‘Meanings of Fossils’, for example Martin Lister (1639–
1712) Philosophical transactions, and in particular, Historia conchylorum 
(1686–92) had made him the world’s expert on shells.
29 Oldroyd, Earth Cycles, p. 36.
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Through fossils, notions of strata and the growing realization of geological 
time were identified, Porter notes that, for Hooke:
[…] strata constituting present land-masses had been formed slowly 
by natural processes on the sea-bed, with organic remains becoming 
embedded in them, and subsequently being raised by earthquakes. Strata 
were thus a witness of the changes the Earth and life had undergone.30 
This identification of strata by Hooke cannot be underestimated, and was 
revisited by further study in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. 
In particular, it was through Hooke’s study of fossils in the cliffs on the Isle 
of Wight31 and in Portland stone that led to this observation about strata in 
Discourse on Earthquakes:
Somewhat above the middle of this Cliff, which I judge in some parts 
may be about two foot high, I found one of the said Layers to be of 
a perfect Sea Sand filled with great variety of Shells, such as Oysters, 
Limpits [sic] and several sorts of Periwinkles […] and may be about sixty 
Foot or more above the high Water mark.32 
In addition, the evidence of fossils so high above the water line indicated several 
outcomes for Hooke; that there were creatures in the fossils that no longer 
existed; the identification that a layer of shells from a former sea-bed had been 
30 Porter, The Making of Geology, p. 60.
31 Drake notes that the Isle of Wight was separated from Dorset’s Purbeck 
Peninsular by marine erosion. Ellen Tan Drake, Restless Genius: Robert Hooke 
and his Earthly Thoughts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 61.






pushed up; and the hypothesis that earthquakes had some effect on the earth’s 
crust, though he did not reach a final conclusion concerning earthquakes. In 
Hooke’s studies, stone from Portland was important, and in his capacity as 
surveyor and architect for rebuilding London, Hooke received Portland quarry 
stones and found and studied the fossils in them:
[…] it has been very much urged upon the Consideration of the 
Petrification or Cornu Ammonis taken out of the Quarry Stone in the 
Isle Portland, whether it could be reasonably supposed that ever there 
were in the World a Species of Nautilus of this shape, and of so vast a 
bigness […] 33 
Hooke recognized that the giant ammonite fossils found on Portland 
exceeded anything that was currently found on the island. In the Discourse 
on Earthquakes there were exquisite engravings of fossils, based on Hooke’s 
drawings, by his friend Richard Waller, including ammonites and shells. Hooke 
further raises an audacious question:
Therefore before the Opinion be wholly rejected, I would desire them 
to consider, whether it may not have been possible, that this very Land 
of England and Portland, did at a certain time for some Ages past lie 
within the Torrid Zone […]34
This hypothesis was proposed based on Hooke’s theory of ‘polar wandering’,35 
a theory later proved by twentieth century theories of continental drift. Hooke 
did much to set up the work of later scientists, many of whom claimed public 
recognition. Time was the key arena of thinking that Hooke and other early 
studies of the earth struggled with, not just the inevitable recognition that the 
earth was so much older than the generally agreed date of five thousand years, 
which had been determined by the number of generations which followed 
God’s creation of the earth, but the insights into what fossils and layers told 
about geological time.
In eighteenth-century Britain, and also in Europe, Hooke’s work was known 
and read, for instance by James Hutton (1726–1797), who published his 
first observations about geology as an abstract in 1785 entitled Theory of 
the Earth,36 with the final of the three volumes in 1795. One of Hutton’s key 
33 Hooke, ‘Discourse of Earthquakes’, No. 3. These lectures were read by 
Hooke between 8 December 1686 and 19 January 1687; in Ibid. pp. 226–45 (p. 
241). Hooke’s emphasis.
34 Ibid. p. 242.
35 See ‘Hooke’s Concept of Polar Wandering on a Oblate Spheroid Earth’, in 
Ibid. pp. 87–96. 
36 This was predated by the novelist and playwright, Oliver Goldsmith’s 8 
volume: An History of the Earth, and Animated Nature (1774).
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findings was framing the concept of ‘deep time’ – that the earth comprised 
layers incrementally created over a vast period of measureless time and 
that these layers were not always integral and even, and could be disrupted 
by violent physical events. This was seen and observed in the folding and 
movement of geological strata, that stone could collapse and be bent and 
disrupted. In 1787 this became Hutton’s ‘unconformity’, whereby he observed 
a layer of stone that had bent into an unlikely parabola. In Playfair’s life of 
Hutton, he wrote about their visit a year, in 1788, later to Siccar Point, where 
they observed another ‘unconformity’:
We felt ourselves carried back to the time when the schistus on which 
we stood was yet at the bottom of the sea, and when the sandstone 
before us was only beginning to be deposited…The mind seemed to 
grow giddy by looking so far into the abyss of time.37
This well-known quote describing the unconformity suggests the abyss as a 
telescopic fissure through which the earth’s layers offered a sense of looking 
into a deep and barely imaginable past and suggested the concept of ‘deep time’ 
for geology – that geological time is both spatial and conceptual, whereby 
collapse and destruction was a significant determinant for interpreting the 
material of geology. Hutton’s abyss is a configuration of and in time, and rather 
than the implications of the primal abyss as a bottomless chasm, it is one where 
looking down through the strata offers a vision of a type of collapse, since 
the material, living and mineral, has collapsed in time to form the strata of 
geology. Hutton is considered by many to be the founder of modern geology. 
However, Drake argues that Hutton’s theory of the earth was ‘almost identical 
to Hooke’s system of the Earth’38 and that when he was developing his theory, 
Playfair noted that he read every available theory39 and, similar to Kant’s 
research, Hutton read all the available literature of the ‘traveller-naturalists’.40 
Other historians of science are less certain about exactly how much of 
Hutton’s theory was ‘indebted to Hooke’.41 Porter notes that, ‘By the end of the 
eighteenth century almost all geologists had discarded the geomorphological 
theory of the complete natural stasis of the Earth’;42 therefore the outcome of 
such events as the Lisbon earthquake meant that natural philosophers could no 
longer hold that the earth did not and was not changing. During the eighteenth 
century other important scientific work on the earth was undertaken by 
William Hamilton (1731–1803), who used his time as ambassador to Naples 
37 Quoted in Denis Cosgrove, ed., Mappings (London: Reaktion Books, 2002), p. 134.
38 Drake, Restless Genius: Robert Hooke and his Earthly Thoughts, p. 120.
39 See Ibid. pp. 121–28, where she demonstrates the very close textual 
connections of Hutton to Hooke. During his lifetime, Hooke was frequently in 
dispute with other scientists, who plagiarized his work.
40 Porter, The Making of Geology, p. 123, 216
41 Oldroyd, Earth Cycles p. 53.
42 Ibid. p. 160.
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to make a thorough empirical study of volcanoes, titled Observations on 
Mount Vesuvius (1772). While this subject was apparently that of dramatic 
eruption and potential collapse, instead of considering volcanoes as inherently 
disastrous, Hamilton suggested that their active force was creative rather than 
ultimately destructive.43 
The development of geological thinking took a different turn with the early  
palaeontologist, Georges Cuvier (1769–1832), who, after comparing the 
anatomy of living and fossilized vertebrates, proposed the idea of extinction, 
though he was not the first to hypothesize this. Cuvier also suggested that 
fossils occurred within strata. The cultural context in which Cuvier advanced 
his hypothesis of ‘catastrophism’, in his Essay on the Theory of the Earth 
(1812), was the aftermath of the Lisbon earthquake, and the contemporary 
situation of the turmoil of the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. For 
example, Cuvier states:
Life, […] has been often disturbed on this earth by terrible events – 
calamities which, at their commencement, have perhaps moved and 
overturned to a great depth the entire outer crust of the globe […] 
Numberless living beings have been the victims of these catastrophes.44 
These comments have a social, political and historical resonance. With 
reference to Cuvier’s theories of catastrophe and extinction, Foucault argues 
that: 
With spatial discontinuity, the breaking up of the great table, and the 
fragmentation of the surface upon which all natural beings had taken 
their ordered places, it became possible to replace natural history with a 
‘history’ of nature.45
Foucault suggests how nature began to be ordered, classified, and archived as 
an outcome of disaster. In the 1830s Charles Lyell (1797–1875) consolidated 
geology as an established scientific field of study, and finally refuted the theory 
of catastrophism, while focusing much of his thinking on the cycles of the 
geological history of the earth through stratigraphic formation. Lyell did much 
towards reconciling the work of previous geologic thinkers from the seventeenth 
century onwards concerning formalizing geological time and the age of the 
earth. An adherent to Cuvier’s theory of catastrophe, William Smith (1769–1839)
was a West Country surveyor excavating canals, who noticed that the layers of 
43 See Porter, The Making of Geology, p. 161–62.
44 Georges Cuvier, Essay on the Theory of the Earth. [facsimile copy] (London: 
Routledge in association with the Natural History Museum 1813/2003), p. 16.
45 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, ed. R.D. Laing (London: Routledge, 
2000), p. 275.
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fossils contained in them could identify strata. This led to the first geological 
map of Britain. It also did much to develop stratigraphy within geology, Porter 
notes that this was led by field-based professionals: surveyors, canal builders, 
coal prospectors and quarrymen46 whose work identified the need for geological 
knowledge, and whose practice had made significant contributions to geology. In 
developing his map of the geological strata of Britain, fossil material in Jurassic 
limestone from the Dorset coast was important for Smith’s endeavour. At the 
end of the eighteenth and in the early nineteenth centuries Portland and Dorset’s 
Jurassic coast were important for early geological mapping and the collecting of 
fossils. William Smith, and Mary Anning (1799–1847), who was based in Lyme 
Regis, were significant fossil finders and collectors. Smith’s considerable fossil 
collection was arranged stratigraphically.47 Smith’s 1815 geological map was the 
first of its kind; by mapping strata, he too looked into the ‘abyss of time’ and 
charted volume rather than surface; consequently, he mapped space and time.
With such figures as William Smith and Mary Anning, nineteenth century 
geology had absorbed working-class discovery and writing into its ranks, yet 
there were few as unique as the Scot, Hugh Miller, a former quarryman who 
became a self-taught geologist. Miller was a compelling writer, essayist and 
poet who wrote lyrically of the work of quarrying, of cutting out blocks of red 
sandstone and of the discovery of fossils. He was important for establishing 
working-class writing and experience, and Jacquetta Hawkes refers to his 
writings. Miller wrote distinctive descriptive writing; he conveyed a powerful 
sense of what it was to be there unearthing fossils, of the excitement and 
wonderment, which then drove him towards knowledge and to geology:
We raised another block in a different part of the quarry, and found 
that the area of a circular depression in the stratum below was broken 
and flawed in every direction, as if it had been at the bottom of a pool 
recently dried up, which had shrunk and split in the hardening. Several 
large stones came rolling down from the diluvium in the course of the 
afternoon. They were of different qualities from the sandstone below, 
and from another and what was more wonderful still, they were all 
rounded and waterworn, as if they had been tossed about in the sea or 
the bed of a river for hundreds of years.48
Miller depicts the work of quarrying and what it could unearth, as well as 
46 Porter, The Making of Geology, p. 136.
47 Simon Winchester, The Map that changed the World (London: Penguin, 
2002), p. 200.
48 Hugh Miller, ‘Gropings of a Working Man in Geology’ [Chambers’s 
Edinburgh Journal, 28 April, 109–110, and 26 May, 137–139, 1838] reprinted 
in Hugh Miller, Hugh Miller’s Memoir: From Stonemason to Geologist, ed. 
and introduced by Michael Shortland (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1995), pp. 248–49.
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conveying a sense of what the living sea had been like so many millions of years 
ago, and how it had laid down the layers of sedimentary rock. Shorland notes 
that Miller’s ‘[…] achievements in geology lay in the field of description. He 
recognised, as did few other geologists that the importance of bringing to life 
the remote eras that geologists were exploring […]’.49 The capacity for language 
to effectively convey scientific observation and thinking and captivate a wider 
audience has been important for the progress of all science, and returns to 
Novalis’s preoccupation in the Romantic Encyclopaedia.50
Portland as a place and a material occupies a significant part in the long and 
complex history of both geology and architecture in Britain. The study of 
Portland’s oolitic limestone has continued for more than two hundred years; 
geologists, palaeontologists and biologists have led this research, yet there 
has been little consideration of Portland in architectural or cultural history 
and theory or in contemporary writing on site and place. The expansion of 
quarrying on Portland coincided with the burgeoning interest in the histories 
and theories of the earth as histories and theories of materiality and origin. 
Portland stone is an oolitic limestone of the period that took place 100 – 170 
million years ago. The stone lies in three beds on top of Kimmeridge clay – 
the Basebed and Whitbeds have the finest oolitic material, with the Whitbed, 
the most favoured for building because of its durability and capacity to retain 
detailed carving; the top layer, the Roach bed, has fossil shell impressions 
of ‘Portland Screw’ Aptyxiella portlandica and bivalves Laevitrigonia. The 
Jurassic coast of Dorset is the most researched and written about coastline in 
49 Shortland, in Ibid. p. 64.
50 See Note 17: Novalis’s critique of Werner’s language as a limitation in his 
classification of mineralogy.
3.2 ‘Portland Screw’ 
Aptyxiella portlandica, 
bivalves Laevitrigonia.





Britain,51 and Portland is the subject of numerous geological and archaeological 
studies from the eighteenth century onwards. In general, there is little 
contemporary writing about stone as an architectural material.52 Stone holds 
time, this attribute of the material is brought to the building; architecture 
borrows time from the stone from which it is constructed, architecture quarries 
a geological history along with the material. Stone belongs to a place, it is 
the material of place, it comes from a landscape; it can be mapped. All stone 
is located; it can be identified and traced to its source. This relationship is 
temporal: geological time, excavation time, and architectural time. 
3. Portland Stone: architecture and the arch
The landscape of Portland has been created by the removal of its stone; it 
is a built environment made from the voids left by quarrying. Portland is a 
site that suggests a tangible image of collapse. Portland has been remade by 
disaster and collapse – both as accident and outcome. This history can be 
traced to the late seventeenth and throughout the eighteenth century, when 
quarrying expanded rapidly on Portland, though Portland stone had been used 
by the Romans, and for building in the environs of Dorset. On Portland the 
51 See E.D.K. Coombe, Some Aspects of Coastal Landslips and Cliff-falls at 
Portland. (unpublished thesis in the Bodleian Library, Oxford and the School 
of Geography, Oxford, 1981)
52 Recent publications on the subject of concrete and architecture are analogous 
with its ubiquity as the construction material used in most building from the 
second half of the twentieth century. Concrete is the antithesis of stone; its 
materiality is derivative – an amorphous mass that takes shape from the moulds 
casting it. The most common ingredient of concrete is Portland cement, named 
because it looked like Portland stone. ‘Portcrete’ was made from reconstituted 
Portland stone waste in the 1950s and 1960s and was used in the construction of 
the Centre Point Tower, (1966); each wall panel was cast on the island of Portland, 
see, Stuart Morris, Portland (Wimborne: The Dovecote Press, 2009), p. 50.





landscape of the quarries is architectural negative space. Portland’s exhausted, 
industrial landscape, marked by more than three centuries of quarrying, is one 
of disruption, dislocation and absence. Recurrent landslips of the coastal cliffs 
exposed the strata of Portland’s fine limestone showing its aesthetic qualities 
and potential as architectural material. As such, coastal collapse started the 
quarrying industry in the seventeenth century. The long-term result of four 
centuries of quarrying to the topography of Portland means that much of the 
island cannot be built on. The space of the quarries implies both construction 
and collapse.
Portland Stone was chosen by architects for its durability and for the fine grain 
of the oolite composing this limestone. Inigo Jones (1573–1652) chose Portland 
stone to stand in for the whiteness of classicism rather than for its unique 
qualities, mythically recreating the marble of classical Greece. After Jones, 
Christopher Wren (1632–1723) took over the monopoly of quarrying the royal 
manor at Portland. A series of significant historical disasters accelerated the 
wholesale requisition for Portland stone as a material: firstly, and best known, 
the rebuilding of the city after the Great Fire of London in 1666; Christopher 
Wren rebuilt more than fifty churches as well as St Paul’s Cathedral, though 
as his close associate and working under Wren’s auspices, it is thought that 
Robert Hooke was the unattributed architect of some of these churches. Hooke 
and Wren designed the monument to the Great Fire; it was built in Portland 
stone, with Hooke executing the precision construction. The monument was 
designed as a zenith telescope and a scientific instrument, the basement was 
planned as a laboratory ‘[…] to allow an operator to observe the heavens up the 
shaft of the column’.53 Wren chose Portland stone as the primary material for 
the reconstruction54 for several reasons: because the quarries for the rebuilding 
of London needed to be near a river or the sea in order to transport the stone 
down to London by ship; the quarries had to be sizable enough to provide the 
amount of stone required and that since a considerable amount of Portland 
stone was able to be salvaged from Inigo Jones’s portico from the old St Paul’s, 
building work could start and therefore using the same stone would match it, 
and also Portland was a freestone, meaning that the stone could be easily sawn 
and carved in any direction, but could withstand considerable weathering. On 
the northeast coast of Portland a large landslide had occurred in 1636, making 
the stone workable from the cliff, and six million tons of stone were thus taken 
53 Lisa Jardine, The Curious Life of Robert Hooke: the Man who Measured 
London (London: HarperCollins, 2004), p. 171.
54 It is claimed that somewhere on the island there is a large block of Portland 
stone bearing Wren’s distinctive quarry mark shaped like an upturned wine glass. 
However, this is a fanciful notion, Wren’s stone does not exist – despite attempts 
to find it by Dr Mark Gooden, geologist and manager of the quarrying firm, 
Albion Stone, who is also from an old Portland quarrying family. He explained 
that a large cut stone is valuable and would have been used long ago. I had a very 
helpful meeting and discussion with him, (26 July 2011).
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for the rebuilding of London. The perpendicular aspect of a cliff face is like the 
vertical wall of a building, and seeing the whiteness of the stone after a coastal 
collapse must have been the occasion to consider Portland stone for its aesthetic 
and architectural qualities. In 1697 another landslip damaged two piers 
beyond repair and delayed the delivery of stone to St Paul’s while the piers were 
rebuilt. On the whole, though delays were due to the unique work and social 
arrangements of the insular and somewhat irascible population of the island, 
which at the time was estimated at about seven hundred. Before Wren could 
begin the large-scale quarrying of stone from the island, agreements had to be 
made with the men ‘free of the Island’55 who had rights to quarry the stone; this 
was rapidly becoming a lucrative venture, and was finally settled through the 
manorial court on Portland.56 Wren used mainly the Kingbarrow and Waycroft 
quarries on the cliffs on the north-east of the island; the Kingbarrow quarry fell 
under the jurisdiction of the royal manor of Portland and was not subject to the 
complexities over the quarrying rights on the island. Lang suggests that Wren 
used Kingbarrow quarry because of ‘[…] the stone produced being of excellent 
quality, hard white, and obtainable in large blocks […]’;57 however, this would 
have been so because, since an existing quarry was being used, the whitbed 
layer of the fine oolitic Portland stone about ten feet below the surface would 
already have been exposed. The best stone does not necessarily come from one 
quarry on the island. Once the stone has been quarried and prepared and used 
as architectural stone, it is not possible to say with any precision which quarry 
it came from on Portland, owing to the way that the successive beds of the 
55 See Chapter III ‘Stone’ in Jane Lang, Rebuilding St. Paul’s after the Great 
Fire of London (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 104.
56 See Ibid., and also ‘Customs of the Manor of Portland’, in Norman Bezzant, Out 
of the Rock The Bath and Portland Group (London: Heinemann, 1980), pp. 33–43.
57 Lang, Rebuilding St. Paul’s after the Great Fire of London, p. 105. See 
‘Stone’, pp. 109, 113–15, for discussion of the master masons at St Paul’s. In 
addition, the rebuilding of St. Paul’s was very well documented, especially in 







sedimentary rocks were laid by the warm, shallow seas of the Jurassic period. 
Portland’s deposits of oolitic limestone are contiguous and extend beyond the 
limits of the coastline. At the northern edge of the Kingbarrow and the Grove 
quarries there is a pillar of limestone called Nicodemus Knob;58 at first glance it 
seems as though it is a unique geological formation, but it is the remainder of a 
whole section of cliff left by the quarry men as a tangible demonstration of the 
vast volume of stone quarried away.
Hooke was one of the principal surveyors59 of the burned-out city of London. 
He learned surveying in order to do the job and became an accurate and 
precise draughtsman with a unique understanding of the tensions and elasticity 
of structures, as well as making a good deal of money because each survey was 
paid separately. The course of this work produced Hooke’s 1675 hypothesis of 
the geometry and tension of the arch, the importance of which was twofold: 
it demonstrated how to reach the mathematics of how an arch could stay up 
and remain safe, and it marked an advance in the shift of architecture from 
the skills of the master mason to the theoretical professional. Hooke created 
a diagram of how an arch distributed its weight; this was demonstrated by 
hanging a heavy chain from its ends and observing how an arch works in 
reverse, writing in Latin ‘[…] ut pendet continuum flexile, sic stabit contiguum 
rigidum inversum […]’,60 (‘[…] as hangs the flexible line, so but inverted will 
stand the rigid arch’).61 While Hooke did not define an actual mathematical 
theory for this, it is nevertheless, according to Heyman, a ‘powerful theorem’.62 
58 A similar pillar of oolitic limestone, the Devil’s Chimney Leckhampton Hill, 
Gloucestershire, described as being produced by ‘the weathering of joints, slope 
instability and frost weathering’ in Denys Brunsden, and J. Doornkamp, The 
Unquiet Landscape (London: David and Charles, 1972) p. 129. However, it is 
in a disused quarry and may have been left by eighteenth century quarrymen.
59 To facilitate his work as a structural engineer, Hooke and Wren revised the 
design of the spirit level.
60 Jacques Heyman, Structural Analysis: a historical approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 79, Heyman notes Hooke’s 
demonstration of this theorem was included in an unrelated publication, on 
instruments for looking at the sun and his comments on watches and longitude. 
See Robert Hooke, A Description of Heiloscopes and Some Other Instruments 
Made by R.H. (London: printed by John Martyn, printer to the Royal Society, 
1676); and is listed as a further intention ‘2. The true Mathematical and 
Mechanical form of all manner of Arches for Building, with the true butment 
necessary to each of them. A Problem which no Architectonick Writer hath 
ever yet attempted, much less performed.’ p. 31. However, the theorem is not 
published in this, as it was a margin note in the original manuscript – though 
clearly it was quickly circulated. 
61 Translation in, Jacques Heyman, Arches, Vaults and Buttresses (Aldershot: 
Variorum Publishers, 1996), p. 347. In addition, this is defined as catenary: 
‘The U-shaped curve formed by a heavy inextensible cable, chain or rope 
of uniform density suspended from its endpoints. The curve is a hyperbolic 
cosine.’ in, Christopher A Gorse, David Johnston, Martin Pritchard, A 
Dictionary of Construction, Surveying and Civil Engineering (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), p. 71.
62 Jacques Heyman, Arches, Vaults and Buttresses, p. 347. Heyman notes 
in Structural Analysis: a historical approach, pp. 79–80, that: Leibniz ‘[…] 
appears to have obtained the solution in 1691, and indeed Huygens and John 
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Hooke’s diagrammatic hypothesis was tested and proved,63 and Block et al. 
assert the importance of a visual demonstration: 
The power of physical models and simulations cannot be denied. For 
example, it was Hooke’s hanging chain that convinced his colleagues of 
the forces acting in tension under a given load as an inverted form of the 
forces in an arch.64
In his extensive work on calculating the engineering and plasticity of stone 
structures Heyman analyses how a stone arch can collapse. He discusses the 
voussoir arch65 as a ‘simple form of masonry construction’,66 and that hinges 
or cracks between the stones can occur and ‘transform the structure into a 
mechanism’,67 and further:
[…] the collapse (unstable) state of a masonry construction is 
characterized by the formation of hinges sufficient in number to 
turn the structure into a mechanism. The position of the thrust line 
is determined at the hinge sections, and the thrust line is unique at 
collapse for the collapsing portion of the structure.68
[sic] Bernoulli also seem to have solved the problem at the same time’, further 
noting such was the ‘secrecy and competition’ that their hypotheses were not 
‘fully supported by mathematical proofs. It fell to David Gregory to publish the 
mathematics in 1697’ And though Gregory made mistakes, his understanding 
was that ‘[…] the horizontal component of the abutment thrust of an arch 
has the same value as the horizontal pull exerted by the equivalent hanging 
chain […] in modern terms […] if any thrust line can be found lying within the 
masonry, the arch will stand’. 
63 In 1748 Poleni used Hooke’s theory to assess the cracks in the Dome of St. 
Peter’s in Rome and proved that it was safe.
64 P. Block, M. DeJong, and M. Ochsendorf, ‘As Hangs the Flexible Line: 
Equilibrium of Masonry Arches’, Nexus Network Journal Vol. 8, No. 2, (2006), 
13–24. <DOI: 10.1007/s00004-006-0015-9> [accessed: 26 February 2015]
65 Voussoir arch: ‘An arch […] that contains wedge-shaped blocks, which 
are placed in such a way as to distribute the load efficiently to maximize 
the compressive strength of the stone’, in Gorse, Johnston and Pritchard, A 
Dictionary of Construction, p. 481.
66 Heyman, Arches, Vaults and Buttresses, p. 7. 
67 Ibid. p. 5. He is referring to the work of others: Pippard and Baker.
68 Ibid. p. 14.
3.5 ‘Hinges’ on a voussoir 
arch causing collapse. 
Drawing, Jane Madsen 
after Jacques Heyman 
Arches, Vaults and 
Buttresses, p. 163
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Heyman further states that cracks in arches are ‘[…] idealised as hinges 
[…] Cracks are not necessarily signs of incipient collapse – they indicate 
that the structure has responded to some unpredictable shift in the external 
environment’;69 he suggested that this can occur, for example, with the shift 
of a river bank and a stone arched bridge. In Kleist’s metaphor of the arch 
made from stones that want to collapse at the same time, the focus was on 
internal rather than any external forces which may precipitate change, both 
conceptually and materially.
The science of engineering that Hooke began to identify in his diagrammatic, 
mathematical and geometrical demonstration with the chain as an inverted 
arch was advanced in order to prove the practical viability and safety 
of construction of an arch. Later, in the eighteenth century, theories of 
engineering can be seen as further extending, especially in France, into the 
teaching of stereotomy70 – the theoretical, scientific application of descriptive 
geometry to stone masonry and wood cutting for arches, vaults, domes and 
trusses, where geometrical theory broke the dependence of the architect and 
engineer on the stone mason and set about establishing an order of authority. 
At the same time, this identified a situation where theory could not resolve all 
the answers for the practices of architecture and, for Pérez-Gómez, the struggle 
for intellectual authority could neither answer nor overcome the crisis shaped 
by the theoretical. He suggests, with reference to Husserl, that this occurred 
in the late eighteenth century with the advent of ‘non-Euclidean geometries’ 
and that ‘[t]his development in mathematics augured the possibility that the 
external world of man could be effectively controlled and dominated by a 
functionalized theory subsumed by technology.’71 The outcome of this was a 
struggle for differing forms of knowledge. Pérez-Gómez comments on one of 
the earliest treatises on stereotomy by Desargues (1640), who thought that:
[…] the architect should provide the craftsman with the precise 
stereotomic tracings to cut every piece of stone, just as he provided 
plans, sections, elevations. Architects should never allow the masons to 
invent these tracings since they had nothing more to go on than their 
own experience.72
However, Pérez-Gómez also notes that in the eighteenth century Frezier 
69 Ibid. p. 388. XXIV. ‘The Collapse of Stone Vaulting’ 
70 See Joël Sakarovitch ‘The Teaching of Stereotomy in Engineering Schools 
in France in the XVIIIth and XIXth centuries: an application of geometry, an 
“applied geometry”, or a construction technique?’ in Patricia Radlet-de Grave, 
and Edoardo Benvenuto Entre Mécanique et Architecture / Between Mechanics 
and Architecture (Basel, Bikhäuser Verlag, 1995)
71 Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1983), p. 5.
72 Ibid. p. 232. 
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concluded his initial findings on the subject that: 
[…] the “natural geometry” of the craftsman was usually enough to  
solve most problems of stone- or woodcutting. His theoretical tour de 
force was therefore rendered ineffective by a traditional practice that 
was for the most part still successful.73
Thus, the intellectual authority of ‘technological control’74 was undermined 
by the material knowledge of the craft of the stonemason, which additionally 
had the experience of history. To some extent, this tussle for understandings 
concerning material knowledge can be addressed with reference to Stiegler’s 
thoughts on tekhneˉ, that ‘Technics (tekhneˉ) designates, however, first and 
foremost all the domains of skill’75 and that:
Technology is first of all defined as a discourse on technics. But what 
does technics mean? In general, technics designates in human life today 
the restricted and specified domain of tools, of instruments, if not only 
machines […]76
Stiegler argues that ‘modern technics’77 began in the eighteenth century, but 
that ‘[w]ith the machine, a discrepancy between technics and culture begins 
73 Ibid. p. 233.
74 Ibid.
75 Bernard Stiegler, Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of the Epimetheus 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 93.
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. p. 68.
3.6 Parts of an arch. 





because the human is no longer a “tool bearer”.’78 To some extent Stiegler re-
positions production, fabrication or the application of skill as tekhneˉ, which 
also implies tekhneˉ-as-thinking. Therefore, though stereotomy generated a 
technical system, this was only in an imposed theoretical mode. By removing 
the system from the craftsman’s skill it could not be constituted as a tekhneˉ, 
because it was dislocated from any material outcome. According to Stiegler, 
‘[n]ew technical systems are born with the appearance of the limits of the 
preceding systems, owing to which progress is essentially discontinuous’,79 and 
thus the extrapolation here that the development of stereotomy did not follow 
in a defined order and did not fit together with specific production needs. 
4. Portland: material, memorial and collapse
A deep connection to the poetics of land and landscape has a long history 
in Britain, from the Enlightenment theories of the sublime from Hume and 
Burke, to landscape painting by Gainsborough, Turner and Constable, to 
Wordsworth’s picturesque and the wildness of Emily Brontë’s nature. During 
the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries the depiction of landscape can 
be linked to changing social relationships, and the questions of class and place 
that emerged through such writers as Thomas Hardy (1840–1928) and D. H. 
Lawrence (1885–1930) in novels and poetry. After WWI, landscape and a 
sense of place was in the painting and photography of Paul Nash (1889–1946), 
the painting of Ben Nicholson (1894–1982), John Piper (1903–1992), Graham 
Sutherland (1903–1980) and Peter Lanyon (1918–1964), the sculpture of Henry 
Moore (1898–1986) and Barbara Hepworth (1903–1975), the photography 
of Bill Brandt (1904–1983), in the films of Humphrey Jennings (1907–1950), 
Michael Powell (1905–1990) and Emeric Pressburger (1902–1988), and in the 
connotations of landscape and socialism in J. B. Priestly (1894–1984) and the 
archaeological histories by Jacquetta Hawkes. The number of depictions of 
stone, at sites such as Stonehenge or Avebury, in the work of these artists attests 
to this sense of a mystical and material attachment to land.
This connection to land and material found a poignant symbol in another 
large scale requisition of Portland stone just over two centuries later. This time, 
it was the social and political collapse of war: Portland stone was used for 
memorials following the First World War and, subsequently, the Second World 
War. A compelling image of a landscape of disruption and a world in a state of 
collapse is the turmoil of the First World War. Early in the war the battlefields 
of France and Belgium already held innumerable casualties, yet the fate of the 
dead had barely been considered. Shocked by the disregard and disorder of the 
78 Ibid. p. 69.
79 Ibid. p. 33. Stiegler’s emphasis.
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battlefield, and the lack of preparation and provision for the dead, Fabian Ware 
(1869-1949),80 a Red Cross unit leader, initiated the formation of the Imperial 
Ware Graves Commission.81 Ware organized burials, and by 1915 his unit had 
registered 30,000 graves. Ware stopped exhumations and the repatriation of 
the bodies of those whose families could afford to bring them back to Britain, 
insisting that all ranks, all peoples of the Empire and all religions were buried 
together – equal in death. Equality was taken into consideration in the design 
of the cemeteries: Ware consulted Sir Frederic Kenyon, director of the British 
Museum, who arbitrated on the designs submitted, and recommended rows 
of flat headstones of uniform design,82 ‘[…] their ordered ranks carry on the 
military idea, giving the appearance as of a battalion on parade’,83 erected 
above flattened, level turf of the eastward facing graves; though, this was 
not without opposition from those who wanted designs reflecting Christian 
sentiment. The simple gravestone looks similar to the ancient Egyptian burial 
stele, a reference Kenyon was undoubtedly aware of, suggesting an intention 
that these graves should be marked for time immemorial. 
Portland stone was the principal material chosen for the headstones because 
it was reliable, cheap and importantly, British.84 The flat tablet of white 
80 Fabian Ware fought in the Boer War. At forty-five he was to old to enlist so 
joined the Red Cross. His unit was taken over by the army and by the end of 
the war Ware was a Major-General.
81 Later Commonwealth War Grave Commission (CWGC)
82 Headstone measures: 38.5” x 15” x 6.75” (99.06 x 38.1 x 7.62 cms). 
This design not used in Turkey [Gallipoli], Greece and other sites prone to 
earthquake or extreme weather.
83 Frederic Kenyon, War Graves. How the Cemeteries Abroad will be 
Designed, Report to the Imperial War Graves Commission (London: His 
Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1918), p. 7.
84 Hopton Wood limestone was also used, but it was harder and more difficult 
to carve.





limestone was secular. Carving individual stones was expensive; however, a 
machine invented in Lancashire based on the pantograph was able to inscribe 
regimental badge, name, rank, regiment, date of death, religious symbol and 
a short commemoration supplied by next of kin. The difficult question of how 
to commemorate the missing with no known grave was onerous, and resolved 
through memorials naming the absent dead. After visiting the battlefields, 
Kenyon recorded the disorder in his report for Ware and the IWGC:
Many bodies are found but cannot be identified; many are never 
found at all; many are buried in graves which have subsequently been 
destroyed in the course of fighting. This is especially the case in Ypres, 
where the same ground has been contested for three consecutive years, 
and the whole countryside has been blasted and torn with shell fire. […] 
Yet, these must not be neglected, and some memorial there must be to 
the lost, the unknown, but not forgotten dead.85
The largest and earliest cemeteries were in France and Belgium on or near 
the sites of battlegrounds, and the French and Belgians made land readily 
available. The principal architects for the memorials and cemeteries were 
Reginald Blomfield, Edwin Lutyens and Herbert Baker. The memorials of 
Menin Gate by Blomfield, and Thiepval by Lutyens both used large-scale vaults 
to house the flat Portland stones bearing the names of the missing dead. These 
designs deconstruct the triumphal arches which had glorified eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century wars, and Lutyens’s Thiepval memorial to the missing, 
based on multiple arches, seems like it is part of a larger structure – the 
crossed form implies a transept, but is also a gateway leading nowhere. The 
typographer Macdonald Gill designed a font used uniformly on all graves and 
memorials: 500,000 names of the missing are carved into Portland stone, text 
85 Kenyon, War Graves. How the Cemeteries Abroad will be Designed, p. 5.





and stone forming a material nexus tracing over the absent body.
In designing and building the memorials and cemeteries, the provisional, 
makeshift architecture of the battleground was replaced and order exerted over 
the chaos, disruption and collapse brought about by the first industrialised 
war.86 Blomfield designed the ‘Cross of Sacrifice’ made from Portland Stone 
and embedded it with a bronze broad-sword; this latter embellishment conveys 
an ancient sense of the Arthurian and chivalric. The cross was available in 
three sizes, from 18’ to 32’ for cemeteries of forty or more, juxtaposing a more 
prosaic standardization reminiscent of nineteenth-century industrialization and 
planning versus the formal classical references in the memorials. The Portland 
Stone Cenotaph, designed by Lutyens, had been a temporary structure in 
Whitehall, but the weight of feeling generated by this symbolic empty grave 
created the need for it to become permanent. Lutyens’s initial intention was to 
repeat the motif of the unmoving, unfurled stone flags used in his design for 
the cemetery at Etaples, which was a rather sentimental and obvious gesture, 
and not one of his best designs. The most powerful of Lutyens’s designs was 
the ‘Stone of Remembrance’, which fulfilled Kenyon’s aspiration that the large 
monument at the cemeteries ‘[…] should be simple, durable and dignified […]’.87 
The Stone of Remembrance, set on three steps, was located at the eastern end 
of cemeteries of over 1,000 graves and was based on geometric proportions 
86 At the end of WWI: 1,115,000 dead: 584,000 identified graves, 530,000 dead 
and missing and 180,000 unidentified graves.
87 Kenyon, War Graves, p. 10.







from the Parthenon: it was 12’ long and weighed 8 tons, and had an inscription 
chosen by Rudyard Kipling from Ecclesiasticus: ‘Their name liveth evermore’.88 
The austere, secular altar Stone of Remembrance made from Portland stone is 
a weighty piece of the English landmass, a material manifestation of place, of  
belonging, and redolent of Rupert Brooke’s 1914 poem, The Soldier:
If I should die, think only this of me:  
That there’s some corner of a foreign field  
That is for ever England. There shall be  
In that rich earth a richer dust concealed;  
A dust whom England bore, shaped, made aware […] 
The ‘dust’ borne and shaped by England became the stone marking the graves 
of the dead, and like many of the bodies beneath the earth, also originated 
within the shores of England. The Stone of Remembrance imparts gravitas 
to grief and endeavours to fill the psychic and material void of absent bodies. 
This is mirrored in the holes left behind on Portland from quarrying the stone 
for the headstones and memorials. A poignant paradox, a double absence, is 
generated: in order to commemorate the absent body, absence is created by the 
removal of the stone. This double absence further occurs in the property of 
limestone as the flesh-eating stone, a concept based on the chemical effect on a 
body observed in early limestone sarcophagi.89 By the completion of the WWII 
cemeteries, the CWGC had bought approximately 120,000 tons of Portland 
stone, which works out to 100,000 tons of finished stone.90 Distributed in 
foreign fields around the world, there are between 700,000 and 800,00091 
grave markers of Portland stone, the disaster of war redressed and ameliorated 
through the process of mourning and the construction of memorials.92 The 
88 ‘Their bodies are buried in peace; but their name liveth for evermore.’ 
Ecclesiasticus 44. 14, Apocrypha, KJV. Kipling was the literary advisor to the 
IWGC and wrote or selected text for the memorials and cemeteries.
89 Limestone coffins in Greek sarcophagi lithos: meaning sarx = flesh, phagien = 
to eat, lithos = stone 
90 Bezzant, Out of the Rock, p. 211.
91 There are CWGC graves in 23,000 cemeteries around the world, some 
dedicated war cemeteries and others in general cemeteries with a war grave 
section. They are as far flung as Australia, North Africa, and, poignantly in 
Gaza, but most of the CWGC graves are in Belgium and France. See: <http://
www.cwgc.org/find-a-cemetery.aspx>
92 A new memorial is being developed on Portland. David Adjaye has designed 
a tower for the Mass Extinction Memorial Observatory (MEMO) to be built 
in the former Bower’s Quarry. The plan is that the tower will house carvings 
depicting the 860 species that have become extinct since the dodo. The tower 
is a continuous spiral, based on the fossil shell from the roach layer, Portland 
Screw Aptyxiella portlandica, and on the Ammonite, though a squashed 
interpretation of these forms and looking more like one of the old lime kilns 
on Portland. In the middle of the building there will be a bell, which will toll 
the end of another species. The publicity for the project frequently invokes 
and quotes Robert Hooke. The project has backing from: the Royal Society, 
and the convention on Biodiversity, with prominent figures such as Tim Smit 
from the Eden Project and Ghillean Prance former director of Kew Gardens. 
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aestheticized, pared down uniformity of the serried ranks of the flat white 
gravestones, which cast a shadow on the turf and the abstract, geometric 
sculpture of the Stone of Remembrance bring modernity to the design of the 
CWGC cemeteries, a further reminder that this was a war ushering in the 
modern industrial age.
Displacement and upheaval of land and cities occurs through natural disaster, 
accident and war. The connections between geological time and the material of 
place can be demonstrably traced to architecture made from stone. A limited 
numbers of texts about the use of stone in British architecture appeared after 
WWII, in the 1950s and 1960s. The likely imperative for writing about stone 
in this period was the need to repair and restore war-damaged buildings. 
Repair offers a deeper sense of renewal; stone has enduring qualities – it has 
continuity with the land, it has survived for millions of years. These ideas had 
particular resonance during and immediately after the First and Second World 
Wars, when a poetics of landscape proliferated in writing, film and art.93 New 
forms of cultural history about land and landscape appeared. In 1955, W.G. 
Hoskins wrote The Making of the English Landscape, an evolutionary and 
topographical history of human intervention in the landscape, developing 
the new discipline of local history and partly laying the ground for the 
contemporary discipline of place and site writing, a critical area in architectural 
thinking, and the more recent advent of ‘earth writing’.94 Jacquetta Hawkes’s 
‘memoir’, A Land, published in 1951,95 was a unique cultural, literary geology 
and archaeology of Britain, and was written as a deep history of the layers of 
Recently, the biodiversity scientist, E. O. Wilson turned the first clods for 
the foundation. The £20–£26 million design looks like Breughal’s Tower of 
Babel, painted three times between 1563 and 1564, and also the images from 
Paul Virilio’s Bunker Archaeology. The MEMO is a cone shaped, a hive of 
death, hiding the hidden space of the void of the quarry underneath. It is a 
mausoleum, an archive of extinction – each Portland stone block carved with 
an image of the (now) extinct species, but each block is already made of dead 
creatures that sank into the Jurassic sea-beds, and many blocks already contain 
extinct species as fossils. The project does not so much seem to be a monument 
suggestive of collapse, but one of failure. See: <www.memoproject.org/docs/
MEMO_brochure.pdf>. See also: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
this-britain/for-whom-the-bell-tolls-20m-memo-project-takes-shape-on-dorsets-
jurassic-coast-7848566.html>
93 See for example: J.B. Priestly’s BBC WWII broadcasts, Humphrey Jennings’s 
Dim Little Island (1948); Powell and Pressberger’s Edge of the World (1937),    
I Know Where I’m Going (1945), and The Small Back Room (1949) the last 20 
minutes of which was filmed on Chesil Beach with Portland in the background. 
Graham Sutherland 1903–1975 painted Origins of the Land 1950–51 for The 
Land pavilion Festival of Britain 1951, Barbara Hepworth 1903–1975, Peter 
Lanyon 1918–1964, Bill Brandt 1904–1983.
94 See note 5, Hayden Lorrimer, ‘Memoirs for the Earth: Jacquetta Hawkes’s 
literary experiments in deep time’, Cultural Geographies, Vol. 19, No 1. 
(January 2012), 87–106. <DOI: 10.1177/1474474011432377> [accessed 18 
February 2015]
95 Written from Spring–Autumn 1949, Jacquetta Hawkes A Land, 1951 was a 
surprise success; it received a very favourable review from Harold Nicholson 
and went through five impressions in fourteen months. 
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geological time and human habitation that had made Britain. A Land returns 
to the themes of the potential for geology (and archaeology) as poetics that 
captivated Novalis in Die Lehrlinge zu Sais (The Novices of Sais) one hundred 
and fifty years previously. Hawkes acknowledges in the preface to the 1978 
edition that it is an original work.96 She represents the geological layers of the 
land and archaeology of early human occupation of Britain as a poetics of 
place and location. Though Hawkes trained as an archaeologist, the majority of 
A Land is concerned with geology, as she reaches back in time to the material 
history of geology as an enduring link between land and people. 
Hawkes elides any discussion of geography, though place is articulated 
through discussion of the vertical history of the located Victorian naming of 
the periods of the geological table: Cambrian the romantic name for Wales; 
Ordovician and Silurian from the Welsh Celtic tribes the Silures and Ordovices; 
Devonian as the source of vertebrates found in Devon; and the Carboniferous 
and Cretaceous deriving from ‘English coal and English chalk’.97 Time is key 
to the project of A Land; Hawkes said that ‘As business men have packeted 
Cerebos [salt], geologists, as we know, have packeted time.’98 She describes the 
formation of the land as: 
Every layer of the sedimentary rocks that has formed since life began, 
each layer of rubbish accumulated since man became an artificer, can be 
distinguished through this extraordinary fact – that existence is never 
for two moments the same. […] So by diversity and process the geologist 
and archaeologist are enabled to do their work, to distinguish each 
peculiar instant of time.99
96 Jacquetta Hawkes, A Land (London: David and Charles, 1978), p. 1.
97 Ibid. p. 32–33
98 Ibid. p. 70.
99 Ibid. p. 29–30.
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She writes of the making of Britain by geological time, built up through 
the gradual layering of sediment and movement of the ancient oceans and 
landmasses, to the disruption and layering of strata. As such, the material of  
Portland stone is both an index and manifestation of collapse in the form of 
the layers of living creatures that died and sank to the bottom of the shallow 
seas during the Jurassic period. The volumes of fossils that comprise Portland 
stone are also boundaries of chthonian histories, of dead creatures falling to 
the bottom of a warm sea as life collapses in time. The discussion of geological 
time is interrupted with links that reach towards the connection and use of the 
material of stone. She is especially drawn to the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries:
In forming the oolitic limestones, the wide sea of the Jurassic Age made 
the greatest and fairest contribution to the buildings which in time were 
to be raised in Britain.100
Hawkes says, with reference to architecture: 
Portland and other less fine but lovely oolitic building stones form 
a relationship between the Jurassic Age, the eighteenth century and 
ourselves, its latest inheritors. English eighteenth century architecture 
could not have achieved some of its highest felicities without this ideal 
material.101
 Hawkes articulates how architecture can reach back in time to the geology of  
the material from which it is constructed and can then be dressed in its history.  
100 Ibid. p. 121.
101 Ibid. p. 76.
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The precariousness of imminent disaster links the development of all these 
theoretical perspectives. The shadow of the recent past was acknowledged in 
Hugh Massingham’s review of A Land at the time of its publication in 1951: ‘It 
is a germinal book and truly heralds a change in cultural orientation that bitter 
experience has made tragically overdue.’102 Later critics see the work differently:
As a contribution to factual knowledge about the British landscape 
and it evolution, A Land is now virtually worthless; as a device for 
recruiting converts to the infant cause of landscape history it was 
important; as a literary evocation of place infused by time, it is 
invaluable.103
This comment on the veracity and style of the work suggests that Hawkes was 
not aware of what she was doing; however, she refers to the piece as a ‘memoir’, 
a remembrance, an evocation of loss, and she acknowledges that it did not fit 
into any ‘accepted category: it was not a work of science, of scholarship, of 
opinion, or of fiction, but a curious blend of them all’.104 The ‘memoir’ begins 
with her lying in the garden of her house in Primrose Hill and feeling the 
ground beneath her and describing a physical sense of belonging and being 
part of the land. Perhaps after the upheaval of WWII, the sense of temporal 
connection and continuity with the land was based on a deep and physical 
need.
At the Festival of Britain in 1951 Hawkes advised and oversaw the design, 
construction, contents and layout of two pavilions: the archaeologically based 
Origins of the People of Britain,105 and in The Land of Britain, which gave 
her the opportunity to demonstrate a three-dimensional model of A Land as a 
clear expression of her profound, heartfelt attachment to the archaeology and 
geology of Britain, and also as a sense of belonging and shared ownership of 
the land, which was devoid of cynicism or world-weariness and indicative of 
the optimism of post-war socialism. At the festival, it was Graham Sutherland’s 
large painting Origins of the Land (1951),106 painted for The Land of Britain 
pavilion, which best created an evocation and distillation of Hawkes’s vision 
102 Hugh Massingham, The Spectator (1951), in Christine Finn, A life on line: 
Jacquetta Hawkes, archaeo-poet 1910–1996, 
< http://humanitieslab.stanford.edu/ChristineFinn/Home> [accessed: 10 
September 2012]
103 Richard Muir, ‘Reading the landscape, rejecting the present’, in 
Landscape Research, Vol. 23, No. 1, (1998), 71–82, (p.73). <DOI: 
10.1080/01426399808706526> [accessed 18 February, 2015]
104 Hawkes, A Land, introduction (1978 edition), p. 1. 
105 Jacquetta Hawkes, ‘The Origin of the British People: Archaeology and the 
Festival of Britain’ Antiquity. Vol. 25, No. 97, (1951), pp.4–8. <DOI: 10.1017/
S0003598X00020639> [accessed: 10 September 2012]. In this Hawkes gives a 
clear sense of her role in the Origins of the People of Britain pavilion, her role 
on the Origins of the Land pavilion is less clear. 
106 4255 x 3277 mm
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of the poetics of geology. Sutherland’s painting is a cross-section of the 
stratigraphy of the earth: the top quarter is spiky, geometric human habitation, 
the level below contains pterodactyls and shell-like organic fossils, emerging 
from a fiery primordial stone basebed that looks like blocks of Portland stone. 
All the forms in the painting are the colour of Portland stone and rest on a 
yellow-orange background; the total effect is modern and ancient at the same 
time. The early editions of A Land included two drawings by Henry Moore. 
The first has the subtitle ‘His lines follow life back into the stone’,107 which 
seems more likely to be a comment by Hawkes about the effect of Moore’s 
drawing and sculpture than the title itself and in the text she wrote:
Once when I was in Moore’s studio and saw one of his reclining figures 
with the shaft of a belemnite exposed in the thigh, my vision of this
107 Jacquetta Hawkes, A Land (London: Readers Union, Cresset Press, 1953), 
Plate A.
3.12 Graham Sutherland, 
The Origins of the Land, 
1950–51 
Painting, 4255 x 3277 mm 
Courtsey, Tate London
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unity was overwhelming. I felt that the squid in which life had created 
that shape, even while it still swam in distant seas was involved in this 
encounter with the sculptor.108
The discussion of artists working with stone tells much about Hawkes’s 
approach to the poetics of her literary geology, since she describes and 
approaches fossils as though they were sculptures, and she actively sought to 
bring together art and geology.
5. Portland: [work] place, island 
[…] he sometimes cast his eye across the Thames to the wharves on 
the south side, and to that particular one whereat his father’s tons of 
freestone were daily landed from the ketches of the south coast. He 
could occasionally discern the white blocks lying there, vast cubes so 
persistently nibbled by his parent from his island rock in the English 
Channel that it seemed as if in time it would be nibbled all away.109
So Thomas Hardy describes Portland stone arriving in London from what 
he calls the ‘Isle of Slingers’ in The Well-Beloved: A Sketch of Temperament 
(1897). Hardy captures the incremental shrinkage and disappearance of the 
island, as the stone is carted away piece by piece. There is a sense that the 
island of Portland may collapse in on itself, buried under the rubble left behind, 
becoming its own cenotaph. Portland is an uncertain place, always changing as 
another absence is made. 
A distinctive feature of Portland’s landscape is the collapsed landslip material 
from the cliffs, called ‘weares’. Brunsden et al. noted that ‘27% of Portland is 
affected by landslips (c. 317 ha out of a total area of c.1130 ha) this includes 
108 Hawkes, A Land (1978 ed.), p. 104. In 1953 Hawkes wrote the voice over 
commentary for a short documentary film on to Barbara Hepworth: Figures in 
a Landscape dir. Dudley Shaw Ashton about the relationship of the landscape, 
stone and sculptures used by Hepworth, the film was narrated by Cecil Day-
Lewis. She had previously written the script for The Beginning of History, 
1946. Directed by Graham Wallace. For the Ministry of Information. See 
Jacquetta Hawkes, ‘The Beginning of History: a film’, Antiquity, Vol. 20, No. 
78, (1946), 78–82. <DOI: 10.1017/S0003598X00019402> 
[accessed: 10 September 2012] and also BFI<http://explore.bfi.org.
uk/4ce2b9fe9263f>. Lorrimer, Cultural Geographies, p. 94, note 22, states that 
Hawkes’s ‘peers were the “romantic moderns” ’ as described by Alexandra 
Harris. However, in the light of Hawkes’s film work, it could be argued that 
she follows the model established by Humphrey Jennings in his work for the 
GPO and Ministry of Information film units, where people and place, were 
represented as poetic socialism through the use of Mass Observation. Jennings 
made Family Portrait 1951 for the Festival of Britain.
109 Thomas Hardy, The Well-Beloved: A Sketch of Temperament (London: 
Everyman Paperbacks, 1997), p. 41.
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most of the coastal fringe’.110 They add that the earliest record of coastal 
landslip is from 1615; occurring relatively frequently, there have been seventy-
two landslips since then. The Portland coast has the most landslides in Britain, 
causing problems for quarrying, as well as necessitating the demolition and 
reinstating of many buildings. The east ‘weares’ above King Pier is ‘the most 
active area on the island with over 40 records of movement since 1665 and 
regular report of failures which raise reefs in the sea floor’.111 The west side of 
the island is described as:
This stretch of cliffs is one of the most spectacular cliff walls in Britain. 
The coast is very straight due to its structural guidance by the master 
joint sets. The Kimmerage Clay is just below sea-level and there is full 
exposure to the Westerlies and a high-energy wave environment. […] 
All stages of detachment and foundering are visible including partially 
detached ‘hinge’ slips.112 
The vertical fissures in this cliff make it look as though it is in a state of 
imminent collapse. Distinct horizontal layers of sedimentary rock with 
vertical joints characterize limestone. The graphic and visual representation of 
limestone as a brick wall in geological mapping diagrams, developed prior to 
colour printing and digital graphics, is a visual demonstration of these fissures 
and cracks. This is both advantageous and dangerous for quarrying, as the 
joints can facilitate the removal of stone, but are also unstable. Brunsden et al. 
outline how the geomorphology of Portland further adds to the propensity for 
the joints or ‘gullies’ in the limestone to enlarge and weaken, causing cliffs to 
collapse; these collapses tend to occur more in February and March especially 
110 Denys Brunsden, Ken Coombe, Andrew S. Goudie, and Adrian G. Parker, 
‘The structural geomorphology of the Isle of Portland, southern England’, 
Proceedings of the Geologists’ Association Vol.107, No. 3 (1996), 209–30. (p. 
214). <DOI:10.1016/S0016-7878(96)80030-7> [accessed: 20 November 2010] 
The total area of the island is 4.4 square miles.
111 Ibid. p. 218.
112 Ibid. p. 219. Cliffs: North of Wallsend Cove to Mutton Cove. See film 
installation: Portland Nos. 2 – 5 (North of Wallsend Cove to Mutton Cove, 
Portland Bill, West Weares, Independent quarry, Tout Quarry) 2010–2012. 
3.13 Cliff with ‘hinge’ slips,









3.15 Map: Portland, 
Ordnance Survey maps 
1926–1927
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after prolonged rain,113 which ‘[…] result from the super-position of the 
permeable, well-jointed limestone and sandstone of the Portland Group on 
the impermeable ductile Kimmeridge Clay’.114 The geology of these coastal 
landslips links with Paul Carter’s thoughts on the study of coasts, 
The coast was primarily conceived as an arena of intellectual inquiry; 
in this form it was the line that enabled the scientist to draw other lines. 
[...] Its very disarray, the mimic resemblance of its productions to the 
specimens arranged in a cabinet de curiosités, […], suggested a museum 
in the making.115
Carter creates an evocative picture of the relationship of science to the 
delineation of coasts as both real and abstract, and that coasts, as edges under 
constant battering by the sea, elude fixity.
Portland is one of the sea areas listed in the practical and lyrical poetics of the 
shipping forecast, heard by the early riser and last thing at night, prepared ‘for 
those in peril on the sea’116 and incorporated by Seamus Heaney into a poem.117 
The Channel Light Vessel automatic coastal weather station, which collects 
and records weather information, is sited in the Portland sea area. The seas 
around the island are dangerous, in particular the Portland Race converges 
at the end of the Bill, where a layer of rock continues beyond the coast under 
the sea and determines tides and currents, and also the Shambles Sandbank. 
In the past this was treacherous for shipping and was the site of many wrecks, 
until the first lighthouse was built in 1789.118 Despite the dangers of the sea, 
Portland’s strategic island location on the English Channel was ideally suited 
to fortification – Rufus Castle was built in 1300, Portland Castle was built 
in 1589 for Henry VIII’s navy;119 also for maritime use, the navy had a base 
on Portland for one hundred and fifty years.120 The rain and the sea pound 
113 Ibid. p. 209. For example, after a very wet period on 25 July 2012 a cliff 
collapsed on Dorset’s South West coastal path killing a young woman. <http://
www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/jul/25/woman-dies-cliff-collapses-dorset>
114 Howard Falcon-Lang, ‘Classic localities explained 7: The Isle of Portland, 
Dorset, England’ Geology Today Vol. 27, No. 1, (January–February 2011), 34–38 
(p. 38) < DOI: 10.1111/j.1365-2451.2011.00780.x> [accessed: 18 February 2015]
115 Paul Carter, ‘Dark with Excess of Bright: Mapping the Coastlines of 
Knowledge’ in Cosgrove, ed. Mappings, p. 132.
116 Hymn: Eternal Father, Strong to Save by John Newton (1779), music 
William Whiting (1860s), anthem of British Navy. See BBC Radio 4: 5, 1 am
117 Seamus Heaney, ‘Glanmore Sonnets VII’, 1979, in Opened Ground: Poems 
1966–1996 (London: Faber and Faber, 1998), p. 169.
118 See Trinity House: http://www.trinityhouse.co.uk/lighthouses/lighthouse_
list/portland_bill.html
119 The presence of the Royal Navy began with the construction of Portland 
Castle for Henry VIII in 1539 as fortification in Weymouth harbour; the castle 
was strategic during the Spanish Armada, 1580s.
120 See ‘Postscript’, in J.H. Bettey, The Island and Royal Manor of Portland: 
Some Aspects of Its History with Reference to the Particular 1750–1851 (The 
Court Leet of the Island and Royal Manor of Portland in association with 
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the coast of Portland;121 it is treeless and windswept, though, as Howard 
Falcon-Lang notes, there are many trees on Portland, but they are under the  
surface dead and petrified as ‘fossil forests’ of ancient conifers, and that when 
quarrying was less industrialised quarrymen would find eight metre lengths, 
and also the ‘impressive circular, doughnut-shaped stromatolites are evident, 
formed when cyanobacterial mounds built up around the mounds of dying 
trees’.122 This was also written about by Thomas Hardy: 
To find other trees […] it was necessary to recede a little in time – to dig 
down to lose a stratum of the underlying stone-beds where a forest of 
conifers lay as petrifactions, their heads all in one direction, as blown 
down by the gale in the Secondary geologic epoch.123
University of Bristol Dept. Extra-Mural Studies, 1970). The navy left Portland 
in 1995, closing its base and the Royal Naval Air Station, HMS Osprey, causing 
the loss of 4000 jobs.
121 On 7 January 2014 the rock stack known as ‘Pom Pom Rock’ collapsed in 
severe weather. See: http://www.dorsetecho.co.uk/news/10917636.Ancient_
rock_stack_on_Portland_Bill_destroyed_by_high_seas/
122 Howard Falcon-Lang, Geology Today, p. 36.
123 Hardy, The Well-Beloved, pp. 72–73. See Falcon-Lang, Geology Today, 
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Hardy captures the quality of isolation at Portland, and also the lives and 
customs, class and personal relations of three ancient quarrying families 
involved in the business of quarrying, selling and shipping the blocks of stone. 
The kind of weathering as that seen on Portland was explored by Adrian Stokes 
as the effect of rain and water on limestone: 
The spectacular witness of limestone weathering or natural sculpture 
has inspired many of the comprehensive images on which civilizations 
have been based […] The interaction of limestone and water is always 
poetic, always appealing to the imagination.124
This interaction acts as water penetrates the cracks in the limestone, causing 
it to collapse and return to the sea. For Stokes, limestone has an originary, 
Neolithic connection: ‘There is an association between man and limestone 
underlying all architecture. Most caves are in limestone. During unknown 
aeons caves were the homes of men.’125 At present in Jordan’s mine at Portland 
an ever increasing underground, cavernous, architectural space is being made 
as the blocks of stone are cut away.126 As Hardy had done previously in his 
novel about the fictionalised Portland, Stokes creates an irrevocable link 
between architecture, sculpture and limestone:
The jutting cornice, the architrave mouldings, the plinths and blocks, 
have a definitive relation to the joints of stones as seen in quarry or cliff; 
and particularly to limestone, medium between the organic and the 
inorganic worlds. […] The influence of material upon style is an aspect 
of art history that is never sufficiently studied, especially in relation to 
building.127
In his captivation with limestone for architecture and art, Stokes considers 
its inherent quality, ‘[…] a uniform radiance, flesh-like and complete’128 and 
reconfigures the stone as flesh.
Portland as a site is contradictory: an island that is not an island, there is a 
paradox in the durability of the stone against the instability of the cliffs. A 
substantial amount of Portland cannot be built on because it is so disrupted 
by quarrying and landslips, and the arable strip fields, or ‘lawns’, remnants 
of mediaeval agriculture on the south of the island, are of archaeological 
p.37, who notes that this is probably not how the trunks fell.
124 Adrian Stokes, The Stones of Rimini (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 33.
125 Ibid.
126 Visit and tour of Albion Quarries mine: 31 May, 2011. Mining is done with 
large-scale stone saws from Carrera, and is less environmentally invasive than 
quarrying.
127 Stokes, The Stones of Rimini, pp. 43–44.
128 Ibid. p. 55.
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significance. Falcon-Lang acknowledges the interdependence of geology and 
quarrying:
[…] much of what we have learned of Portland’s geology has depended 
upon the long history of quarrying, which has created accessible 
exposures across the entire length of the isle.129
The villages and hamlets on Portland fit in the gaps between the quarries; 
the majority are built from Portland stone, the vernacular architecture of the 
quarrymen’s cottages was created using available stone of variable proportions. 
Portland is a terrain of scars; quarrying has irretrievably changed the 
topography of the island – it is impossible to return it to an undisturbed state. 
The ‘weares’ of the fallen material at the bottom of the cliffs are not just the 
fallen rocks of coastal collapse; the term ‘weares’ also applies to layers of debris 
and off-cut stone at the quarries, in the past often dumped over the cliffs, and 
used as partial infill across the island. The ‘weares’ look as though something 
has collapsed, or a disaster has happened, like a battlefield; but the ‘weares’ 
are also constructed, the abandoned rubble making unintended, random 
sculptures, abstract arrangements from the piles of stone.
The island of Portland is an intriguing and compelling site: its multiple 
histories suggest a nexus of departures, and it is never possible to return to 
the same island, as each day and each week part of it is taken away. Quarries 
are industrialised work places, and perhaps too quotidian for architectural 
historians who prefer the outcome of the material rather than its source. 
Portland is an industrial landscape constructed by labour working to extract 
the blocks, in the past using the plug and feathering method, where a hinged 
wedge is driven into a hole drilled in the stone and then opened up to break it 
129 Falcon-Lang, Geology Today, p. 38.





away. Explosives tend not to be used at Portland, as they damage the stone.130 
Stone is a commodity bearing the marks of the labour that worked it. The 
blocks of Portland stone are marked with the measurements of the stone, the 
site it was quarried from and the bedding direction that the block lay in the 
ground; until the prosaic spray can of the twentieth century, the legacy of 
Roman quarrying was the use of chiselled marks on the stone based on Roman 
numerals. The landscape also bears marks of those tools: drill lines scarify 
downwards on the stone as the quarries were excavated. For many men in 
the quarries, time was measured in the duration of a prison sentence’s hard 
labour, where working the stone was both punishment and rehabilitation, their 
relationship to the site legally determined as bodies in space. Portland has two 
prisons, the Grove and the Verne.131 Casey discusses Foucault’s concept of 
‘docile bodies’ from Discipline and Punish, that the concept is located:
[…] bodies that exist only in sites and as a function of sites. The fate of 
such bodies is to be incarcerated – positioned – in buildings. Bodies and 
buildings alike have become site-specific.132
At Portland the quarries were a further location of this site-specificity of the 
body as the hard labour extending the space of the quarries through working 
and moving the stone. The Grove prison, built by convict labour in 1848, was 
regarded by reformers as a model because it offered the chance for prisoners 
to earn a ticket-of-leave when they were transported to Australia,133 their past 
histories buried under the rubble of the quarries, lost in the gaping holes they 
130 See Portland Stone, (Pathé News, 1955. Film 2 min.) 1:30 min – 1:50 min. <http://
www.britishpathe.com/video/portland-stone>, The Island of Stone, (Pathé News, 1934. 
Film 2 min.) <http://www.britishpathe.com/video/the-island-of-stone-portland>
131 Originally an army garrison which could house up to 3,000 troops, the 
Verne was converted to a prison in 1949. 
132 Casey, The Fate of Place, p.184.
133 Bettey, The Island and Royal Manor of Portland, p. 122.
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worked into the landscape. Without prison labour from the Grove prison it 
would not have been possible to build in Portland Harbour one of the largest 
breakwaters ever built; a considerable engineering project designed for use by 
the navy as their base, it used stone from Admiralty Quarry. Convicts also built 
and worked a number of lime kilns on the island. The images of quarrying in 
the work of unskilled prisoners and skilled quarrymen show that Portland is 
constantly under construction, as each stone is won from the landscape in a 
battle for a material. 
Cosgrove and Daniels refer to Ruskin’s treatment of ‘landscape as a text’.134 
However, the way that landscape may be regarded as ‘text’ may depend upon 
how it is being read, and by whom, since that sense of ‘reading’ can be from 
multiple perspectives – as potential art work, as site, as situation, as geology, 
as science, as archaeology, as history, and – in the case of Portland – as the 
architecture of absence, as disruption and as collapse. Reading ‘landscape as 
text’ also has an experimental quality: it moves across ideas, disciplines and 
practices, as with Novalis’s Romantic Encyclopaedia. This reading is also the 
contemplation of space, of staring out to sea, to the horizon, of looking down 
from the vertiginous cliffs, and of staring into the space of the empty quarries. 
The landscape of the quarries is a built environment constructed from the 
voids of absent stone; it is the negative space of architecture, but there are no 
architects or builders present in their construction. The walls of the quarries 
– scarred by drills, cutters and saws – show the history of quarrying, and the 
geological strata exposed evoke the levels of a building. 
The quarries are containers that are being emptied out, their construction 
creates a vessel that is empty. Returning to Casey, who extrapolates with 
134 Cosgrove and Daniels, The Iconography of Landscape: essays on the 
symbolic representation, design and use of past environment, p. 5. 
3.19 Postcard: Convicts, 
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reference to Aristotle’s idea that place is determined by the condition of 
being in it: ‘To be in a place is very much like being in a vessel, and the 
question becomes just how is this so – thereby calling for further descriptive 
refinement.’135 Casey further questions whether Aristotle is moving away 
from the view of ‘regard[ing] either form or matter as providing the key to 
the nature of place’136 but concludes that place depends on the ‘[…] power to 
hold things in’.137 However, if this is applied to the situation of the quarry, the 
quarry becomes a de-limited limit, that, by quarrying, the space of the vessel is 
emptied – in this instance, the power of the quarry as a vessel lies in its capacity 
for not holding anything, that in the limit is the representation of the absent 
material. Whereas place is:
[…] this immediately environing thing taken as a limit. But the limit 
belongs to the surrounder, not to the body surrounded […] As a vessel, 
such as a glass or a jug, surrounds its content – say air or water – so 
place surrounds the body or group of bodies located within it 138
but according to Aristotle ‘[…] the vessel is a place which can be carried around, 
so place is a vessel which cannot be moved around’,139 but it can be changed or 
expanded: in the case of the quarries, the limits of the vessel are uncertain and never 
the same, as each piece of stone is cut and carried away.
At the abandoned and working quarries space is a remainder, a history; it is both the 
absent material and the material absence, and, as such, space becomes something – at 
the quarries space is made. This is contrary to the view Kant advances:
135 Casey, The Fate of Place, p. 54.
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid .
138 Ibid. pp. 54–55
139 Ibid p. 55.





One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very 
well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore 
to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as 
a determination dependent on them.140
Kant suggests that space is the outward appearance of possibility, an idea of 
imminence, of something impending, that in the future something might come 
into being; this does not necessarily have to be an actual form, though this 
is not absolutely ruled out. The sheer scale of the space left behind compels 
the viewer of the quarry to re-imagine the stone that has been taken away, to 
re-build the landscape out of the absent blocks of free stone. Carter suggests 
methods for ‘viewing emptiness’, concluding that ‘in materialising the laughable 
offspring of dust, it was pleasurable to prove that things as we see them right 
here generate expectations of things elsewhere and out of sight […]’.141 With 
reference to the Portland quarries, it might be possible to suggest an addition 
to this; that, in looking at these big, dusty voids and debris, it is possible to 
generate images of architecture over the emptiness and to trace in the absent 
blocks of stone.
Centuries of quarrying have left Portland’s landscape scarred by dislocation 
and absence and the repeated gnawing away of the stone means that the island 
is in a state of perpetual change. This instability is further demonstrated in 
the geomorphology of the island, where the limestone cliffs can break away, 
causing coastal collapse – an edge that is as uncertain as it is unstable. The 
exploration of concepts of absence and collapse trace a thread of uncertainty, 
disruption and catastrophe through early theories of natural philosophy, 
geology, history and architecture to contemporary ideas of place and site. 
By following Portland stone as a material and a place created the means of 
retrieving the history of architecture and re-inserting it into the specific location 
of Portland, making experimental connections between architecture and the 
material of stone.
140 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 158.













Film poetics: material and spatial practice[s]
Part 1 – Experimental film
The thinking and making of my practice can be characterized as a poetic 
filmmaking of collapse. The initial aim of my film practice in the early 
stages of this research project was to develop, work with and demonstrate 
a visual equivalent or manifestation of the concept of collapse originating 
from reading Kleist. This has been achieved through working with the 
idea that the materiality of collapse as a poetic is visual, literary, historical, 
spatial, architectural and philosophical, and that making films and videos 
is a constituent component of that interdisciplinary practice. The concept 
of collapse is intellectual and material. This is especially so since Kleist’s 
observation of the arch as a concrete object which may imminently or 
eventually collapse is based on the material properties of the stones, whose 
qualities mean that they may all collapse together. The discussion of the 
practice is placed at the end of the thesis because it is fundamental to the 
thinking of uncertainty and collapse. The experimental practice synthesizes the 
philosophical and historical inquiry. 
The initial visual research began with exploring architecture and film, and 
this progressed to the recollection of a visit to the island of Portland in Dorset 
in 1999. Portland is a place where a sense of precariousness and collapse 
pervades the island. What was so striking about Portland as a site, was that the 
landscape was one of disruption and collapse. On the surface this seemed to be 
so because the centuries of quarrying Portland stone have left the island in a 
state beyond regeneration, but also this precariousness is inherent in the nature 
of the limestone itself, which makes the cliffs unstable and likely to collapse. 
The poetics of collapse in the quarries and on the edges of the island lies in 
the unceasing potential for change through the removal of the stone or coastal 
collapse. In my creative research, I have looked at the spaces where Portland 
stone has been taken from the landscape, investigating the site as a multi-
faceted starting point for material histories, and have interrogated absence 
as architectural formation. In the course of the practice I have worked at and 
with this site. In this chapter I consider the origins and development of my own 
practice as a filmmaker and think about the material of celluloid film itself as a 
disappearing technology in danger of collapse. Away from the island, reading 
these histories led not only to the style of research I have previously undertaken 
for making documentaries, but indeed the methodology of collapse found in 
the histories of Portland and its stone was also part of the analysis of natural 
philosophy, geology, geography, architecture, and space. 
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1. The collapse of film and the end of mechanical reproduction
Motion picture film was first put through a camera and projector in 1895,1 
and as art, experimental film, documentary or popular narrative form film as 
material, practice and culture has been the medium that defined the twentieth 
century. And now we are witnessing its collapse. Film is teetering on the brink 
of collapse. During the time I’ve been researching this project I’ve seen the 
demise of the material of film. It is unexpected and surprising, and I am more 
disheartened than I could have imagined; perhaps I did not see it coming.
Kodak2 has been liquidated. This seemed a startling turn of events, since it has 
been the most powerful and iconic name in the film industry. Buying a roll of 
Kodak film meant that most people could have a relationship with film, with 
the means of recording and observing the world around them through their 
‘Kodak moment’ (as the slogan said). This material of the twentieth century 
made up many personal and family archives in the form of black and white or 
colour negative or as reversal slides, exposed to light through cameras, from 
the box brownies of the 1920s and thirties, to the instamatics of the 1960s 
and 1970s, and the compact cameras of the 1990s, and the rolls of Super 8, 
16 mm and 35 mm movies by the amateur or the professional. Packed in the 
distinctive chrome yellow and red boxes and cans, Kodak seemed ubiquitous, 
its characteristic logo at every tourist attraction and high street. Now the 
Kodak moment seems to be passing. Other companies that produced film stock 
have already gone – Agfa the West German film and, as of the end of 2012 Fuji, 
the Japanese company that promised to maintain its film division, has stopped 
making moving image film stocks. During this time I have also seen the end 
of the film laboratory Soho Images – the lab that did so much to support 
artists’ film – taken over by an American company who have phased out film 
processing and printing; it was the subject of a campaign to defend it led by 
Tacita Dean.3 
Film is an elegant mechanical technology of precisely measured intervals of 
material and time – not so much as the increments of space between frames 
but the sprocket holes engineered to locate the frame so that the film may 
firstly be exposed to light as it goes through the camera, then the editing 
bench and finally through the projector. Film appeared at the end of, or could 
be seen as the culminating technology of industrialisation. The majority of 
Walter Benjamin’s 1936 essay, ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’, is devoted to film, and while Benjamin is impressed by the scope 
1 August and Louis Lumière La Sortie de l’Usine Lumière a Lyon 1895.
2 The Kodak name was registered in 1888 and the Brownie camera was 
introduced in 1900.
3 Tacita, Dean, Save this Language, (BBC Radio 4, 17 April 2014) <http://
www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b040llzm>
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for photography, he is really captivated by motion picture film, his argument is 
primarily located in and about film – of how film can reproduce and transmit 
art: 
[…] nothing is more revealing than the nature of the repercussions that 
these two different manifestations – the reproduction of works of art 
and the art of the film – have had on art in its traditional form4
Even though Benjamin mainly discusses narrative film, there is much that can 
be applied to the use of film by artists. He goes on to say:
[…] for contemporary man the representation of reality by the film 
is incomparably more significant than that of the painter, since it 
offers, precisely because of the thorough going permeation of reality 
with mechanical equipment, an aspect of reality which is free of all 
equipment.5 
Benjamin explores the capacity of film to approximate reality via the 
mechanical apparatus of the equipment and its capacity to document reality. 
Significantly, however, in relation to art, Benjamin does not suggest that there 
should be an end to painting, nor is there any suggestion that manufacturers 
like Windsor and Newton, for example, should stop making paint or other 
fine art materials. Rather, at the time it was written in 1936, it was more an 
argument that the technologies of art and film could exist together. 
Benjamin’s comment seems to have much to say for artists who took on the 
possibilities of the new mechanical technology of film, not only to ‘represent’ 
their ‘environment’ but also to question movement and time, and experiment 
with the limits and possibilities of the material of film itself as a technology. For 
artists in the early twentieth century film was a new medium, which rapidly 
became part of modernist art practice; for example, less than thirty years 
after the advent of film, Robert Wiene made Das Cabinet des Dr. Caligari in 
1920,6 Man Ray made Le Retour a la Raison in 1923 and Ferdinand Leger 
made Bállet Mechanique in 1924. These are films in which artists explore 
the possibilities of the new medium of film as the camera and the subjects 
move, and the language of duration and movement is articulated in intriguing 
4 Walter Benjamin, Illuminations, ed. and introduced by Hannah Arendt, trans. 
by Harry Zohn (London: Fontana, 1982), p. 222.
5 Ibid. p. 294.
6 Robert Wiene directed because the two writers, Hans Janowitz and Carl 
Mayer, were considered too inexperienced to undertake such a production. 
Nevertheless, Janowitz orchestrated the look and style of the film by suggesting 
that the painter Alfred Kubin design the sets. See Siegfried Kracauer, From 
Caligari to Hitler: a psychological study of the German film (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1974), ‘Caligari’, pp. 61–76. 
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ways. In Man Ray’s film these abstract and animated images are based on 
his ‘rayographs’ and shots of a body in motion. Leger’s longer film Bállet 
Mechanique explores movement and time, and with the repeated framing of 
eyes and faces observes what this new technology means for looking, while 
his use of the in-camera techniques of double exposure questions how the 
medium can work with ideas about doubling. Yet, these films were made 
more than a decade before Benjamin wrote ‘Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction’ and show how artists were already working with film materially 
and conceptually.7 By 1926 filmmaking had reached modernist literature as 
the central theme in Pirandello’s novel, Shoot. Art was combining with film 
itself, for example through artists working directly onto the surface of film 
itself by painting, drawing and scratching, as in Len Lye’s Colour Box (1935), 
and cheating reality using simple in-camera techniques of double exposures, 
stop motion and jump cutting as in Luis Buñuel and Salvadore Dali’s Un Chien 
Andalou (1929). This starts to subvert Benjamin’s notion of the aura of the 
artwork because film itself has turned into the artwork, albeit one that is now 
repeatedly reproducible through the mechanics of printing. Benjamin notes: 
The characteristics of the film lie not only in the manner in which man 
presents himself to mechanical equipment but also in the manner in 
which, by means of this apparatus, man can represent his environment.8
Perhaps, it could be added to Benjamin’s perspective that this potential to 
represent the environment could also be determined by the artists creating and 
using it. Nevertheless, all of these figures, from Benjamin to the mentioned 
artists who were working with film, demonstrate a real pleasure in the material 
and mechanics of the medium. 
But now in 2015, I have an uneasy sense that film as a viable material for making 
work is slipping through my fingers. Though there are a few  laboratories 
processing and printing film, as a practice it is becoming obscure and arcane. Is the 
end of film as the medium the twentieth century now defined as a marker for the 
end of the twentieth century? Just because it is possible to go to the cinema, turn 
on the TV or download videos, seeing contemporary moving image does not mean 
that the audience is seeing film as material. There is a slippage of language at work: 
film is the celluloid (previously nitrate) material that goes through a camera and is 
processed, edited, printed and projected. Fewer and fewer audiences see film in the 
cinema as it is so rarely shown, but rather the digital approximation of it.
7 In Luis Buñuel and Salvador Dali’s Chien Andalou (1929), and Jean Cocteau 
Le Sang d’un poète (The Blood of the Poet) (1930) in-camera techniques were 
used to play with reality, of what it known and remembered. See: Film as Film: 
formal experiment in film 1910–1975. Hayward Gallery, South Bank, London, 
SE1. 3 May – 17 June 1979. Arts Council of Great Britain.
8 Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 237.
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2. Avant-garde practices and the Bolex aesthetic
My film practice developed with reference to the legacy of three tendencies of 
experimental and avant-garde film. Firstly, the experimental films made by 
artists; in particular, the work of from the 1960s and 1970s by such artists 
as the Americans Jonas Mekas,9 Joseph Cornell, Maya Deren, Andy Warhol, 
Stan Brakhage, Kenneth Anger; in Britain, Margaret Tait, Chris Welsby, Nicky 
Hamlyn, Derek Jarman, Jayne Parker and Isaac Julien; in Australia, Corinne 
and Arthur Cantrill, and Ross Gibson. All these filmmakers made work using 
a Bolex 16mm camera (even if they subsequently made work using other means 
of production). Secondly, the radical European film movements: the New 
German Cinema, including such filmmakers as Alexander Kluge, Jean-Marie 
Straub and Danièle Huillet; the French New Wave of Jean-Luc Godard’s ‘Dziga 
Vertov’ period; the Italian neo-realists, in the work of Michelangelo Antonioni. 
Thirdly, the experimental and poetic documentaries of the GPO and Crown 
film units of the 1930s and 1940s, especially that of Len Lye and Humphrey 
Jennings; and in the American Direct Cinema of the 1950s and 1960s; in 
the essay style documentaries which came out of the British Film Workshop 
movement of the 1970s and 1980s, such as Sue Clayton and Jonathan Curling’s 
Song of the Shirt (1979) and John Akomfrah’s Handsworth Songs (1986).
The visual aesthetic of experimental film by artists was determined by the 
Bolex camera, the Swiss wind-up clockwork 16mm camera. The Bolex was the 
9 Jonas Mekas has been a regular visitor to London, especially to the London 
Filmmakers Co-operative. On 19 July 2008 Jonas Mekas presented his work 
at the Cuzon Soho followed by a question and answer session. In 2013 the 
Serpentine had a exhibition of Mekas’s work, which was shown as poorly 
installed digital moving image; at the same time the BFI Southbank held a 
retrospective of his works shown as film.





cornerstone of experimental film at the New York Filmmakers Co-Operative,  
the London Filmmakers Co-Operative and elsewhere. A hallmark of this kind 
of filmmaking was work that was painterly and intuitive and imbued with the 
poetics and politics of ‘poor art’.10 In his handbook on filmmaking, the classic 
text for experimental filmmakers, Lenny Lipton says of the Bolex:
[…] I don’t know if there would have been an independent filmmaking 
movement without this camera. There is no other machine at such a 
comparatively low price with so many features and so much quality.11
The Bolex camera runs on a wind-up spring mechanism; it is possible to set the 
running speed to 24 frames per second, but this is not absolutely precise, since 
this is not a sound camera.12 The longest each shot can run is approximately 
28 seconds, and the inaccuracy of the Bolex refutes accurate measurement. 
Additionally, the Bolex can shoot single frames and therefore has been used for 
animation for decades; currently it is still used to film experiments in science 
labs, as it can be mounted on to a microscope. The film is driven through the 
Bolex camera by the wind-up mechanism and there is slight movement or drift 
in the gate as the film passes through the shutter, which has also contributed 
to the aesthetic. It is possible to wind the film backwards and double or triple 
expose it, and to make rudimentary fades to black in the camera. These 
elements, based on a lack of total control, add up to a fundamental principle of 
many artists’ experimental films – that of the unforeseen, where the filmmaker 
courts disaster in order to reach the unexpected, the glorious accident. It is 
something that I am interested in as a poetics of collapse. The conditions of 
the accidental are also the case in optical printing, a technique of copying 
film to film where on one side is a projector and the other side is a camera, 
usually a Bolex, where it is possible to copy film frame by frame, but also to 
change the running speed of a shot, to stretch a shot and to slow it down or 
speed it up, to skip and stretch; for example, to copy every fourth frame nine 
times, or to put in different coloured gels into the projector, and where the 
best work comes about by not being prescriptive but making decisions on the 
fly while standing in the dark exposing 4000 frames of film. The whole point 
of the accidental is that it cannot be programmed; for example the attempts 
to put film-like scratches on digital moving image by programming them into 
final cut or premiere never looks good – they are too precise, mathematically 
determined and consequently contrived. In these processes, and in the aesthetic 
of the Bolex, I can read the concept of collapse, where the accidental and the 
10 See Germano Celant ‘Art Povera’ in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood, eds., 
Art in Theory 1900–1990: An Anthology of Changing Ideas (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1993), pp. 886–89. 
11 Lenny Lipton, Independent Filmmaking, introduced by Stan Brakhage (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1972), p. 129.
12 A sound camera is silent, with precision running speed – so it is possible to record sound 
and sync it to the film. The main sound camera I have worked with is the Arriflex SRII.
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unexpected are incorporated in the ideas and the experimental processes.
The majority of this work and the aesthetic of the Bolex are linked by a sense 
of exploring the language of experimental film as one of poetics. Jonas Mekas, 
Joseph Cornell, Stan Brakhage and Margaret Tait have all used film specifically 
as a medium for visual poetics. Mekas, who was well reputed as a poet in 
Lithuanian, stated that he began to make films because when he arrived in New 
York his English was not good enough to write poetry.13 Cornell had a life-
long fascination with film and got filmmakers to shoot film for him, directed 
to designated locations, collecting places and the experience of wandering the 
streets of New York, creating found footage, in much the same way that he 
collected material for his boxes. In Aviary (1955) Cornell refers to ‘Emily D.’ 
– Dickinson was a significant figure for the development of Cornell’s poetics; 
Emily Dickinson wrote a series of poems called ‘Aviary’. In Edinburgh, Margaret 
Tait was associated with the group of artists and writers around the poet 
Hugh MacDairmund, and she made a film portrait of him in 1964. A sense 
of materiality and poetics ran through the work of Stan Brakhage, and is also 
present in Chris Welsby’s time-lapse films, where he experiments with landscape 
and time, and also in the material architecture of Nicky Hamlyn’s work. This 
sensibility is repeated in dozens of examples, where the poetics of each such film 
both makes up its own rules and subverts what has gone previously, as noted by 
Raul Ruiz:
I am interested in films which, wherever they occur, are in some sense 
unique. […] But the main principle has nothing to do with craftsmanship, 
because the purpose is to make poetic objects. The rules you need to 
understand these poetic objects are unique to each film and must be 
rediscovered by every viewer; they cannot be described a priori, nor a 
posteriori for that matter. In short, these are films that cannot respond to 
the question, “What is this film about?” […] what matters are the magical 
accidents, the discoveries, the inexplicable wonders and the wasted time.14
3. Editing
I came to filmmaking firstly through writing then editing. As a student used to 
writing, I helped friends at film school with their treatments and scripts. My 
intervention was at the beginning of the process of filmmaking and again at 
the end, when I became interested in the editing of the films and realised that 
13 Mekas talk, Curzon Soho 19 July 2008. See also: Scott MacDonald, ‘Lost 
Lost Lost over Lost Lost Lost’, Cinema Journal, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Winter 1986), 
20–34. [accessed: 21 May 2013] <http://www.jstor.org./stable/1225457>
14 Raúl Ruiz, Poetics of Cinema, trans. by Brian Holmes (Paris: Éditions 
Disvoir, 1995), pp. 76–77.
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film editing was another form of writing. Through this process I learned that 
writing could be material, visual, aural and temporal. On film productions I 
have never liked the actual shoot – they are the public space of filmmaking 
of being out with the crew, the actors, or the subjects of the documentary or 
whatever was being shot, where the delineation of roles is often defined by 
gender and the performance that goes with it. Locations (and studios) are 
performative spaces. In the past, I enjoyed being around experimental film 
events at the LFMC, where expanded cinema became performances breaking 
out of the two-dimensionsal screen. However, I have tended to work alone, 
or in small collaborations, and found the best part of experimental or artists’ 
filmmaking is that there are so few people involved. Setting up a shot for any 
film camera, including a Bolex, takes time because of the need for judgment 
about framing lighting, requirements of the shot and so on, and the shot may 
be less than half a minute long. Digital video tends to generate vast amounts 
of unmediated material, therefore taking a great deal of time to edit. While my 
camera skills are acceptable, in the past I have had the chance to work with a 
really intuitive camera operator, which was rewarding. The fascinating aspect 
of filming is seeing the location or the shot and the sense of collecting material 
to take away and cut up, edit, reform, or rewrite. 
In editing there is the real handling of the material of film. The cans come 
back from the lab - the rolls, takes, shots need to be logged and the images 
numbered and identified, the clapper boards noted and the edge numbers 
printed through from the negative recorded. When the film has just been 
processed sometimes the harsh irritants of the chemicals come off with 
handling. Nevertheless, I always liked the smell of the photographic chemicals 
from the freshly processed and printed rolls of film as they come back from 
the laboratory, transformed by developing and printing. The film is carefully 
logged and each shot noted, so that in the cutting room each shot or scene must 
always be able to be found at a moment’s notice. So from sometimes thousands 
of feet the editor needs to be able to find a shot that is perhaps only 2’, 5’ or 10’ 
long. My experience of editing led me at times to feel that the editor was a kind 
of librarian of the images. The editor looks after and maintains the archive 
of images collected from every shoot and each location and through repeated 
viewing of the film gains a visual memory of all the footage. But this is an 
active relationship, as the editor cuts the film up and re-makes and re-writes 
the ideas set out in the treatment or script – working not with the intention of 
what was in the mind or imagination of the writer/director, but in the reality 
of what material there is to work with, of what has actually been recorded and 
shot on film, of making something from what you have in the cutting room. In 
editing there are countless decisions, from selecting the exact moment when the 
shot should start or end, the timing and pace of the film and the counterpoint 
of putting one shot against the other; Eisenstein identified in his theories of 
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montage ‘[...] the juxtaposition of two separate shots by splicing them together 
resembles not so much a simple sum of one shot plus another shot – as it does 
a creation.’15  Each of those decisions is a departure point, and can change the 
film, especially so in films where they are not pinned down by the conventions 
of a mainstream narrative script. Editing creates a system of writing in time or 
writing with time, where considerations of duration and movement and how 
best to show the place, action or transitions determine the aesthetics, meaning 
and construction of the scene or the film. 
Editors sit in dark rooms very often on their own (depending on the scale of 
the budget, there might be editing assistants) working with and assembling 
the material. It has been a job very often done by women; this may be because 
it lacks the apparent glamour and urgency and drama of the film shoot. It 
requires patience and working in sections or scenes or fragments of a whole, 
and takes time to see the results of the work. It may have been that the editor 
was seen as the person who has the capacity to realise and fulfil the vision of 
the (male) director; hence the job fell to women. And, in more recent times 
it was because in mainstream film and television industry production the 
(largely) masculine roles of the camera, grip, sound, and lighting, and so forth, 
negotiated considerable overtime payments through their unions, but editors 
did not get paid proper overtime rates. 
In Dziga Vertov’s Man With a Movie Camera (1929)16 the reflexive quality of 
the film is created not just by showing Vertov carrying the film camera and 
tripod around Moscow, setting up shots and rolling the camera in exciting and 
dangerous locations, but also through the editor, Yelizaveta Svilova’s17 hands 
carefully and quickly cutting and arranging the strips of film as she sits in the 
darkened editing room. Svilova’s role as editor discloses the secret space of 
the construction of the film. About a third of the way into the film the images 
suddenly stop moving, strips of film are frozen and revealed; as the camera 
frame widens, the viewer gains entry into the secluded room of the editor 
and sees the frames of film being deftly cut with scissors, then arranged and 
assembled – it is the most direct instruction and revelation about how a film is 
made and constructed that Vertov and Yelizaveta Svilova could have offered. 
15 Serge Eisenstein, Film Sense, trans. and ed. by Jay Leyda (London: Faber, 1968), 
‘Word and Image’, pp. 13–59, especially pp.17–20. Montage theory is based on 
concepts of how a film is assembled and constructed in the editing process. 
16 Man with a Movie Camera, dir. Dziga Vertov (VUFKU, Moscow, 1929. 
Film, 68 minutes) is a portrait of a day in the lives of the people of Moscow. It 
opens with the audience arriving to the cinema, and as such it is a film about 
the people who are watching it.
17 Yelizaveta Svilova (1900–1975) began work in the film industry at the age 
of 14 as an editing assistant for Pathé Moscow and in 1918 became editor for 
features at Goskino. She began working with Dziga Vertov in 1922 at Cinema–
Eye, edited the Kino Pravda series, and became his principle editor, and also 
assistant director. She married Dziga Vertov in 1924.
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Later inMan With a Movie Camera the editing is allied to the factory, to the 
interior space of women’s industrialised labour; it is visually and graphically 
matched and intercut with scenes of women as sewing machinists, weaving 
yarn and packing cigarettes in factories – the dexterity and deftness of the 
women’s work is linked with the spooling and assembly of the film and the 
work of the editor.18 The work of Esfir Shub offered a third perspective on the 
role of the editor and on theories of montage in Soviet avant-garde filmmaking. 
Shub worked with existing documentary films as (found) footage re-editing and 
reconstructing using montage principles to change the political interpretation 
and meaning of the material. Shub identifies the power of the editor by 
eschewing the primacy, control and construction of the space in front of the 
camera. She entered the debates concerning documentary and asserted that the 
meaning and construction of a film lay in the way it was edited.19
A later political collaboration was that of Jean-Marie Straub and Danièle 
Huillet, who were part of the 1960s radical left filmmaking in Germany known 
as the ‘New German Cinema’, along with Alexander Kluge and others. Their 
work comprises political and spatial inquiries into history through the places, 
sites and territory where history is made. Straub and Huillet were always 
seen as a strict collaboration, their credits saying: a film by J-M Straub and 
Danièle Huillet, and generally referred in shorthand to by writers and critics 
as Straub/Huillet. An insight into their working methods was demonstrated 
by Pedro Costa in his documentary about them Onde jaz o teu sorriso? 
(Where does your hidden smile lie?) (2001). In their film work Straub was the 
camera operator and Huillet was the editor20 and both were the producers 
and directors; their roles were carefully delineated and documented, and this 
collaboration of demarcated roles was strictly equal. In his film, Pedro Costa 
shows Straub and Huillet at work editing. Huillet is patiently and carefully 
18 In mainstream narrative film, there has been key women editors. Alma 
Reville (1899-1982), Alfred Hitchcock’s wife, was a film editor established in 
the film industry before him. For a substantial part of his career, Hitchcock 
and Alma worked collaboratively and she always had the final say or the last 
look at the editing of his films, even noticing that the shower scene in Psycho 
needed frames cutting from it. Martin Scorsese has worked with his editor 
Thelma Schoonmaker for decades; she has edited every film of his since Raging 
Bull in1980. Schoonmaker has been working in film since the 1960s.
19 Esfir Shub (1894–1959) contributed to a discussion recorded in New Lef, 
No. 11–12, 1927 extracts in John Ellis, ed., Screen Reader I: cinema/ideology/
politics (London: SEFT, 1977), pp. 310–11. See also, Esther Leslie, ‘Art, 
documentary and the essay film’, Radical Philosophy, 192 (July/Aug 2015), 
7–14. <rp192_dossier_essay_film_leslie_art_documentary_essay_film.pdf> 
[accessed: 15 July 2015]
20 See Jane Madsen, Cutting Through the Seventies to Find the Thirties: A 
Consideration of ‘Fortini–Cani’ as Marxist Reflection in T. O’Regan & 
B. Shoesmith eds. History on/and/in Film. Perth: 1987. pp. 159–65; <mcc.
murdoch.edu.au/ReadingRoom/hfilm/contenth.htm> See also film Pedro Costa 
Onde jaz o teu sorriso? (Where does your hidden smile lie?) 2001. A film 
about Straub and Huillet working together, principally in the editing room. 
Further: on Danièle Huillet <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2006/oct/18/
guardianobituaries.france>
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editing their film judicially removing frames and making the logic of the shot 
and scene work, while Straub is grumpy and impatient and mistrustful – their 
exchanges become more forceful until Huillet gives an account of how they 
have always worked. On the whole, women’s role in editing is a largely hidden 
history; it is underwritten, and unrecorded in a coherent history.21
My role as an editor was consolidated through an offer of training as an 
assistant film editor for documentaries made on 16mm film by the state 
film council, Film Victoria, who at the time made a number of sponsored 
documentaries. This scheme was the means of gaining union tickets for young 
filmmakers in various production roles in what was a relatively closed shop. I 
was also involved in the political activism around independent film, of the kind 
that went around so many cultural activities in the mid-1980s. Later, I was the 
principal editor on a collaborative essay documentary made as a critique of 
the celebration of Australia’s bicentennial in 1988: First Time Tragedy, Second 
Time Farce (1989). As with many documentaries, especially those in essay 
form, the film is made in the editing, where the editing process writes the film, 
as it were. It was through my experience as an editor that later I got a job at 
the London Filmmakers Co-operative, because as visual artists most of the 
members were very adept with the camera, but less so at editing and sound 
editing.
21 See for example Kuhn, Annette. The Women’s Companion to International 
Film. London: Virago Press, 1990. The two pages on editing, pp.132–33, 








In the development of digital editing, the architecture of the non-linear editing 
software of Final Cut, Avid, and Premiere was based on the architecture and 
language of the cutting room; their terms are the same and simulate a real 
place. While this was designed with editors in mind and, more particularly, 
those who were already working in film in order to effect a seamless transition 
into digital editing, the programmers who wrote such software would have had 
to spend time in analogue cutting rooms in order to find out what editors did. 
In doing so, the language of the material film and the space and ordering of the 
cutting room have been colonised. The transformative quality of the chemistry, 
the alchemy of film in the laboratories of the analogue, has been replaced by 
digital simulation, where the digital screen is a barrier against a material, 
hands-on experience.
Measurement is a repetitive process in all aspects of film and photography: light 
is measured, focal length is measured, footage is measured, and the amount of 
film exposed for each shot is measured. Editing means constant counting: of 
the 40 frames which equal 1 foot, or the edge numbers on the negative which 
appear every 20 frames, or the projection speed of 24 frames per second. The 
small off-cut fragments of 1, 2, or 3 up to 6 frames of film are usually kept 
taped inside the lid of the can of the roll from which they were pulled. The 
out-takes are hung up on the trim bin, then filed away in correct order on the 
rolls, back in their cans, ready to be referred to for review or addition into the 
film. In editing every frame of film in or out of the final edit must be accounted 
for in the final preparation from the negative cutter to the laboratory, including 
ensuring that there are enough frames for visual effects such as dissolves and 
fades to black, and are all counted (and invoiced) in numbers of frames. Editing 
taught me a great deal about how ideas on film, and in writing are generated 
and nurtured, that nothing is written or made without editing. For me, editing 
is a reflective practice of thinking, experimenting, making and assembling 
material as time and movement.
4.3 Film can with 16mm trims.
Photograph, Jane Madsen
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4. Site: place, space, landscape
In their introductory essay to The Iconography of Landscape, Cosgrove and 
Daniels note that Ruskin was the first art critic to contemplate the tradition of 
landscape painting. They argue that Ruskin treated ‘landscape as a text’.22 This 
is a useful descriptor here, as I believe that has been an aspect of my practice, 
and this relationship to reading landscape and space is a further indicator of 
my filmmaking as a reflective practice. The question of landscape is neither 
neutral nor easily reconciled; however, the uncertainties of landscape can be 
addressed through the poetic of collapse. Landscape questions both previous 
pictorial formations in art and philosophy, and also landscape as place, history 
and territory.
Landscape has long been part of the visual poetics of artists’ film particularly 
in the convergence of documentary and experimental lyricism from the GPO 
films of the 1930s onwards. Across experimental and independent film, I was 
particularly interested in the poetics and politics of the Cantrill’s experimental 
films shot in the bush, and Ross Gibson’s film Camera Natura (1986), which 
questioned the historical myths of landscape in Australia as it was represented 
and constructed through white, European colonization. The question of how 
to deal with landscape has been a thorny issue for Australian artists, since 
it involves the implications of colonization, guilt, the histories of contested 
terrain, displacement of indigenous peoples, as well as a sense that there is 
nothing much else but landscape in Australia. However, increasingly there 
is now a more nuanced relationship to how to confront and address the 
complexities of a relationship to land and landscape since the explosive politics 
following the bicentennial in 1988.23
The process of practice-based research has meant that, while my practice 
evolves, an aspect of the research led to the inevitability of an overview of 
my previous work. In doing so, it has been possible to gain insights into my 
interdisciplinary practice in experimental film and video, installation and 
documentary, clarifying the main recurrent themes as: home, place, space, 
territory, landscape, absence, duration, literature and architecture/s. These are 
linked with an overarching sense of materiality that is specifically spatial and 
the recognition that the poetic of collapse is a facet of my films and videos. 
This is present in previous work including, for example, the documentary First 
22 Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, The Iconography of Landscape: 
Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), p. 5. They note that this is 
further expounded in Ruskin’s Modern Painters 1843.
23 See for example Ross Gibson, who has written extensively about the fraught 
relationship of landscape and its representation in art, film and language. Ross 
Gibson ‘Camera natura: Landscape in Australian feature films’ Framework 
22/23 (Autumn, 1983). pp. 47–51. 
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Time Tragedy, Second Time Farce (1989), considered history as the politics 
of contested territory in the celebration of the1988 bicentennial of Australia’s 
colonization and opposition by indigenous peoples; and in the experimental 
works Home (1994), optically printed S8 found footage to 16mm where home 
is archive and place; Hercules Road (1999), which depicted the space of street 
in Lambeth where Blake lived from 1792–1799 as the place where poetry was 
made; the film London Stock (2002) a material consideration of bricks; the film 
Elephant Steel (2009), which experimented with gyratory movement and the 
reflective surfaces of the Faraday monument; and the videos The Knowledge 
(2001), a three-part work considering habitat and the city; Rum Jelly Collapse 
(2002), which depicted a short passage from Lampedusa’s The Leopard; and 
Venetian Drift (2003), which explored movement around the sites of the 
biennale.
Interdisciplinary thinking and practices are the foundation of my filmmaking. 
This approach has always involved research into the minutiae of subject and 
location. This process came from my experience of working in documentary, 
which involved considerable research into the history and background of the 
subject, which then formed the treatment of the film, since there is no script 
as such in documentary. This became the way I developed experimental 
films; this method is different to the way other friends and colleagues make 
their experimental work. The early visual research for this project considered 
material and spatial thinking in previous experimental filmmaking, especially 
those focusing on space, landscape and architecture. This progressed to the 
recollection of a visit to the island of Portland in Dorset in 1999, where what 
was so striking about Portland was that the landscape was one of disruption 
and collapse. Yet, because of the material of Portland stone, this landscape 
was both created and destroyed – a constructed environment that could be 
read as collapse through site, space, art and architecture, but one with a visual 
uniformity because of the material of the stone itself. 
The stone at Portland also made a link to the materiality of the very stones 
cut to make the arch of Kleist’s metaphor, and that the material was from 
a place. Even though the stones of Kleist’s arch were clearly not from 
Portland, they were made from architectural stone from somewhere. And, 
further the stones to which Kleist is referring had to be cut and prepared 
by stonemasons, each stone made to fit the construction of the arch, so the 
stones could remain standing, held in place as collapse. The cutting of each 
stone block and preparing it for the arch, and putting it in its correct place 
had a correspondence with film editing through the idea of cutting and fitting 
material together to make a greater whole. Further, this concept of cutting 
and preparing stone could also trace back to Adrian Stokes’s essay24 about 
24 See Adrian Stokes, ‘Carving, Modelling and Agnostino’ in The Stones of 
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the difference between the acts of carving and modelling in sculpture, where 
in preparing the stone the stonemason carves away the excess and unwanted 
stone. 
As far as possible I have tried to have an immersive relationship to the site, 
of being there and allowing Portland to seep into conscious and unconscious 
formations. In doing so, I found more and more connections between the site 
and the period of time from the middle to the end of the eighteenth century, 
when Europe was in a state of chaos and collapse. In this sense Portland as 
a small island of a little less than 4.4 square miles became a kind of situated 
laboratory for thought, philosophy, history, and visual and architectural 
practices. This landscape is comprised of quarries dating to the seventeenth 
century; it is a site that is constantly changing – that its basis is one of 
uncertainty, that from one visit to the next it has changed, since increments 
of its stone disappear as it collapses from the cliffs or is quarried away. This 
sense of uncertainty has connections with Kleist’s writing, and also with that of 
Kant’s critical thinking. 
Through the experience of being at the quarries at Portland I have begun to 
look at landscape differently, so that it is less a two-dimensional, horizontal 
vista as far as the eye can see and has become one of volume and layers, vertical 
densities; of thinking about the geography and geology of what lies beneath, 
and the uncertainty of what may happen when it fails as collapse. I have 
wandered the landscape of Portland and worked with the spaces and material 
as a poetics of collapse. After spending so much time at Portland, I can see the 
island in the architecture of London. There have been other connections and 
resonances of working down at Portland: the whiteness of the stone captures 
light and causes it to bounce around the environment – in the summer, when 
the sun is out, the harshness of the light and the dry aridity of the quarries is 
reminiscent of the landscapes of familiarity. But also, it reminds me of films I 
have researched previously, such as Straub and Huillet’s Geschichtsunterricht 
(History Lessons) (1972), filmed in and around Rome, or their Moses und 
Aaron (1974), which used remote locations in southern Italy. In the work I 
made at Portland, I have represented the quarries as sites devoid of people, 
as sites for contemplation; this was also the case in Hercules Road where the 
street was emptied of people in order to emphasize the spatial poetics.
After the majority of the filming was completed, ways of looking at and filming 
the Portland quarries were further confirmed when I read Robert Smithson’s 
account of a trip to quarries in New Jersey:
Rimini (New York: Schocken Books 1969) pp.105–66
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The walls of the quarry did look dangerous. Cracked, broken, shattered; 
the walls threatened to come crashing down. Fragmentation, corrosion, 
decomposition, disintegration, rock creep, debris slides, mud flow, 
avalanche were everywhere in evidence. The gray sky seemed to swallow 
up the heaps around us. Fractures and faults spilled forth sediment, 
crushed conglomerates, eroded debris and sandstone. It was an arid 
region, bleached and dry. An infinity of surfaces spread in every 
direction. A chaos of cracks surrounded us.25
25 Robert Smithson, Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, ed. by Jack Flam 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 1996), p. 9. In ‘A Tour of the Monuments 
of Passaic, New Jersey’ (1967), pp. 68–74, there are discussions on the Instamatic 
camera, p. 70, and a long quote from the instructions for Kodak film p. 73.
4.4 Robert Smithson 
Mirror Displacement 
(Portland Isle, England) 
1969
Prospect 69, Dussledorf, 
Städtische Kusthalle, 
30 September – 
12 October, 1969. 
Exhibition catalogue.
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Smithson’s observations of the quarry are suggestive of imminent collapse. 
In August 1969 Robert Smithson and Nancy Holt made a trip to England 
and Wales. The visit was significant, as it added an intriguing dimension to 
Smithson’s work. During their trip they spent time visiting historic and material 
landscape sites including Stonehenge, Avebury and Silbury Hill, Cerne Abbas, 
Pentre Ifan and quarries in Wales, Dorset, and Oxted Chalk quarry in Surrey, 
as well as landscape gardens. The sites were carefully chosen and researched 
in advance, and particularly demonstrated Smithson’s longstanding interest in 
geology, materiality, and landscape. In an interview in 2012, the artist Nancy 
Holt, Smithson’s widow, spoke of their visit to England and Wales in 1969. She 
observed that Smithson was: 
[…] fascinated by quarries, and took great interest in geology and 
palaeontology – just south of the Oxted quarry dinosaur remains were 
unearthed in the early nineteenth century.[…] He also loved geological 
survey maps. We had some with us, so he would know where to find the 
kind of stone and earth foundations he was looking for.26 
While he was in Dorset, Smithson continued the ‘Mirror-travel’ concept, 
which had begun with the nine Mirror Displacements in the Yucatan in April 
1969.27 The two pieces were Mirror Displacement (Chesil Beach) 1969, where 
the mirrors were located among the pebbles; and the second in a quarry on 
Portland (Fig. 4.4), which was shown a short time later in Prospect 69.28 The 
representation of Mirror Displacement (Portland Isle, England 1969) in the 
exhibition catalogue shows a grid of images depicting seven identically framed 
photographs with upright mirrors added one by one to the vertical bank of 
dumped debris in a disused quarry. The significance of this version of the 
Mirror Displacement is the inclusion of the map of Portland. This explicit 
reference to Portland is contrary to the anonymity of Smithson’s previous 
works. The specificity of place is something that Smithson deliberately avoided 
representing; many of his works were developed around the concept of ‘non-
site’. Even though Smithson had interest in particular places, documenting 
actual locations was usually not part of the work. It is probable that Portland 
would have held a twofold interest for Smithson because of the industrial 
landscape of its quarries and its significance in the history of geology and 
26 Nancy Holt Interview. Simon Grant, ‘Notes from An Ancient Island’, Nancy 
Holt Interview, Tate Etc. Issue 25 (23 May 2012) 97–103. (p. 98). See also ‘Robert 
Smithson’s Library’ in Ann Reynolds Robert Smithson: Learning from New Jersey 
and Elsewhere (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2003), which included a considerable 
amount of material on geology, and geological history, mining, maps, and on Britain.
27 Robert Smithson, ‘Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan’ Artforum 
(September 1969). Published as photographs and essay. Reprinted in Smithson 
Robert Smithson: The Collected Writings, pp. 
28 The exhibition Prospect 69 was 30 September to 12 October in Dusseldorf at 
the Städtische Kusthalle.
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geological mapping of the Jurassic coast. Later versions of the Portland Mirror 
Displacement (Portland Isle) (1969) broke up the grid and removed the map 
but, in this form, the work indicates how the brief expedition to England and 
Wales suggested a departure for Smithson and shows his captivation with the 
weight of material histories of place.29
The concept of displacement in the Mirror Displacement works implies a 
quality of movement or disruption, and is a condition of the sites that Smithson 
chooses. The pebbles of Chesil Beach are in a constant state of flux, and the 
outcome of quarrying causes constant displacement through the removal of the 
stone and the unsecured walls of the (unnamed) Portland quarry that remain; 
in the displacement the mirrors reflect and create a commentary on this. Holt 
describes Smithson’s approach:
This Mirror Displacement was at Chesil Beach. It consisted of eight 
mirrors that reflected the rounded rocks and pebbles, while capturing 
the light in a glowing way. These works have become much more 
significant than even Bob anticipated at the time. Back then we used 
an Instamatic camera and shot our slides with Kodachrome film. It 
is interesting to think about the fact that an artist takes his material 
with him into the landscape, sets it up, makes a sculpture and then 
photographs it, and the photograph becomes art. The landscape and the 
art can shrink to the size of something you can put in your pocket – the 
size of a slide.30
This observation about photography and situated practice is important, since 
framing and photographing the Mirror Displacements and taking the image 
away is itself another displacement. Holt observes the way the documentation 
was made, which in the 1960s and 1970s seemed to be a necessary but 
marginal adjunct to note the existence of the practice. Documentation has now 
become the practice; except now it is no longer generated on film but in digital 
formats, sometimes requiring a camera specialist or crew to be on site to record it. 
Smithson had an ambivalent relationship to film and filmmaking of all kinds. 
In his writings he refers to mainstream narrative film, including a fascination 
with horror B–movies, but also acknowledges the expanded or experimental 
29 From this grid (bottom left frame) there is a single image work entitled 
Mirror Displacement (Vertical on Rocky Bank) England (1969), but Mirror 
Displacement (Portland Isle) (1969) no longer exists in this form. See http:// 
www.robertsmithson.com/photoworks/mirror-vertical.htm. While he was 
abroad on the same trip he made another work with a map Theory of Non-site 
(Oberhausen, Ruhr, Germany) (1969).
30 Simon Grant, ‘Notes from An Ancient Island’, Nancy Holt Interview, Tate 
Etc. Issue 25 (23 May 2012) 97–103. (p. 100).
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work made by contemporary artists working in film.31 Nevertheless, Smithson’s 
ideas about the perplexing aspects of filmmaking are thought-provoking; in ‘A 
Cinematic Atopia’ (1971)32 he writes:
The simple rectangle of the movie screen contains the flux, no matter 
how many orders one presents. But no sooner have we fixed the order 
in our mind than it dissolves into limbo. Tangles jungles, blind paths, 
secret passages lost cities invade our perception. The sites in films are 
not to be located or trusted. All is out of proportion. Scale inflates or 
deflates into uneasy dimensions. We wander between the towering 
and the bottomless. We are lost between the abyss within us and the 
boundless horizons outside us. Any film wraps us in uncertainty.33 
For Smithson, this cinematic atopia or no-place is the act of filming at a 
location or locations where the camera frame is used to cut out an image and 
displace it; the material shot at the site is then dislocated, taken away on the 
negative; it is relocated and constructed in the montage to be experienced and 
interpreted through the viewer’s suspension of disbelief.
The island of Portland is not an obvious site for film practice. However, if 
W.J.T. Mitchell’s comments about the landscape and the potential of film are 
considered: 
[…] it should be clear why moving pictures of landscape are, in a 
very real sense, the subtext of these revisionist accounts of traditional 
motionless landscape images in photography, painting, and other media. 
[…] landscape is a dynamic medium, in which we “live and move and 
have our being,” but also a medium that is in itself in motion from one 
place or time to another.34
At Portland the movement of film from ‘one place […] to another’ is also 
the movement of collapse as a poetic following the perpetual movement and 
31 See ‘A Cinematic Atopia’ (1971) in Smithson Robert Smithson: The Collected 
Writings, pp. 138–42; and ‘The Monument: Outline for a Film’ (1967), pp. 
356–57, which delineates a rather prosaic narrative of a road movie about 
artists looking for sites, travelling to places in a car, then returning to a gallery 
opening and party. See also Smithson’s polemic on film ‘Art Through the 
Camera’s Eye’, pp. 88–92 in Robert Smithson, Unearthed: Drawings, Collages, 
Writings, ed. by Eugenie Tsai (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991)
32 Ibid. atopia from the Greek: strangeness, from a–(privative), topos place 
Chambers 12th Edition. London: Chambers Harrap Publishers, 2011. p. 94; 
and: atopia ‘unusualness’, from a- ‘without’ + topos ‘place’ Oxford Diction
33 Ibid. p. 141.
34 W.J.T. Mitchell, ed. Landscape and Power (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2002) p. 2. Mitchell says this in his introduction by way of an omission, 
qualifying the absence of any essays on cinematic landscape, though he sees the 
scope of this in future research. 
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disruption in the quarries and the uncertainty of the cliffs; the latter despite 
looking monumental, have the constant possibility of failure and collapse. The 
idea noted by Cosgrove and Daniels of ‘landscape as a text’,35 suggested ways 
of reading and interpreting landscape, both as place and representation. In this 
instance the text inscribed in Portland’s landscape is one of uncertainty caused 
by quarrying and collapse; this pervades the island. The landscape was filmed 
and represented as a filmic text experimenting with and interpreting collapse as 
a poetic. 
On the ground at Portland, I have not made a project of formally and 
systematically walking the site of the island, of hiking the twelve mile 
circumference of the coastal path walk, or the various bisecting paths. I have 
not followed the prescribed routes on the ordnance survey map. Instead, my 
experience has been one of wandering and meandering, allowing for chance 
encounters and unpredictable events. Walking across the island, it is uncertain 
what will be over each low ridge; walking very often means coming to another 
quarry and finding they are all different in size, scale, and age. Walking the 
cliff paths on the western side of the island and setting up the camera for 
filming and photographing at these locations causes a sense of vertigo, a fear 
of the edge, of falling and collapse. Each time at the island has been one of 
roaming according to what seemed right on the day, depending on the weather 
conditions or light and what paths were accessible through the working and 
abandoned quarries; walking around the edges of quarries, following the old 
railways, walking along some of the cliff paths and of scrambling down to the 
beaches, and searching for and finding locations for the film camera. 
At Portland there is a persistent sense that at any moment something may 
happen – that something might collapse. Quarries of any kind were important 
places for Smithson, but unlike the ‘non-sites’36 that he went searching for, 
Portland kept exuding and imposing its own multiple histories, each offering 
the potential for further departure points and ways of making, thinking and 
writing. Quarries are man-made craters hacked into the ground, the edges, 
walls, and floors are rough, the sites worked only while they are economically 
viable, and because they are unfinished places they are also creative spaces. It 
seems that everyone who has come to Portland has seen something in the stone 
and the spaces made by its removal.
The villages and hamlets on Portland unfold as the traveller enters the 
island. The lower village of Fortuneswell is near Chesil bank, looks across 
to Weymouth, and is more of a fishing village. Next to it is Castletown, near 
35 Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, The Iconography of Landscape: Essays 
on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments, p. 5.
36 Ibid. p. 244.
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Henry VIII’s ruined castle and where the navy was based. Rising up five 
hundred feet onto the plane of a hill created by displacement of the strata by 
an ancient and distant earthquake, the village of Easton and the hamlets of 
Weston and Southwell are perched on the edges of the quarries. The cottages 
made from stones opportunistically collected by quarrymen sometimes face 
toward the quarries and at other times face the roads. On the island of Portland 
there is the pervading sound of work – industrial machinery, trucks moving the 
stone around, which must have been even more so in the past when more of the 
quarries were in operation. As a site Portland is largely industrial and does not 
fit the usual criteria for the picturesque, or as a place of contemplation, which 
strangely makes it all the more visually compelling. Even so, for such a small 
geographic area there are a number of interests and ranges of production there 
from quarrying, fishing, and ancient agriculture; until recently the navy, and 
earlier the army were there; also there are two prisons. It is a site for studying 
geology, it is a sea area and a weather station, and has three lighthouses, one 
in current operation, one a private house and the last a bird observatory. The 
contemporary interests of preservation, conservation and sustainability are 
reflected in leisure activities: the sculpture park in the disused Tout Quarry 
administered by a quarry trust; the sailing events at the 2012 Olympics on the 
bay between Portland and Weymouth were meant to establish this further. 
During my time working on site at Portland and later working with the film 
material generated there, collected and cut out of the island and taken away 
like the stone, I have kept in mind the observations at the beginning of Paul 
Carter’s Material Thinking, where he states that:
Material thinking occurs in the making of works of art. It happens 
when the artist dares to ask the simple but far-reaching questions What 
matters? What is the material of thought? To ask these questions is to 
embark on an intellectual adventure peculiar to the making process. 
[sic] 37 
Reflecting on these questions about ‘what matters’ and asking ‘what is the 
material thought’ have been central to the practical inquiry and process of 
making and editing films and videos and building installations in order to 
experiment with and demonstrate a visual poetic of collapse.




1. 16mm Film works
Portland Nos. 2 – 5 (North of Wallsend Cove to Mutton Cove, Portland Bill, 
West Weares, Independent quarry, Tout Quarry) 
2010–2012. Installation: 2 x 16mm film loops. colour 10mins. Loop 1: cliffs, 
sea, horizon, weares. Loop 2: quarries, piles of off-cut stone waste. (Plates 1-3)
The concept of collapse at Portland is shown as space, time and material. 
Recurrent coastal landslips exposed the strata of Portland’s Jurassic limestone 
and revealed its potential as architectural material. Centuries of quarrying have 
left Portland’s landscape scarred by dislocation and absence. I explored the 
island of Portland as an uncertain and unstable space of collapse. 
The time-based medium of moving image was used to survey Portland as place 
and material inscribed by time. This film installation shows technical and 
material images of the geology of the cracks in the limestone cliff faces on the 
western coast: north of Wallsend Cove to Mutton Cove, the quarried stone, 
the spaces left behind in the quarries, and abandoned material, are viewed as 
sites of imminent or potential collapse. The cliff faces of three hundred feet or 
more, with their deep fissures that create spaces between upright sections of 
stone, look like perpendicular gothic columns. Further along the coast, at the 
West Weares collapsed cliff faces known as ‘weares’ look as though a disaster 
has happened, or like a battlefield; but the ‘weares’ are both constructed by the 
dumping of waste material over the cliffs in the nineteenth century as well as by 
coastal collapse. In the quarries the abandoned off-cuts of Portland stone make 
unintended, random sculptures, abstract arrangements from the piles of stone. 
The uncertainty of Portland is that there is no continuity of space, surface or 
edge – the collapsing cliffs and the continual removal and shifting of the waste 
stone means that the site is never the same.
The film installation is devised to be projected from two 16mm projectors in 
continuous film loops, creating two adjacent images: one focusing on the sea 
and the cliff faces of Portland’s uncertain edge, looking outwards into the 
horizon; and the other looking inwards into the absent voids and empty spaces 
of the quarries. The shots are carefully framed; save one shot, the camera 
does not move – movement can be discerned gradually in the frame: a bird, 
the sea or a wild plant in the wind. The duration of the projection creates 
and marks out time making a connection between the material temporalities 
of the film as a small increment of the geological time of the landscape. The 
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two loops are not of equal length, which means that viewers will see a work 
that is continually changing, as the two images always fall differently against 
each other. The viewer can never be certain they have seen the same work 
that someone else has seen. The duration and mechanics of the film repeatedly 
running through the projector causes the material of the film to scratch and 
deteriorate. The scratches are unique, marks inscribed accidentally on the 
surface of the films as random traces. The continuous time of the film running 
through the projectors causes it to break down: collapse continues to occur in 
time and in the presence of the viewer.
Film loops have been part of experimental film practice and exhibition as 
‘expanded cinema’38 since the 1960s. The idea of expanded cinema was to 
break out of and go beyond the limits of the two-dimensional cinema screen, 
to take over auditoriums, galleries and the spaces where experimental film was 
shown and make film dynamic and performative in its own right. The projector 
became part of the show as the mechanical reproduction demonstrated itself. 
The purring sound of the projector filled spaces along with its light.
Off Cuts: Portland 3f 
2013. Installation: 80 glass mounted slides containing 16mm frames. Slide 
projector 35mm + timer unit, continuous time projection. Approximately 7 
minutes.
This piece is concerned with the material of film, and in particular the collapse 
of celluloid film itself. It was made at a time when it began to get harder to 
make 16 mm films. This piece is based on the experience of editing – of the 
pleasure of making, of handling and looking at the material of film. Off 
Cuts: Portland 3f is made from the trims that are pulled from the exposed 
film, which must be kept to account for each frame of film for the process of 
negative cutting and matching. The title of the piece is a play between the idea 
of the little pieces of film trimmed from the beginning and end of each shot 
3f meaning three frames, and the waste material of the stone at the quarries 
piled up in heaps that look as though they may collapse. These off-cuts include 
the flash frames that occur when the camera is turned on and off and the light 
level momentarily changes, causing a frame to be considerably brighter than 
those adjacent; even though this occurs at one twenty-fourth of a second, most 
people notice the flash even if they don’t know what it was. At other times 
this flash frame occurs as just a void of light, an empty space defined by the 
frame. Most of these kinds of trims become the sole provenance of the editor, 
who cuts them out of the roll. I have always found them to be compelling and 
38 See: Gene Youngblood, Expanded Cinema (New York: Dutton, 1970); and 
A.L. Rees, Dave Curtis, Duncan White, Steven Ball eds. Expanded Cinema: 
art, performance, film (Tate Publications: London, 2011)
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beautiful, abstract and material images that have so much to say about film 
itself, and sometimes when the editing has come to an impasse I have assembled 
them and looked at them for my own pleasure. 
Three frame 16mm fragments of film have been mounted in 35mm glass slide 
mounts using film cement; at times they have been stuck in place imperfectly. 
Pressing the film frames in between the glass slide mounts had a sad dimension 
to the process – that of keeping and preserving the fragments of film itself in 
glass created them as an archive, an archaeology of conserving film, of saving 
an endangered material. The systematic mounting of the frames of film on 
slides echoes the scientific, and is reminiscent of the glass microscope slide – it 
seems like mounting and pinning out insects as scientific specimens. This felt 
like a poignant reversal of what Stan Brackhage did in Mothlight (1963), where 
he stuck the wings of moths onto the surface of film and projected it; making 
a remarkable and striking film that captured a sense of fragility, of nature and 
death through the creatures who fly into the light and die.39 Whereas here, 
in Off Cuts: Portland 3f, film itself is being stuck down and preserved as 
scientifically conserved fragments of a collapsed technology.
The scale of the projection is ideally one where the projector is on a plinth of 
about 1.1 – 1.3 metres high with a throw of at least 4 metres; in doing this 
it is possible to project the slides so that they have a vertical, perpendicular 
presence in the space. The scale of this, together with the subject of the visual 
material of the frames of films from the quarries and cliffs creates a sense of 
the monumental, coincidentally paralleling the proportions of the Portland 
stone grave markers seen in Commonwealth War Graves of the first and second 
world wars. More particularly, the whole of the 16mm film is seen - the edges, 
sprocket holes, occasionally edge numbers and even previous damage of torn 
sprocket holes and scratches, red flaring and void frames. As the robust but 
jerky mechanics of the slide projector revolves, the frames sometimes slip inside 
the glass mounts. While this piece is a slide installation, the use of the now 
retro-technology of the slide projector means that it is still viewed as projected 
film and also works with the sound of the projector.
Nicodemus Knob Panorama  
2012/2015. Installation. A curved photographic light box is planned – 
metal, perspex, LED lighting 24x6x6 reversal shot on a continuous roll of 
Fuji 220 film, metal frame holding film strip behind clear perspex. Behind 
the film strip an opaque white perspex layer diffuses a strip of LED lights.                               
Plate 11, Drawing, James Swinson.
39 See: P. Adams Sitney, Visionary Film: The American Avant-Garde (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1974), ‘The Lyrical film’, pp. 174–210.
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The panorama mounted on a light box is made from a continuous strip of 
24 frames of medium format 6mm x 6mm film put through a Hasselblad 
camera. The panorama demonstrates the scale of the stone removed from the 
seventeenth century quarries Waycroft and Kingbarrow. These two quarries 
provided stone for Inigo Jones and for Wren’s rebuilding of London after 
the Great Fire. As previously, mentioned, the pillar of stone is not an ancient 
geological formation, but a marker left by quarrymen to indicate the extent and 
quantity of stone that was removed from this area of the island. A panorama 
seemed the best way of showing this. The light box is used so that light would 
shine through the film, consistent with projecting the other 16mm and the 
35 mm slide pieces. As with Off Cuts: Portland 3f the film is mounted and 
protected, this time between two sheets of perspex; mounted in a curved light 
box which parallels the movement of looking around the quarry. This piece 
shows collapse as absence in the scale of the removal of the stone. 
Das Gewölbe 1800                                                                                         
(The Arch 1800) 
2012 / 2014. Installation: 16 mm film loop. Animation b&w, 75 seconds. 
An animation based on the pencil drawing that Kleist made of the arch added 
on 30 December 1800, to the end of the letter of 16 and 18 November 1800 
to Wilhelmine von Zenge. Kleist’s original drawing is a diagram showing 
how the arch remains standing because all stones want to collapse at the 
same time. Kleist’s drawing of the arch is awkward, even amateurish, but 
functions diagrammatically; it is not the drawing of a professional engineer 
or architect. The drawing of the arch has been individually traced from a 
reproduction one hundred times onto animation cells. As I was copying this 
drawing over and over again, the lines took on identities – the sketchy vertical 
lines underneath the arch became collapse lines, since they seem to drawn in 
order to suggest how the imminent movement of the stones could cause them to 
collapse. The line Kleist drew immediately underneath the keystone of the arch 
and extending beyond the whole drawing is a practice of mark-making and 
performs no functional service to the geometry of the diagram – it is entirely 
conceptual. In the animation the conceptual, gestural and experimental nature 
of this line is reinforced through the way it moves, expands and contracts. 
This wavering, conceptual line demonstrates uncertainty; it is a metaphor 
experimentally traced through the thesis in the central inquiry about collapse.
Each drawing creates movement because it has been done by hand and 
therefore varies slightly, creating movement as it is animated. Each cell is filmed 
a single frame at a time, repeated in varying order from the numbered 100 cells 
for about 4000 frames (the length of a roll of 100ft of film), as it never works 
effectively to repeat the cells in exact order, because the eye starts to discern a 
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pattern. A febrile, shaky movement ensues, as the hand drawing can never be 
exactly the same each time, and this creates a moving and shaky line echoing 
the imminence and uncertainty of the arch as a visual poetics of collapse. The 
loop will be 75 seconds long, which is 1800 frames running at 24 frames per 
second. The number 1800 was chosen because that was the year in which the 
arch was drawn by Kleist.
Sound
In these 16mm film installations the sound of the projectors and the film 
moving through the guides of the looping plate systems is the only sound. In 
both the 16mm and 35mm slide projectors the sound is a mechanical, repetitive 
clatter of movement, and part of the installation. Location sound has been 
avoided in the 16mm films.
2. Video works
The video material has been used as a method of researching and documenting 
place and site. Video was used to explore and have an immediate relationship 
to the sites of the quarries, cliffs, landscape and sense of place and location at 
Portland and was used to help with the visual thinking of the site and how I 
might approach it using film, and in order to plan the 16mm film shoots. In 
addition, video was used in Germany to make work as part of my practice and 
also to collect documentary and notational imagery of places in Germany that 
I may only be able to get to once during the course of the research and may not 
develop a continuing relationship with. Video allows for longer shots than the 
Bolex, so duration became a factor. These documents have helped to create a 
sense of place.
Die Insel Ziegenwerder, Frankfurt an der Oder 
(The goat river island) 
2013. Installation: Video 5 mins, colour. 
Documents a visit to Frankfurt an der Oder, the city where Kleist was born, in 
the Branenburg region of Germany where his family had estates dating from 
the 12th century. Frankfurt an der Oder was a place that Kleist repeatedly 
returned to. The Oder is now the border between Germany and Poland; during 
Kleist’s lifetime Branenburg was one of the states, together with the western 
and northern regions of Poland, which were part of Prussia. The video was shot 
on an island in the river Oder; it has a bleak and melancholy feel to it. Perhaps 
Kleist knew this little river island. The island n the Oder resonated with the 
repeating motif of the island explored in this thesis as a place and a concept; 
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it stood  in as reference to Kleist’s time exiled on the island in river Aar, near 
Thun in Switzerland where he finally ended his engagement to Wilhelmine and 
decided to become a writer. The sound track, made up of location sound and 
footsteps walking, is connected to the idea of wandering, of Kleist’s ‘wavering 
spirit’, and of the search to find a place in the world. The video contemplates 
islands as places of shifting and uncertain edges, where boundaries constantly 
erode and wash away.
Kleist Grabe, Kleiner Wansee                                                                        
(Kleist Grave, Lesser Wansee) 
2013. Installation: Video 5 mins, colour.
A video contemplating the site of the graves of Henrich von Kleist and 
Henriette Vogel at Kleine Wansee. They are buried at the place where they 
died in a suicide pact on 21 November 1811. Wannsee is the furthest western 
area of Berlin, near Postdam. There are two lakes lying on the river Havel, 
Großer Wannsee (Greater Wannsee) and Kleiner Wannsee (Lesser Wannsee), 
demarcated by the Wannsee bridge. The graves overlook the lake and are 
enclosed by iron railings; a tree grows inside the enclosure beside the granite40 
gravestone. The stone has been replaced several times. On the side of the 
gravestone with Kleist’s dates of birth and death is a quote from his play, 
Prinz Friedrich von Homburg (The Prince of Homburg), Act V scene 2: 
‘Nun, o Unsterblichkeit, bist du ganz mein!’ (Now, Oh immortality, you are 
all mine!). The idea of immortality was belated, added decades later when a 
gravestone was put up, by which time Kleist had earned a place in the German 
literary canon. On the other side of the stone, a reference to Matthew 6:v12 
floats on the gravestone, alluding to but not actually quoting the biblical 
reference; (Matthäus Ch 6 v12. Und vergib uns unsere Schuld, wie wir unseren 
Schuldigern vergeben) is an ambiguous choice: ‘And forgive us our debts, as 
we forgive our debtors.’ (King James Bible). Another version offers the verse 
as ‘and forgive us our shortcomings, as we also have forgiven those who have 
failed in their duty towards us’ (Weymouth Bible). Either way, in relation to 
Kleist’s suicide it is unclear who needed forgiving and who fell short. On the 
other side of the gravestone are both Kleist and Henritte Vogel’s names together 
with lines from Max Ring, a poet and chronicler of Berlin: ‘Er lebte sang und 
lift /in trüber schwer Zeit / er suchter hier Tot / un fand Unsterblichkeit’ (He 
lived, sang and suffered / in troubled and difficult times / he sought death here / 
and found immortality). 
The video was made in Spring 2013. It was cold and there was no sense that 
40 The gravestone is made from granite. This was the stone Goethe and 
Werner considered to be the ‘Urstein’, the foundational mineral of geology. See 
discussion of this in Chapter 3, Part 1. 
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green shoots would be coming any time soon; the rain suited the melancholy 
theme and the sound of the drops on the umbrella held over the camera added 
to the atmospheric sound and seemed appropriate. Despite the signposts, the 
grave was hard to find. Eventually we found it on Bismarck Strasse. The voice-
over reads a quote in German from Ferdinand Grimm, who visited the grave in 
1818 with his brother Wilhelm, and is subtitled: 
From the hilltop, a spacious clearing surrounded by pine trees, one has 
an open view across the wide sacred lake, taking in the many other 
wooded hills extending westward almost to distant Spandau, whose 
pointed church tower can be seen indistinctly. This is probably one of 
the loveliest and most peaceful spots for miles around. The graves are 
surrounded by some twenty tall poplars, but except for one I found 
them all withered; this is because of the sandy soil, in which they seldom 
thrive; Wilhelm and I removed several of the withered trunks, planted 
new ones, and tied them all together. Within a short time the saplings 
formed a wreath and stretched out their hands to one another. It looked 
really beautiful when we went back and looked. Not a soul had been 
there, it was so lonely and still; there was no other sound than the song 
of the chaffinches and titmice, and that too was beautiful.41
Initially, I had something else in mind for the voice-over: I read a translation 
of the autopsies of Kleist and Henriette Vogel. Though I kept hesitating about 
using this, I eventually decided that it would be too obvious and sensationalist, 
and ultimately gratuitous to use the autopsy, which described how the gun 
shot injury caused his death. I reread the description by Ferdinand Grimm of 
his and his brother’s  visit to the graves and the way they carefully tended it, 
and decided to use it for the voice-over because it was determined by a sense of 
place and consistent with collapse as a poetic.
3. Knowledge and practice
The knowledge gained through the film and video practice is a representation 
and demonstration of the concept of collapse. This knowledge is experimental 
in form, and as with Novalis’s Romantic Encyclopaedia, is constructed from 
parts, each of which generates its own thinking. By curating the films, videos, 
animation, slides and still images together in an installation it confirmed 
collapse as a way of thinking and making. 
The experience of being in the space of the installation offered further 
understandings of collapse represented through experimental practice. In an 
ideal situation, the works should be installed and projected onto walls opposite 
41 Quoted in Maass, Kleist: a biography, p. 300.
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each other, with films on one side and the videos on the other. The films and 
videos face each other and speak to each other while maintaining a sense of 
uncertainty because the whole cannot be apprehended. The viewer is placed 
in such a way that they cannot see both projection walls of the installation at 
the same time; a fluid montage is created through the movement of the viewer 
and by the movements of the images and projectors. A unique montage is 
constructed by each viewer as they move through the space catching fragments 
of the films, videos, slides, the stills of the light box and the animation as they 
create and experiment with their own version of the installation as a whole. 
The installation experiments with time. This is in part through the montage 
constructed by the viewer, the running time of each of the films and videos 
and the slide projection. The sense of time in the installation is twofold – it is 
synchronic in the quality of at-the-same-time-ness that Kleist described in the 
way the arch would collapse, and is also diachronic, in that collapse progresses 
as movement through time. 
Dissonant movement is created in the animation of the drawing of the arch 
by connecting each of the disjoined, single animation cells by filming them, 
then projecting as one piece. The animation of Kleist’s drawing of the arch 
establishes a staccato movement, especially of the movement and gesture of 
the line drawn under the arch, which reinforces and marks the turn of the 
geometrical diagram of the arch into concept, idea, and experiment, which 
is disconcerting and uncertain. This line is also one of experimentation, and 
traces a path through the thesis, creating collapse as knowledge, thinking, 
looking and practice.
A soundscape is created in the installation from the mechanical whirr of two 
16mm projectors, the repetitive mechanics of the 35mm slide projector, and 
the unsettling irritation of the fans from the three video projectors. There 
is the choice for the viewer to opt out of this soundscape and listen to the 
single sound track through headphones from each of the two videos made in 
Germany, which are composed of location sounds from nature, distant urban 
sounds and a voice over.
A recurrent theme present in the visual material is a sense of uncertain 
foundations. The locations at Portland and in Germany had a common thread 
of being poised on edges – of the sea, of river islands, of the lake and of the 
void of the quarries. These edges of land and water invite looking outwards 
into uncertain space, they create a sense of unknown yearning and set the 
viewer towards the retrieval of what is absent and uncertain. The edges of the 
islands are unstable and are defined by their uncertainty. Islands have edges, a 
coast, this can be seen in Carter’s suggestion that:                                                     
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[…] the coastline, unlike the conventionally differentiated river or hill or 
lake, is infinite and folded; it cannot ultimately be mapped and known. 
It has no other side – if it has one, it becomes detached turned into an 
island. It cannot strictly be bounded and possessed [….] 42
Even though Portland or the die Insel Ziegenwerder on the Oder are relatively 
small islands, which suggests that their coastlines should be knowable and 
opposite to the infinite sense that Carter suggests, but the constant change 
and uncertain quality of all coastlines makes them unknowable. The coast is 
an edge, a space giving a viewpoint, not of itself, but further outwards to the 
uncertain horizon. The boundary of the island has a correspondence with the 
boundary of the quarry; the edge is a material place and is suggestive of the 
abyss.
The spatial and material quality of uncertainty for the viewer of the installation 
returns to Kant’s introduction to the ‘Physical Geography’, where he outlines 
the reasons for a study of the earth, more particularly he argues how 
knowledge is assembled and constructed and incrementally built:
Idea[s] are architectonic […] Anyone intending to build a house, for 
instance, will first form a conception of the whole […] What we are 
doing here is making an architectonic concept for ourselves, which is a 
concept whereby the manifold parts are derived from the whole.43
By advancing a method, which is derived from architectural thinking and from 
spatial concepts, Kant gives insight in to his own processes of thought. The 
‘architectonic concept’ of building ideas made from parts has a correspondence 
with Novalis’s experimental construction of the Romantic Encyclopaedia, and 
is present in the way this thesis has built a new knowledge of collapse through 
practice.
42 Paul Carter, ‘Dark with an Excess of Bright’ in Denis Cosgrove, ed., 
Mappings, pp. 130–31.






















This thesis responded to Kleist’s question, which asked: why does an ‘arch not 
collapse since it has no support?’ and the observation which followed that 
‘[i]t remains standing, [...] because all the stones tend to collapse at the 
same time –’ The central research question asked whether collapse is always 
imminent, how collapse could be represented, what collapse might look like 
and whether uncertainty is the condition of collapse. In order to address 
these questions, my research was interdisciplinary and practice-based ranged 
across the visual practices of film, video, photography and installation; and 
in history, philosophy, literature, geology, architecture, spatial practices, and 
considerations of place and site.
The answers to these questions identified an interdisciplinary, experimental 
approach to this empirical observation about the arch constructed as a series of 
interlocking elements: stone, space, threshold, architecture and collapse. Kleist’s 
arch is multiple and trans-disciplinary – it is a philosophical proposition, 
an architectural construction and a material artefact. The observation 
Kleist advanced concerning the possible continuity of the arch is empirically 
determined and reasoned, but the compelling and paradoxical image of the 
stones that keep the arch standing while wanting to fall – only holds collapse in 
abeyance and the imminence of this foreshadows its capacity for collapse. This 
empirical observation revealed a visual, demonstrable and certain truth, but 
also possessed transgressive potential in its construction – that the arch could 
collapse, at some time or another. 
This led to the supposition that something devised and constructed embeds 
collapse within its form as uncertainty. The multifaceted components, which 
both construct the arch, and may be the means of its demise, led to the 
investigation of the materiality of collapse. The arch is constructed, it is an 
architectural artefact, the geometry of the arch itself constructs space, as both 
boundary and limit, but because the arch is also a threshold, it is therefore 
temporal. The arch exists in time – traversing it demarcates time and its 
potential for collapse occurs in time. 
The metaphor about the potential for the arch to collapse is material, visual, 
geometric and diagrammatic, and it invited contemplation and interpretation 
as a poetic and a practice. This was explored through the principle areas of 
inquiry of collapse, uncertainty and experimentation. This formed a triangle 
with collapse at the apex; uncertainty and experimentation completed the 
geometry and this triumvirate offered the means of thinking about collapse.
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The concept of collapse was developed as experimental practices in film, video, 
stills and animation, which came together as an installation. The site-specific 
practice at Portland built on, and consolidated, the exploration of collapse as 
material, and as reflections in time. At Portland the site exists for and about its 
material, and this allowed for interdisciplinary methods of collaborating with 
Portland as place and site that invited practice as the handling and application 
of the material of Portland stone through art, film, architecture, geology, 
geography, philosophy in ways that were so fascinating as to induce me into 
researching its history and material time.
Terrains of thought and ideas criss-crossed between history, practice, place and 
material throughout this interdisciplinary research. The findings in relation 
to the literatures considered, which initially seemed as though they may be 
related to a theory of collapse, such as those of the ruin, determined that an 
inquiry into collapse was separate and different. Studies of the ruin show that 
the condition of the ruin is verified by certainty, because it is an event that 
has already taken place, whereas collapse is qualified by its uncertainty, of the 
imminence or threat that collapse may happen at an unknowable, but indefinite 
moment.
The disintegration and fragmentation of the certainties of empiricism were 
precipitated by the external and unpredictable geological and material event 
of the calamitous earthquake in Lisbon in 1755. This had an immediate and 
lasting effect on Enlightenment thought. This historical event demonstrated 
that the imminence of collapse could suddenly become collapse at the same 
time. The uncertainty of earthquake creates provisional architectures out of 
collapse, randomly making survival possible, and death inevitable. Kant’s 
three essays responded to the disaster in order to hypothesize the causes of 
earthquakes, which subsequently formed a significant part of his pre-critical 
thinking and led to theories of the earth, and then to geography. Acceptance 
and recognition of the uncertainty of the material world beneath the apparent 
stability of the surface of the earth were acknowledged and became foundations 
to the material and the geographical for Kant, and consequently questions of 
the spatial were crucial for the incremental movement towards the critical turn 
in his thinking.
When Kant’s Critiques were published they set in motion questions of time 
and space, of what is knowable, the veracity of truth, and of consciousness and 
the modern subject. This established the idea that nothing is certain and truth 
is ultimately unknowable, and thus truth collapsed, and becomes qualified 
and relative. Post-Kantian thinking in the late eighteenth and the first decades 
of the nineteenth centuries led to the rapid expansion of German philosophy. 
Novalis’s and other post-Kantian contributions to this field emerged as both 
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clarification and critique. Kleist made a tortuous transition between empirical 
and critical thinking. Kleist applied uncertainty as a repeating theme in his 
writing, but also invoked questions of consciousness and self-consciousness. 
However, Novalis questioned the means of creating consciousness, 
and identified that the concept of consciousness has the potential to be 
misconstrued by the subject. Novalis’s experimental thinking worked from a 
material, geological perspective intertwined with philosophy and poetics as a 
practice, establishing a link between language and the enhancement of science 
through ‘romantische Poesie’. Kant’s extensive writing on natural philosophy 
identified and articulated the scope of inquiry for physical geography and 
theories of the earth. The poetics of geology brought layers of description to 
science; much later this was especially so in Jacquetta Hawkes’s attachment to 
land, and the intense sense of place which emerged from the collapse of a war-
torn world. She established that the material of the earth has enduring qualities 
of time and continuity, and showed why it became important for mourning and 
memorial. 
The interweaving of poetics, philosophy and tangible material gave insights 
into the scope and potential for the interdisciplinary practices in this thesis. I 
was drawn to Portland as a site of inquiry and research because its fractured, 
disrupted landscape suggested an image and demonstration of collapse. At 
the island collapse is part of the landscape and geomorphology of limestone 
and as a quality of quarrying. Centuries of quarrying have created a disrupted 
landscape of collapse on Portland. The material quarried at Portland was 
needed in vast quantities as reconstruction and restoration following the 
seventeenth century collapse occasioned by the Great Fire of London and 
of the mass destruction of the wars of the twentieth century. Wren led the 
reconstruction of London, and Hooke was a pivotal figure not just in this 
scheme, but his own endeavours in scientific study. Hooke intuited a theorem 
concerning the arch – of how it might fall, but also how it can stay up – and 
answered questions about how and why an arch collapses. 
The research at Portland was located. Place is suggestive of territory, and 
whether this is the subject of dispute or as the place of situated practice, 
territory eventually has a boundary, an edge that is always uncertain and 
prone to collapse in whatever form that may take as material fragmentation or 
historical outcome. At Portland collapse is manifested as the perpetual change 
of coastal collapse; the continuation of collapse at the island occurs as the 
stone is quarried and carted away. At the quarries space is constructed and an 
uncertain vessel is made as the quarried stone is emptied out of these places. 
This is depicted in a still photographic panorama, which has been used to 
demonstrate the scale of removal of the stone at Portland and how the island 
may be nibbled away. This inquiry has advanced the idea that the construction 
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of absence, through the spaces left by architecture’s uses, can be regarded as 
architecture and as history.
This was explored in film constructed as visual and material links to collapse 
by making films that would deteriorate and collapse as they were projected 
as continuous film loops. The film and video practice was concerned with 
materiality and collapse also in the current context of the precarious and 
uncertain fate of celluloid film, and through handling and preserving the 
material of film as artefact on the one hand; on the other hand, by setting up 
the conditions of damage and destruction in the projected film loops, and also 
by cutting, editing, and reassembling it into (an)other visual form, both within 
and outside its own frameworks. 
The video works are determined by space, time and place. They were filmed at 
the sites of Kleist’s birth and death and reflect on Kleist’s wavering spirit, which 
led to restless movement manifested as wandering and primarily, uncertainty. 
Spatial encounters were suggested by Nietzsche’s ideas of the wanderer and 
with Kleist’s compulsion towards the abyss. The videos give time and space to 
thinking and the contemplation of place.
In the interdisciplinary histories and questions of place, and the explorations 
of spatial thinking as practice and concept – the implications of this research, 
and the knowledge gained is that collapse is an original way of thinking, and 
that in conjunction with experimentation and uncertainty, collapse suggested a 
substantial inquiry. 
The possibilities for further inquiries into collapse in other places and other 
situations, from literary, historical, architectural or conceptual sources are 
wide-ranging. As theory, conceptual thinking, and as practice-based research, 
ideas concerning collapse have the potential and the scope for further 
investigation, analysis and application in specific fields or as interdisciplinary 
inquiry. The capacity for the concept of collapse to continue to be part of my 
practice and research is in no doubt – this concept is a constituent facet of my 
thinking and making, and is the likely background characteristic of future 
projects. In the course of this thesis, I have shown that uncertainty creates 
the condition and potential for collapse. Considering the implications and 
exploring the possibilities of the separate components that built the image 
of the arch, has identified and attested that a theory of collapse is temporal, 




228 of Kleist’s letters were collected.
1. Frankfurt-am-Main 13 - 18 March 1793  to Auguste Helene von Massow
2. Eschborn 25 February 1795   to Ulrike von Kleist
3. Postdam 18 and 19 March 1799   to Christian Ernst Martini
4. Frankfurt an der Oder May 1799 – May 1800 to den vom. Rgt. Garde verabscheideten  
      Lieut v. Kleist
5. Frankfurt an der Oder May 1799   to Ulrike von Kleist
6. Frankfurt an der Oder 12 November  to Ulrike von Kleist
7. Frankfurt an der Oder early 1800   to Wilhelmine von Zenge
8. Frankfurt an der Oder early 1800   to Wilhelmine von Zenge
9. Frankfurt an der Oder 30 May 1800  to Wilhelmine von Zenge
10. Frankfurt an der Oder early Summer 1800 to Wilhelmine von Zenge
11. Berlin 14 August 1800    to Ulrike von Kleist
12. Berlin 16 August 1800    to Wilhelmine von Zenge
13. Pasewalk 20 August 1800   to Wilhelmine von Zenge
14. Coblentz, near Passewalk 21 August 1800 to Ulrike von Kleist
15. Coblentz, near Passewalk 21 August 1800 to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
16. Berlin 26 August 1800    to Ulrike von Kleist
17. Leipzig 30 August, 1 Sept 1800   to Wilhelmine von Zenge
18. Dresden 3 & 4 September 1800   to Wilhelmine von Zenge
19. Öderan in Erzgebirge 4 September 1800, 9 pm
 & Chemnitz 5 September 1800, 8 am
 & Zwickau 5 September 1800, 3 pm
 & Reichenbach 5 September 1800, 8 pm  to Wilhelmine von Zenge
20. Wüzburg 9 or 10 September 1800  to Wilhelmine von Zenge
21. Wüzburg 11 & 12 September 1800  to Wilhelmine von Zenge
22. Wüzburg 13 – 18 September 1800  to Wilhelmine von Zenge
23. Wüzburg 19 – 23 September 1800  to Wilhelmine von Zenge
24. Wüzburg 10 & 11 October 1800  to Wilhelmine von Zenge
25. Berlin 27 October 1800   to Ulrike von Kleist
26. Berlin 27 October 1800   to Karl August von Struensee
27. Berlin 13 November 1800   to Wilhelmine von Zenge
28. Berlin 16 & 18 November 1800,   to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
      with addition 30 December 1800 
29. Berlin 22 November 1800   to Wilhelmine von Zenge
30. Berlin 25 November 1800   to Ulrike von Kleist 
31. Berlin 29 November 1800   to Wilhelmine von Zenge
32. Frankfurt an der Oder December 1800  to Ulrike von Kleist 
33. Berlin 11 & 12 January 1801   to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
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34. Berlin 21 & 22 January 1801   to Wilhelmine von Zenge
35. Berlin 31 January 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge
36. Berlin 5 February 1801    to Ulrike von Kleist
37. Berlin 22 March 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge
38. Berlin 23 March 1801    to Ulrike von Kleist
39. Berlin 28 March 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
40. Berlin 1 April 1801    to Ulrike von Kleist
41. Berlin 9 April 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge
42. Berlin 12 April 1801    to Gottlob Johannn Christian Kunth
43. Berlin 14 April 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge
44. Dresden 4 May 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
45. Leipzig 21 May 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
46. Göttingen 3 June 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
47. Straßburg 28 June 1801   to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
48. Paris 18 July 1801    to Karoline von Schlieben
49. Paris 21 July 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
50. Paris 28 & 29 July 1801   to Adolfine von Wedeck
51. Paris 15 August 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
52. Paris 16 August 1801    to Luise von Zenge
53. Paris 10 October 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
54. Paris 27 October 1801    to Wilhelmine von Zenge 
55. Paris November (?) 1801   to Ludwig von Brockes
56. Paris & Frankfurt-am-Main November 1801 to Adolfine von Wedeck
57. Frankfurt-am-Main 2 December 1801  to Wilhelmine von Zenge
58. Basel, Switzerland 16 December 1801  to Wilhelmine von Zenge
59. Liestal & Bern 23 – 29 December 1801  to Heinrich Lohse
60. Bern 12 January 1802    to Ulrike von Kleist
61. Thun 1 February 1802    to Heinrich Zschokke
62. Thun 19 February 1802   to Ulrike von Kleist
63. Thun 2 March 1802    to Heinrich Zschokke
64. Thun 18 March 1802    to Ulrike von Kleist
65. Island of the Aar, near Thun 1 May 1802  to Ulrike von Kleist
66. Island of the Aar, near Thun 20 May 1802 to Wilhelmine von Zenge
67. Bern August 1802    to Wilhelm von Pannwitz
68. Weimar November 1802   to Ulrike von Kleist
69. Weimar 9 December 1802   to Ulrike von Kleist
70. Weimar January 1803    to Ulrike von Kleist
71. Weimar & Oßmannstedt January 1803  to Ulrike von Kleist
72. Leipzig 13 & 14 March 1803   to Ulrike von Kleist
73. Dresden April 1803    to Heinrich Lohse
74. Dresden 3 July 1803    to Ulrike von Kleist
75. Leipzig 20 July 1803    to Ulrike von Kleist
76. Geneva 5 October 1803   to Ulrike von Kleist
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77. St. Omer October 1803    to Ulrike von Kleist
78. Berlin 24 June 1804    to Ulrike von Kleist
79. Berlin 27 June 1804    to Ulrike von Kleist
80. Berlin 11 July 1804    to Ulrike von Kleist
81. Berlin 27 July 1804    to Ulrike von Kleist
82. Berlin 29 July 1804    to Henriette von Schlieben
83. Berlin 2 August 1804    to Ulrike von Kleist 
84. Berlin 24 August 1804    to Ulrike von Kleist
85. Berlin December 1804    to Ulrike von Kleist
86. Berlin 7 January 1805    to Ernst von Pfuel
87. Berlin April 1805    to Christian von Massenbach
88. Königsberg 13 May 1805   to Karl von Stein zum Altenstein
89. Königsberg 1805    to Ernst Pfuel [incl. drawing]
90. Königsberg July 1805    to Ernst von Pfuel 
91. Königsberg 13 November 1805   to Karl von Stein zum Altenstein
92. Königsberg Late November 1805  to Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern
93. Königsberg 10 February 1806   to Karl von Stein zum Altenstein
94. Königsberg 30 June 1806   to Karl von Stein zum Altenstein
95. Königsberg 10 July 1806   to Hans von Auerswald
96. Königsberg 4 August 1806   to Karl von Stein zum Altenstein
97. Königsberg 31 August 1806   to Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern
98. Königsberg 24 October 1806   to Ulrike von Kleist
99. Königsberg 24 November 1806   to Marie von Kleist
100. Königsberg 6 December 1806   to Ulrike von Kleist
101. Königsberg 31 December 1806   to Ulrike von Kleist
102. Marburg 17 February 1807   to Ulrike von Kleist
103. Au Fort de Joux, France 31 March 1807  to Monsieur de Bureau, Commandant du  
      Fort de à Pontarlier
104. Chalons-sur-Marne 23 April 1807  to Ulrike von Kleist 
105. Chalons-sur-Marne 8 June 1807  to Ulrike von Kleist
106. Chalons-sur-Marne June 1807   to Marie von Kleist
107. Chalons-sur-Marne 15 July 1807  to Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern
108. Chalons-sur-Marne July 1807   to Ulrike von Kleist
109. Chalons-sur-Marne 15 July 1807  to Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern
110. Berlin 14 August 1807   to Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern
111. Dresden 17 September 1807   to Ulrike von Kleist
112. Dresden 17 September 1807   to Johan Friedrich Cotta
113. Dresden 3 October 1807   to Ulrike von Kleist
114. Dresden 25 October 1807   to Ulrike von Kleist 
115. Dresden 30 October 1807   to Adolphine von Werdeck
116. Dresden Late Autumn 1807   to Marie von Kleist
117. Dresden Late Autumn 1807    to Marie von Kleist
118. Dresden Late Autumn 1807   to Marie von Kleist
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119. Dresden 17 December 1807   to Ulrike von Kleist
120. Dresden 17 December 1807   to Christoph Martin Wieland
121. Dresden 21 December 1807   to Johan Friedrich Cotta
122. Dresden 22 December 1807   to Hans von Auerswald
123. Dresden 22 December 1807   to Karl von Stein zum Altenstein
124. Dresden 5 January 1808   to Ulrike von Kleist
125. Dresden 24 January 1808   to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
126. Dresden 29 January 1808   to Heinrich Dieterich
127. Dresden 1 February 1808   to Ulrike von Kleist
128. Dresden 4 February 1808   to Joseph Thaddäus Freiherrn von Sumeraw
129. Dresden 8 February 1808   to Ulrike von Kleist
130. Dresden 14 February 1808   to Heinrich Joseph von Collin
131. Dresden April 1808    to Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern
132. Dresden 4 May 1808    to Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern
133. Dresden 7 May 1808    to Gerog Joachim Göschen
134. Dresden 7 June 1808    to Johann Friedrich Cotta
135. Dresden 24 July 1808    to Johann Friedrich Cotta
136. Dresden August 1808    to Ulrike von Kleist
137. Dresden 30 September 1808    to Ulrike von Kleist
138. Dresden 2 October 1808   to Heinrich Joseph von Collin
139. Dresden 6 October 1808   to Karl August von Varnhagen von Ense
140. Dresden 2 November 1808   to Ulrike von Kleist
141. Dresden 8 December 1808   to Ulrike von Kleist
142. Dresden 1808    to Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern
143. Dresden 1 January 1809   to Heinrich Joseph von Collin
144. Dresden 1 January 1809   to Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern
145. Dresden 22 February 1809   to Heinrich Joseph von Collin
146. Dresden 5 April 1809    to Georg Moritz Walther  
147. Dresden 8 April 1809    to Ulrike von Kleist
148. Dresden 14 April 1809   to das Sadtergericht zu Frankfurt a. d. Oder
149. Dresden 20 April 1809   to Heinrich Joseph von Collin 
150. Töplitz 3 May 1809    to Ulrike von Kleist
151. Stockerau 25 May 1809   to Joseph Baron von Buol-Mülingen
152. Prague 13 June 1809    to Friedrich Schlegel
153. Prague 17 July 1809    to Ulrike von Kleist
154. Frankfurt an der Oder 23 November 1809 to Ulrike von Kleist
155. Frankfurt an der Oder 23 November 1809 to Georg Friedrich Dames
156. Frankfurt am Main 12 January 1810  to Johan Friedrich Cotta
157. Gotha 28 January 1810   to Heinrich Joseph von Collin
158. Berlin 4 March 1810    to Johan Friedrich Cotta
159. Berlin 19 March 1810    to Ulrike von Kleist
160. Berlin 1 April 1810    to Johan Friedrich Cotta
161. Berlin 8 April 1810    to Wilhelm Reuter
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162. Berlin 16 April 1810    to Wilhelm Reuter
163. Berlin 30 April 1810    to Georg Andreas Reimer
164. Berlin 8 May 1810    to Wilhelm Reuter
165. Berlin May 1810    to Georg Andreas Reimer
166. Berlin 10 August 1810   to Georg Andreas Reimer
167. Berlin 10 August 1810    to August Wilhelm Riffland
168. Berlin 12 August 1810   to August Wilhelm Riffland
169. Berlin 12 August 1810   to Georg Andreas Reimer
170. Berlin 13 August 1810   to Georg Andreas Reimer
171. Berlin 15 August 1810   to Johann Daniel Sander
172. Berlin 4 September 1810   to Georg Andreas Reimer
173. Berlin 5 September 1810   to Georg Andreas Reimer
174. Berlin 8 September 1810   to Georg Andreas Reimer
175. Berlin 2 October 1810    to Julius Eduard Hitzig
176. Berlin 14 October 1810   to Achim von Arnim
177. Berlin 23 October 1810   to Eduard Prinz von Lichnowsky
178. Berlin 24 November 1810   to Christian Freiherrn von Ompteda
179. Berlin 2 December 1810   to Christian Freiherrn von Ompteda
180. Berlin 3 December 1810   to Karl August Freiherrn von Hardenberg
181. Berlin 12 December 1810   to Georg Andreas Reimer
182. Berlin 13 December 1810   to Friedrich von Raumer
183. Berlin 15 December 1810   to Friedrich von Raumer
184. Berlin 15 December 1810   to Karl August Freiherrn von Hardenberg
185. Berlin 17 December 1810   to Wilhelm Römer
186. Berlin 1 January 1811    to Friedrich Schulz
187. Berlin 12 January 1811   to Georg Andreas Reimer
188. Berlin 30 January 1811   to Georg Andreas Reimer
189. Berlin 10 February 1811   to Georg Andreas Reimer
190. Berlin 13 February 1811   to Karl August Freiherrn von Hardenberg
191. Berlin 21 February 1811   to Friedrich von Raumer
192. Berlin 22 February 1811   to Karl August Freiherrn von Hardenberg
193. Berlin 22 February 1811   to Friedrich von Raumer
194. Berlin 26 February 1811   to Friedrich von Raumer
195. Berlin 10 March 1811    to Karl August Freiherrn von Hardenberg
196. Berlin 4 April 1811    to Friedrich von Raumer
197. Berlin 4 April 1811    to Karl August Freiherrn von Hardenberg
198. Berlin 23 April 1811    to Henriette Hendel-Schütz
199. Berlin 25 April 1811    to Friedrich de la Motte Fouqué
200. Berlin 26 April 1811    to Freidrich Karl Julius Schütz
201. Berlin 20 May 1811    to Wilelm Prinz von Preußen
202. Berlin 31 May 1811    to Georg Andreas Reimer
203. Berlin 6 June 1811    to Karl August Freiherrn von Hardenberg
204. Berlin 17 June 1811    to Friedrich Wilhelm III
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205. Berlin 21 June 1811    to Georg Andreas Reimer
206. Berlin 26 July 1811    to Georg Andreas Reimer
207. Berlin end July 1811    to Georg Andreas Reimer
208. Berlin July 1811    to Marie von Kleist
209. Berlin Summer 1811    to Achim von Arnim
210. Berlin Summer 1811    to Marie von Kleist
211. Berlin Summer 1811    to Marie von Kleist
212. Berlin Summer 1811    to Marie von Kleist
213. Berlin Summer 1811    to Ulrike von Kleist
214. Berlin 11 August 1811   to Friedrich de la Motte Fouqué
215. Berlin 17 September 1811   to Marie von Kleist
216. Frankfurt an der Oder 18 September 1811 to Ulrike von Kleist
217. Friedersdorf 18 September 1811  [Record] Aufzeichnung auf Gut Friedersdorf
218. Berlin 19 September 1811   to Karl August Freiherrn von Hardenberg
219. Berlin October 1811    to Sophie Sander
220. Berlin 16 October 1811   to Rahel Levin
221. Berlin 24 October 1811   to Rahel Levin
222. Berlin 10 November 1811   to Marie von Kleist
223. Berlin 19 November 1811    to Marie von Kleist
224. Berlin 20 November 1811   to Sophie Müller
225. Stimmings, bei Potsdam 21 November 1811 to Frau Manitius
226. Stimmings, bei Potsdam 21 November 1811 to Ulrike von Kleist
227. Stimmings, bei Potsdam 21 November 1811 to Marie von Kleist
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